

16 MAY 1991



# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

### ***Political Affairs***

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# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

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16 May 1991

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### Burlatskiy Renews Call for Direct Vote

91UN1416A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 17, 1 May 91 p 1

[Article by Fedor Burlatskiy: "A Bridge Across the Abyss"]

[Text] Two events of recent days will perhaps be the beginning of our long-suffering country's turn away from its rapid slide toward the abyss: the joint declaration of the USSR president and the leaders of the high state organs of the nine republics, and the vote at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee concerning the retirement of M.S. Gorbachev. While the former marked the long-awaited program of joint actions for emerging from the crisis, the latter signaled a crushing defeat for reaction, which was leading us to further destabilization and ultimately to the establishment of a dictatorship. It was this dictatorship I had in mind in my speech at the Fourth USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

The CPSU Central Committee plenum is important not so much for what it did as for what it rejected. And it rejected the bid to restore the power of the party apparatus. Under the conditions of pluralism of various movements both outside and inside the CPSU, this could only be a prologue to a military-party coup. The joint declaration of legally elected leaders of state power, adopted on the eve of the plenum, destroyed the house of cards built by the revisionists. Thirteen of the 349 participants in the plenum—such was the paltry harvest gathered by the leaders of the Russian Communist Party, Soyuz, and other organizations which, having raised an incredible ruckus, tried to give the impression that they were powerful. Of course, these forces must not be underestimated. We must fight actively against them. But there is no need to fear them, although their representatives parade around like rock stars in leather jackets and more and more frequently threaten the people with their fists from the screens of television sets.

It is deeply symptomatic that not long before this in a more difficult situation, at the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies, an attempt to deal a blow to B.N. Yeltsin was defeated. Politicians with common sense no longer allow themselves be carried away by Lebanese passions or allow force to be used to decide which religion is better—Christian or Mohammedan. There are legal forms for resolving problems of leadership. The elections of the RSFSR president are coming soon, and not long after that are the nationwide elections for the president of the country. And they will show what the people want, and not extremists from one region or another.

The direct and, one must assume, tough conversation between the country's leaders, which lasted 10 hours, ended with the development of a promising declaration. Constitutional procedure. An agreement among sovereign states. The fulfillment of the economic agreement of 1991. The food problem. Social protection from hunger and poverty caused by the price hikes.

For many months our newspaper has consistently spoken out in favor of dialogue and cooperation among M.S. Gorbachev, B.N. Yeltsin, L.M. Kravchuk, N.I. Dementey, N.A. Nazarbayev, and all leaders of the republics and the country, without giving in to the temptation to accumulate cheap capital by tearing apart one leader or another, since we consider it immoral to pour oil on the fire of a burning house.

Moreover, it is wrong to consider the activity of the present leaders according to old models of totalitarian power. That train has departed. There are no longer any all-powerful leaders who can turn the wheel of state control in "any direction their hearts desire."

Each of them is operating under strict limitations. Limits of resources—ruble, hard currency, raw material. Political limits—the distance between the powers of the center and the republics, the struggle of various forces and movements. Finally, limits on mentality—both of the people and of the elite. Of course, many serious mistakes were made during the period of perestroika. But the results of the activity of any leader in the center or the republics must be evaluated realistically, considering the possible alternative.

What is important in politics is not who goes but who comes. Representatives of Soyuz and certain other movements have already begun to name candidates of a "third force" which is to replace both Gorbachev and Yeltsin. I do not want to go through the names of the people, who possibly do not even know which roles have been assigned to them.

But who has proved that the new claimants will do a better job of steering our ship through the stormy sea of the crisis than our present leaders have done? We must not give in to the "crucify him" mentality. This has never led to anything good. There are reports about the "extreme confusion" the coordination council of Democratic Russia was subjected to by the report about B.N. Yeltsin's signing the "One-Plus-Nine" declaration. Are real democrats really confused by the fact that the position of uncompromising opposition between the two leaders, right down to the point of the defeat of both, is defended by the most reactionary forces of the Russian Communist Party?

I cannot help but note something else as well. Three years ago our newspaper suggested conducting nationwide elections for the parliament and the president. In my latest speeches in the USSR Supreme Soviet, I have constantly defended this position. I recall that one of the least informed deputies called me a "black cardinal," seeing in my suggestion a desire to please the leaders. But we put forth this idea as early as 1954 under Khrushchev when the new USSR Constitution was being developed. This deputy also did not think that the idea of presidential power would soon be supported by B.N. Yeltsin and the majority of leaders of republics, including those where noncommunist forces won.

A presidential parliamentary republic is the most suitable form for our country. In the first place, we need a symbol of power that would unite all peoples and the colossal territories of the Union and the republics. In the second place, we need a strong executive power that could carry out the tormenting transition from a totalitarian to a civilized society. Finally, this corresponds to our political culture which—whether we like it or not—is increasingly drawn to the personalization of power.

Now the gun hanging on the wall has finally been fired. The institution of the president has become an effective instrument for leadership of the country. Next to come, in my view, are two large constitutional reforms. First: We must transform the Council of the Federation from an organ of advisers under the president into an organ that makes binding decisions on fundamental strategic problems of domestic and foreign policy. At one time, this role was played by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and it is good that it no longer plays it. But we need a legitimized, legal organ that represents federative power and unites the interests of the republics. In the legislative sphere this will be the Soviet of Nationalities, and in the executive sphere—the Council of the Federation.

And second. It is extremely important to transform the USSR Supreme Soviet into a real parliament which holds firmly in its hands the legislative power and control over the budget and the general direction of policy and government. This will not happen immediately. But we must start thinking about it now, in order to avoid going too far in the direction of presidential power. Moreover, the main laws affecting the interests of the republics will have to be coordinated with it before hand. The procedure for adopting laws will, of course, be more cumbersome, but then the laws will be executed everywhere.

What will happen to the worker movement, which was drawn into the channel of political struggle and looked almost as threatening as it did on the eve of October 1917? I think it will acquire real goals, as is the case in all civilized countries. Above all, economic ones. Wages. Vacations. Food, industrial goods, and services. Independence of the enterprises. Participation in their management. As the economy is demonopolized and enterprises are turned over to the republics and privatized, the demands of the workers will be translated into concrete tasks for specific people—the administrations of the enterprises, the leaders of joint stock companies, or the local authorities on whom the solutions to the problems depend.

The most difficult problem that will be left to the cadres are the autonomous entities. Will they become subjects of the federation? Or will they be given some new and different status? Will they be represented in the Council of the Federation? This question is critical in Russia and in certain other republics. It is awaiting an answer. And the sooner we find an answer which will satisfy all the people the better. For otherwise we will again be faced

with conflicts which can burst out unexpectedly first in one place and then in another, destroying the bridge across the abyss which is being erected with such difficulty before our eyes.

And so the first step has been taken. But, as John Kennedy said during the Caribbean crisis, the first step is the most difficult. It closes the gap and stops the landslide. We shall wait for the next steps and follow them to the best of our strength and ability.

### **Poll Shows Support for Entry-Exit Law**

*91UN1418A Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 18, 29 Apr 91 p 3*

[Article by Liliya Kazakova, head of the Center for International, Sociological, and Marketing Research: "What Should the Entry-Exit Law Be? Results of a Public Opinion Poll"]

[Text] Between 2 March and 17 April the Center for International, Sociological, and Marketing Research conducted a nationwide poll on the issues of entering and exiting the country. The poll was conducted on a representative sample of 3,000 people. Of these, 56 refused to answer the questions. The remainder of the respondents participated very actively in the poll. Below are the results.

The overwhelming majority of respondents are seriously concerned with the delay in adopting the law on Soviet citizens' right to enter and exit the USSR. The opinion of 93.6 percent of respondents is that such a law must be urgently adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet and be in full compliance with international norms and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. At the same time, 88.2 percent believe that the law should not be of a declarative type.

An absolute majority of respondents (98.4 percent) believe that adoption of such a law is a necessary condition for creating a democratic "open" society and will make it possible to obtain most-favored-nation status in the United States and its economic help for the Soviet people, who are forced to live under conditions of acute shortages of food, consumer goods, and services.

The respondents also pointed out that the delay in adopting this law is a direct violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 13 on the freedom of movement)—this is the opinion of 70.5 percent.

Thus, 80.7 percent of respondents insist that travel on personal business should become the norm for Soviet citizens, while 98.5 percent believe that anybody in possession of hard currency should have an unimpeded right to travel abroad for business, creative, tourist, or any other purpose—as it is practiced in all civilized countries of the world. To achieve this, in the opinion of 98.4 percent, the cumbersome procedure of arranging any trip abroad needs to be abolished; each citizen (93.6 percent) should have an international passport without a time limit and with the right to keep it at home. Also,

87.8 percent of respondents believe that Soviet citizens should have unrestricted passports that do not require a visa and would allow them to travel abroad at any time.

What articles, in the respondents opinion, must be included in the law? First, it is necessary to stipulate the possibility of working abroad on a contract basis. This point was named by 73.8 percent of participating respondents. Second, an opportunity for family, individual, and mass (group) recreation and tourism abroad—82 percent believe that the state should develop recreation, travel, and tourism abroad for its citizens.

In the opinion of a large group of respondents (51.5 percent), in the environment of the shortage of medicines, worsening health care and increased illnesses, as well as the growing ecological imbalance, the state should care for its citizens—especially children—and assist them in obtaining medical care abroad.

This could be facilitated, in the opinion of 78.9 percent of respondents, by the use of hard currency reserves of the Children's Fund, the Fund for the Defense of Peace, the Fund for Benevolence and Health, and the Fund for the Survival of Humanity, which have been created with contributions from working people.

The law should include an article, 81.8 percent of respondents said, that will stipulate the training of cadres abroad, including the education of children and students and on-the-job-training, as well as articles that permit opening accounts abroad (57.94 percent), the purchase of real estate (16.39 percent), and payment of salaries partly in hard currency (83.9 percent) for travel abroad. Introduction of an article on "dual citizenship" was supported by 69.7 percent, and 51.73 percent would like to be able to go on religious pilgrimage to holy places—for instance, the Tomb of the Holy Sepulcher or ancient Muslim places of worship in Jerusalem.

Can freedom of movement bring about an explosion of emigration moods in the USSR? This question was also asked in the course of the poll.

The majority (78.8 percent) believe the answer is "no"; 20.1 percent have such misgivings; the rest refrained from answering.

The "no" answer is based on the people's sober assessment of their abilities, qualifications, the age barrier, and ability to compete in "foreign lands."

The opinion on the subject of a potential "brain drain" from the USSR was also divided: 41 percent believe it can happen unless decent conditions for creative people come into existence in the USSR. The majority, however, (57 percent) believe we are in no danger of a "brain drain" because of the language barrier, restrictions that affect immigrants in Western countries, and the lag in the professional level between our specialists and their foreign colleagues. Having visited abroad, Soviet citizens will be able to appraise their prospects realistically. This group of respondents believes that an opportunity to

work abroad on contract, on the other hand, and to obtain the necessary experience and qualifications will enhance patriotic feelings and a desire to help the fatherland.

Many respondents believe the draft law should also include articles dealing with the rights and duties of individuals temporarily residing in the USSR, and foreigners in general. More than one-third (39.7 percent) of respondents believe there should be restrictions on such individuals' taking goods and valuables out of the country, for emigrants leaving the USSR permanently, and for cooperatives and joint enterprises dealing with foreign partners. In this, 28.2 percent categorically support strict restrictions on the export of raw materials, household goods, valuables, and works of religious, cultural, or artistic significance, while 31.3 supported customs restrictions of a milder nature.

The fourth necessary condition the majority of respondents demand be taken into account in working out the draft law and adopting the law with an appropriate article is, in the opinion of the majority, the need for obtaining education abroad in colleges, universities, private schools, and state educational institutions in the countries of Western Europe and America. Many pointed out the current "elitist" approach to this issue (55 percent). The respondents offered various options for financing studies abroad: 29.1 percent—at the expense of the enterprise; 30.2 percent—at the expense of the state; 24.6 percent—at the individual's own expense; and 29 percent—at the expense of special funds, public organizations, etc.

**The conclusion drawn from the results of the entire poll is unequivocal: The law on entry-exit should be adopted as soon as possible. And in such a way that would not encroach on the rights of citizens, but would only regulate the migration in and out of the country. This needs to be supported by freely available hard currency exchange, an opportunity to buy tickets, and unrestricted passports that do not require a visa.**

#### **Nina Andreyeva Views Causes of Country's Economic, Political Crisis**

91UN1354A Minsk ZNAMYA YUNOSTI in Russian  
21 Feb 91 p 2

[Interview with Nina Aleksandrovna Andreyeva, chairman of the All-Union "Unity—For Leninism and Communist Ideals" Society, conducted by Robert Bayrashev, ASMO-Press Information Agency correspondent: "Nina Andreyeva: They Want To Lead Us Astray"]

[Text] *Nina Andreyeva is the chairman of the Leningrad Technological Institute, a candidate of technical sciences, chairman of the All-Union "Unity—For Leninism and Communist Ideals" Society and a CPSU member since 1966.*

*Following the publication of her much-publicized article "I Cannot Abandon My Principles" she has been visited at Petergof by over 100 Soviet and foreign correspondents, and Western television companies have already made tens of films about her.*

*Today we present to our readers a conversation between Nina Andreyeva and Robert Bayrashev, an ASMO-Press Information Agency correspondent.*

[Correspondent] Nina Aleksandrovna, the events presently occurring in the Union and, as we said until just recently, the countries of the socialist community are characterized by some as renewal, and by others as the natural decline of Marxist-Leninist ideology...

[Andreyeva] Marxism-Leninism, as a scientific proletarian ideology, is not something petrified, a fixed body of ideas handed down once and for all. It is a continuously developing and self-renewing doctrine which reflects changing reality. The dogmatists have latched onto individual quotes taken out of context and are following them to the letter; they are afraid to reject outdated statements and conclusions. In contrast to them the revisionists reject the classical essence of Marxism-Leninism, substituting for it a conglomeration of fashionable bourgeois ideas spruced up with Marxist terminology. But they are throwing the baby out with the bath water.

Some proponents of perestroika have "forgotten" that the essence of Marxism-Leninism is to provide a philosophical-sociological and political-economic foundation for the world history-making mission of the working class to build a society which does not know exploitation, oppression, war, violence or social injustice, a society in which the free development of each is a precondition for the development of all, where all is in the name of and for the benefit of the worker. Since private property is the source of exploitation and oppression, for Communists, beginning with Marx' and Engels' "Communist Manifesto," private property as a production tool has been incompatible with socialism, which is the first phase in such a society. The task of eliminating private property falls to the transition period from capitalism to socialism and a state of proletarian dictatorship; from the moment of its origin such a state bears the traits of socialist democracy and expresses the creative work of the people's masses. It is through a state of proletarian dictatorship that the working class asserts the leading socialist tendency.

The capitulation- and restoration-oriented tendencies in perestroika have reaffirmed that if a dictatorship of the proletariat is essential for the transition from capitalism to socialism, then rejection of socialism and a slide into capitalism is not possible without dictatorship by the neo-bourgeoisie in conjunction with the corrupt bureaucracy and the elite intelligentsia, which have brought about our transition to a presidency. A president was an urgent requirement of the "civilized cooperatives" and

the bigwigs of the shadow economy. Their dictatorship is incompatible with the slogan "All power to the soviets!"

The restorationists and revisionists have plainly confused the issue of what is Marxism-Leninism and what is socialism. Their volunteer aides from the social science departments are agonizing over the hundred-and-first definition of socialism while counterrevolution gathers momentum outside their windows. Opining that socialism is a system of civilized cooperatives, they not only reproduce Bukharin's view of Lenin's "political testament" and the role and place of the notes made shortly before his death, a view which has been rejected by history, they also distort Lenin's position. Firstly, Lenin was by no means referring to the present-day cooperatives, which serve as "laundries" for stolen money. Secondly, he envisioned a system which included public ownership of the means of production. Thirdly, this system would include victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie in the economy, politics and ideology.

[Correspondent] If I understand you correctly, you feel that reform processes in the Eastern European countries and the USSR are a temporary retreat from socialism, correct?

[Andreyeva] At this point it is hard to say whether they are a temporary retreat. I think that we are witnessing just the beginning of a counterrevolutionary drama. Right now power in the Eastern European countries is held by "centrists," as a rule of social-democratic orientation. Their position is unstable. Emerging chaos and anarchy could call forth a "firm hand." The most likely scenario would be one of a pro-fascist orientation. That is expected in Hungary, Poland and Romania. So the game is just beginning. The internal processes involved in capitalization of socialist relationships will probably result in a different correlation of forces. In short, measured against a broad historical scale the struggle in the socialist countries is not over, nor will it likely be over soon.

Unfortunately, in that struggle the USSR and the CPSU have taken by no means taken an internationalist stance in all cases. Thus far neither Gorbachev nor any other of our leaders has given a clear-cut class-oriented assessment of the events which are occurring. Many people are getting the impression that our participation in those events is on the side of reaction.

[Correspondent] Today this question arises more and more frequently: how could it have happened that a country as rich in natural resources as ours forces its people to live virtually in poverty and privation?

[Andreyeva] What is to blame is the gradual transition from a planned to a market economy which began in the 1960's. The negative effects of this turnaround began to be felt in the stagnation period of the 1970's and 1980's. The economy lost its former growth rate, elements of social tension emerged, there were breakdowns in the supply of food and essential goods, etc. During that same

period within the CPSU there was a gradual shift toward rightist opportunism, against which a sham struggle was waged. The flourishing of the "shadow" economy became a serious factor.

The essence of this about-face lay in the fact that the economy began to be directed not toward meeting the people's needs or creating consumption value, but instead toward value as such, toward profits and increased expenditures. It became advantageous to increase costs, not decrease them, and to squander public property. The inflationary increase in profits resulted in a smaller role for actual wages and reduced the buying power of the ruble. That widened the gap between the rich and the poor. The "shadow" bourgeoisie was legalized as private capital, recruiting speculators, buyers, brokers and corrupt elements in the state, commercial and party apparatus. It also succeeded in turning the working people's justified dissatisfaction against the CPSU and the Soviet State.

To put it briefly, it is our homegrown bourgeoisie, which has now emerged, grown and been constituted as a class, that is responsible for the crisis and the decline in working people's standard of living; right now with the aid of revisionists and renegades in the CPSU leadership the neo-bourgeoisie is disorganizing the party and the working masses. Its goal is to do away with the entire socialist system, not just the deformations in socialism, replacing it with a system of pre-monopoly capitalism, i.e. to go back to the beginning of the 19th century.

[Correspondent] You are known as an opponent of market relationships. Why do you not accept that economic strategy?

[Andreyeva] A market economy will solve the problem of saturating the market by lowering working people's purchasing power. In Poland people are already reduced to going to the store and buying a single egg; in Hungary there has been a sharp drop in the public's food consumption. Yet "the market is being saturated"; everything is available in stores, but no one can buy things except the speculators and the new bourgeoisie. We can expect the same thing. Of course, in our country prices will not rise by factors of 10, as in Poland, but they will definitely rise by factors of two or three. Instead of opposing the introduction of a market economy the trade unions are coming up with "social shock absorbers" so that the "shock" will not be too great.

The most important thing to remember is that the market economy means restoration of a capital market and a labor market, i.e. the omnipotence of wealth and oppression of the worker.

[Correspondent] Where will we get the funds to break out of our impoverished condition?

[Andreyeva] In five years of perestroika our country has suffered greater financial and material losses than in the four years of the Patriotic War. And continues to suffer them. The funds are mainly being shifted to the pockets

of our homegrown bourgeoisie, the cooperative *nouveau riches* and even their foreign colleagues. I feel that it would be appropriate to conduct an exchange of banknotes with no restriction on the sum thereof upon presentation of a declaration of income starting at R10,000 [rubles], halt the payment of interest on savings accounts over R10,000, and levy a progressive tax on inheritances of R20,000 or more. These measures will disrupt the circulation of the shadow economy and the process by which social parasites grow rich. On the other hand, it will also yield hundreds of millions of rubles for the scientific and technical refitting of industry, transportation and agriculture.

[Correspondent] Ethnic problems are also closely interwoven with economic problems...

[Andreyeva] Naturally. The ethnic crisis is deepest in the Transcaucasus, Central Asia and the Baltic republics because it is connected with the rapid growth of neo-bourgeois elements and an increase in the number of speculators, persons of narrow, parochial views, con artists and underground millionaires. Even back in the 1970's Soviets who visited those republics said there was "no soviet power" there. To this new economic power, this newborn exploiter class, if you will, socialism is an obstacle on the path to its greedy desires, its striving for wealth. That is the soil in which interethnic tension grows. Economically reinforced anti-socialist forces have transformed national egoism into militant nationalism with its notion of ethnic exclusiveness, into separatism and centrifugal tendencies.

I think that regional cost accounting and self-financing in combination with efforts to undermine the foreign trade monopoly will cause our country not only interethnic conflicts, but interregional conflicts as well. Provincialism is already flourishing.

[Correspondent] Will it be possible to maintain relative calm with regard to interethnic issues in Russia?

[Andreyeva] Things will remain calm in Russia if it rejects the idea of a market economy and the transformation of our country into a semi-colony supplying raw materials to imperialist plunderers. Otherwise the same process will occur in autonomous republics and okrugs as in the union republics.

[Correspondent] Some press organs have written with alarm about increasing anti-Semitism in our country and the possibility of pogroms against the Jews. Do you share that concern, or do you feel that it is groundless?

[Andreyeva] The increase in anti-Semitism is prompted by the growth of Zionism. It is the Zionists who are circulating rumors of pogroms. Nowadays it is dangerous to take an anti-Zionist stance, as one will immediately be labeled an anti-Semite. I regard Zionism as the most dangerous form of nationalism and chauvinism. Some prestigious professions in our country have become Jewish professions. In view of that it is a pure provocation to raise a hue and cry about our alleged persecution

of Jews. The Zionists are also engaging in that sort of provocation. As an extreme form of nationalism, Zionism is dangerous because it is not localized in one region or political structure. It permeates all of society, spreading the poison of Russophobia.

However, though all Zionists are Jews, not all Jews are Zionists. It is the Jews themselves who suffer the most from Zionism, who are being turned into emigrants without adequate reason. The present hubbub being raised by the Zionists about possible pogroms as being used as pharisee-like evidence that Jews are a persecuted people in the USSR. Therefore when they emigrate from the Union they attempt to obtain the status of political refugees, i.e. to receive financial assistance.

[Correspondent] Nina Aleksandrovna, our society is becoming more and more cruel and crime is on the rise, particularly among young people. Where do the roots of this ill lie?

[Andreyeva] The rise in cruelty and crime in recent years is due, in my opinion, to causes rooted in the economic policy being introduced, a policy which has created a thirst for wealth, greed and indifference to one's neighbor. A certain role has also been played by mass culture with its brutality, its cult of force and its idea of a superman who is allowed to do anything, its moral impurity and ideological squalor. We are witnessing a process of deliberate corruption of young people.

[Correspondent] What is your attitude toward the beauty contests which have now become commonplace?

[Andreyeva] I have a very negative attitude toward beauty contests. These events teach the fair half of humanity to evaluate itself only in terms of purely superficial attractiveness, and in the final analysis of sexual attractiveness. On the one hand this makes a woman regard herself as a commodity which must be used as soon as possible while one is young, and on the other hand this is a clear undervaluation of the meaningful, spiritual aspect of the feminine personality.

Generally speaking "beauty contests" are a natural phenomenon at a period when socialist society—though everyone is shouting about greater morality—is being driven toward the abyss of moral decadence, toward drug addiction and prostitution. Note that it has become futile to struggle against pornography in our country. For example, after smut had started oozing off of videotheque screens the Leningrad Gorispolkom passed a resolution banning the showing of pornographic films. That ban was only in effect for a few weeks, and then everything went back to the way it was before. I think that the reason for this is not just the substantial profits made by those rent this sort of material or a newly-awakened interests in "forbidden fruit"; the reason lies much deeper. Does not all this serve as a means of distracting ordinary people from the problems of Gorbachev's perestroika? To whose advantage is that? It is to the advantage of those who want to see today's consumers of pornographic films become a commodity

on the hired labor market instead of individuals striving to develop their personalities. That commodity is easier to handle; it is being prepared in advance under the camouflage of slogans about spirituality, morality, charity and liberation of the individual.

[Correspondent] In your opinion what were the most important events of the past year?

[Andreyeva] I think that the most sinister "milestone" of the past year was the swallowing up of the GDR by the Federal Republic of Germany; in my opinion this not only had unpleasant effects of a political, economic and strategic nature for our country, it also marked the beginning of a countdown in preparation for the next war in Europe. It is clear that a united Germany, after changing its present government, will demand a return to the 1937 boundaries of Hitler's Reich. And perhaps it will demand more serious territorial changes in Europe.

Within our country I feel that the most threatening change in our state's political system was the introduction of a presidency. Presidential power means the beginning of the end of soviets' power and de-sovietization of socialism's political superstructure. Is it not amazing how our General Secretary can convince himself that he is still a follower of Lenin?

Among the positive events of the past year I would list certain steps in the direction of arms reductions on the basis of a mutual agreement. Most important of all was the appearance, after a period of shock, of a number of Marxist-Leninist parties in European countries such as Italy, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and several other states. Their straightforward, anti-opportunistic orientation and militancy are delightful. In our country the formation of an RSFSR Communist Party and the withdrawal of ardent anti-communists, neo-Mensheviks and pseudo-democrats from the CPSU was of great significance.

[Correspondent] Nina Aleksandrovna, today many people are familiar with your political views, yet little is known about you personally.

[Andreyeva] I was born in Leningrad in 1938. I was baptized in the Church of St. Nicholas. My parents were believers, peasants from the vicinity of Tver; the famine of 1929 caused them to leave Seliger, where all my ancestors had lived. My mother became a fitter at the Kirov Plant and worked there until she retired, working as long as she possibly could. My father worked as a stevedore in Leningrad's port. We lived at 77 Fontanka. Just a few steps from the Great Drama Theater, whose repertoire I knew by heart. There were five children in our family. My father was killed near Leningrad in 1941. In 1943 my older sister died in the battle for the Donetsk Basin. My older brother was crippled during the taking of Berlin and later died of his wounds...

I graduated as a gold medalist from Leningrad School #322. Later I graduated with a "red diploma" from a technological institute, where I was invited to stay on

and work. Then I wrote and defended my candidate of science dissertation. The same year I was defending my dissertation I married Vladimir Ivanovich Klushin, a candidate of sciences and veteran of the Great Patriotic War. I have a daughter named Svetlana and a grandson named Vitaliy; he was named in honor of Vitaliy Bonivur...

[Correspondent] Which qualities do you most admire in people? Which qualities do you find unacceptable?

[Andreyeva] I admire devotion to the cause of the October Revolution, firm belief in the historical correctness of those who built and defended the first workers' and peasants' state in the world, will and intellect, honesty and decency, and the ability to put one's shoulder to the common hard task. I cannot tolerate careerism, double-dealing, indifference, irresponsibility, demagoguery and many other things.

[Correspondent] The book currently on your table?

[Andreyeva] A novel/essay by Vladimir Chivilikhin entitled "Pamyat" [Memory]. And political literature: the collected speeches of Fidel Castro.

[Correspondent] Are you a happy person?

[Andreyeva] Yes, I am a happy person, because I love my cause, I enjoy my work with my students and an atmosphere of mutual understanding and mutual respect prevails in my family.

### Effectiveness of Opposition-Controlled Soviets Questioned

91UN1335A Moscow GLASNOST in Russian No 9,  
28 Feb 91 p 6

[Article by V. Tsybul'skiy, abridged from KARETNYY RYAD: "Fruitless Efforts of the Love for Democracy"]

[Text] An article under this title was recently published by the small-circulation Moscow newspaper KARETNYY RYAD. We offer readers an abridged version.

...No power structure in the country in recent decades has had such a credit of trust, perhaps, as the new democratic soviets. Despite the fact that since the elections the situation has become increasingly worse, the inhabitants of the cities of victorious democracy have stubbornly defended the representatives of the new authorities against the attacks of conservative newspapers and have continued to look for culprits among the bureaucracy, the Communists, and the mafia. This position has been occupied by all in any way authoritative, progressive journalists, avoiding recognition of the mistakes of the new authorities and criticism of their representatives. It was the absence in the democratic papers, it would seem, of constructive criticism of the first steps of the new soviets which prolonged and intensified their inevitable crisis.

The inhabitants of the cities have seen that life there is slipping out of control, but instead of serious explanations of the reasons for what is happening, they have been reading in the radical press rebukes of the partocracy.... While prepared last fall even to pass under the nightsticks of the militia to defend the democratic authorities, by the new year Muscovites and Leningraders, tired of looking at empty shelves, began to openly abuse these authorities.

It was at this time that the leaders of the municipal democracies began to talk about the premature nature for us of democracy as such and about strengthening the executive and the benefits of humane authoritarianism. Sobchak and Popov wearily brushed aside their former associates in the soviets, convinced that, whatever the deputies might say, merely nonsense would necessarily issue forth. But following the orgy of democracy it was also hard to believe in their own capacity for bringing order to bear with the aid of dictatorship. It has become obvious that the present authorities are authorities of a transitional period, and their sole opportunity to not cause the country even greater damage is to find fitting hands into which their power may be transferred.

Why has everything turned out this way? Why have intelligent and conscientious people who evoke the trust of the majority been unable to halt the impending catastrophe? Why under intelligent and conscientious people is our life worse than under dishonest fools? What is wrong? Or is it that there have not been enough intelligent and conscientious people on this occasion either? Or, perhaps, that there are questions concerning their professionalism and competence also?

The revolution of the spring of 1990 was not, in fact, an uprising of professional managers against the incompetence of the official party appointees. It was a revolution of new, spontaneous and, perhaps, gifted politicians. But what, if you will excuse the expression, has management got to do with this? How much do Stankevich, Zaslavskiy, and Afanasyev understand of it?

Since the democrats of the 1990's have not been and have not considered themselves managers but have called themselves politicians, they should have operated by political methods. And this means, having agreed on strategy and tactics, primarily gaining control of the administrative system, finding in it sympathizers, encouraging those who are working honestly, and gradually ridding themselves of manifestly corrupt functionaries. In parallel with mastery of the administrative system the new economic relations should have been afforded the maximum freedom in order to ease their dependence on the old municipal administrations. Judging by the democratic leaders' latest statements, this is how they finally intend to act. But is it not too late?

There are questions primarily concerning the possibility of agreement with regard to strategy and tactics in the camp of the so-called democratic deputies. The corps of deputies of all levels took shape under the conditions of



a one-party totalitarian system, when the majority of serious, thinking, and sober-minded people simply did not believe in the possibility of civilized political activity in the country. Some of them risked running for people's deputy of the USSR, for all that. Fewer of them remained by the time of the elections to the Russian Congress. And at the time of the formation of the local authorities only a few Union democratic deputies who had decided entirely speculatively to undertake a change in the political structures from below represented the thin stratum of reasonable politicians.

The basis of the democratic factions in the local soviets, however, whose effectiveness today as structures of power is giving rise to perfectly justified doubts, was composed of so-called "informals." In the absence of a real political opposition the corps of deputies in opposition to the former regime could only have been formed from people who were members of the opposition not by political conviction but in spirit. From the ranks of those who in the newspapers of stagnation times were called lovers of truth, but among one's closest colleagues were called whiners, sensation-seekers, and uncontrollable individuals. From the ranks of those who by nature are incapable of any activity and who have been accustomed to explaining this incapacity of theirs for work by persecution, reprisals for criticism, the vengeance of the authorities....

The appearance of even one such individual can paralyze the work of a whole outfit. In our local soviets, however, you will discover dozens of them. Blocking one another in the soviets, and all together, the executive, they have paralyzed the system of administration from top to bottom. Together with the slowness of the leaders of the democratic soviets toward commissioning alternative economic forms of management (in Moscow it took Popov, who has said so much about such forms, three months of empty shelves and the protests of KOMSO-MOLSKAYA PRAVDA for him to earmark just 300 (!) stores for the sale of meat at contracted prices)—all this leaves very dim prospects for the present democratic soviets.

What will come to replace them? Having joined forces with the communist factions and having proposed an alliance to sober-minded democrats, the executive committees will most likely quite quickly restore locally the former administrative procedure, but they also will hardly achieve the former, albeit dubious, successes in distribution given the present crisis.

Our well-being depends today on the possibility of a positive answer to a number of questions.

Will this new bloc be strong enough to deprive the anarchic deputies of power? Will the communist part of the bloc be able to abandon ideological prejudices and understand that without privatization, private property and the market even the ideally adjusted system of management on the old model (raykom [rayon committee]-ispolkom [executive committee]-party committee) would lead to even more appalling chaos and decline? Will the sober-minded deputies have sufficient sobriety to not reach for the microphone each time they hear the word "communist"?

So many questions. But we still want to live a human life.

### January Poll Shows Declining Popularity of Democratic Groups

91UN1382A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 16 Feb 91 p 2

[Article by Leontiy Byzoyev: "Democracy Is Losing Popularity: A Shift of Public Opinion in Moscow"]

#### [Text] Survey

In mid-January—at the height of the events in the Baltic—a regular telephone survey of Muscovites of a random representative sample (908 persons surveyed) was conducted by the sociological group for the study of public opinion of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

The survey showed:

- The growing dissatisfaction of the population with the democrats, who have not been able to halt the deterioration of the situation in the country;
- a reduction in the ratings of all leading figures, including the recent idols;
- deep disappointment with the activity of the parties and movements that recently developed;
- appearance of a significant social basis for the possible establishment of an authoritarian regime.

If the past year and the beginning of the present one brought to the political horizon a large number of new names, already beginning with the summer a process of the sharp reduction of the "list" of persons regarded in the public conscience as promising political leaders has been taking place. Actually only two politically significant figures have retained authority: Yeltsin and Gorbachev.

"White List" (Most Respected Authoritative Political Leaders) (in Percent)

August 1990		November 1990		January 1991	
Yeltsin	36.8	Yeltsin	49.7	Yeltsin	17.4
Sobchak	13.2	Sobchak	4.8	Sobchak	4.2
Popov	9.6	Gorbachev	3.9	Shevardnadze	3.7



**"White List" (Most Respected Authoritative Political Leaders) (in Percent) (Continued)**

August 1990		November 1990		January 1991	
Gorbachev	7.4	Popov	2.8	Travkin	3.5
Stankevich	5.9	Travkin	0.8	Popov	1.2
Travkin	1.8	Stankevich	0.7	Yavlinskiy	0.8
Kalugin	0.6	Volkogonov	0.4	Stankevich	0.7
Afanasyev	0.6	Kalugin	0.4	Bakatin	0.4
Shevardnadze	0.4	Bocharov	0.3	Fedorova	0.3

The popularity of Yeltsin went through three stages. The first—dismissal from the post of first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom of the CPSU, the second—election as deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the third—election as chairman of the Russian parliament. In the intervals between these events, the rating of Yeltsin fell perceptibly. The current fall, of course, may be in part connected with the anti-Yeltsin campaign apropos of his position in the Baltic crisis. But, in our view, the reasons are more profound. In the fall he promised "an improvement of the life of the population", and the intensifying

economic crisis, irrespective of the concrete responsibility of the Russian leadership for it, strikes strongly at the prestige of Yeltsin.

In the conditions of a crisis, the people without fail has a need to accuse somebody. Beginning with the year 1988, such a lot befell Ligachev, then (in the fall of 1990) Polozkov and Ryzhkov in turn were in this role. Today there is no other serious object for hatred than Gorbachev himself.

**"Black List" (The Least Respected Political Leaders) (in percent)**

August 1990		November 1990		January 1991	
Ligachev	26.3	Ryzhkov	15.1	Gorbachev	11.2
Polozkov	20.2	Polozkov	7.9	Polozkov	5.1
Ryzhkov	8.1	Ligachev	3.7	Yazov	2.9
Lukyanov	4.0	Yazov	1.8	Alksnis	1.2
Yazov	1.9	Lukyanov	1.1	Yanayev	1.1

The rating survey as a whole confirms the conclusions that have been drawn. There was a sharp decline in the ratings of Yeltsin, Popov, Stankevich, Travkin, and other "inter-regionalists." The Moscow rating of Gorbachev also fell significantly (in out-of-the-way places it fell even more). Shevardnadze, who has partly already become a living legend, has the highest rating. The "new democrats", such as Oleg Rummyantsev and Sergey Shakh-ray, who were late when "the pie was divided" in 1989, cannot, after all, acquire a reputation and popularity because of the reduction in interest of Muscovites

in politics in general. Workers, who vacillated for a certain time, who almost followed the "democrats of the Inter-Regional Movement", have appreciably inclined to the right, that is in favor of the authoritarian trend. However, the "rightist" leaders (in particular those connected with the partocracy), also collect very few points. The situation appears to be very dangerous: The first contender for the role of national leader who is able to break through the shroud of public indifference, proves to be practically outside the competition. The people is waiting for the Messiah!

**Ratings of the Leading Political Figures of the Country (on a 5-Point Scale)**

	Nov 89	Apr 90	May 90	Aug 90	Nov 90	Jan 91
Shevardnadze	—	—	—	3.61	—	3.81
Sobchak	3.84	4.06	4.21	3.88	3.65	3.42
Yeltsin	3.57	3.68	3.93	4.04	4.10	3.39
Shatalin	—	—	3.31	—	3.37	3.22
Bakatin	—	—	—	—	—	3.21
Silayev	—	—	—	3.11	3.08	3.20
Yavlinskiy	—	—	—	—	—	3.20
Stankevich	3.60	3.85	4.02	3.70	3.41	3.20
Khasbulatov	—	—	—	—	—	3.19

Ratings of the Leading Political Figures of the Country (on a 5-Point Scale) (Continued)

	Nov 89	Apr 90	May 90	Aug 90	Nov 90	Jan 91
Popov	3.60	3.67	3.86	3.71	3.31	3.15
Shakhray	—	—	—	—	—	3.10
Gdlyan	3.56	3.71	3.65	3.33	3.22	3.07
Travkin	—	—	3.89	3.53	3.16	3.00
Obolenskiy	—	—	—	3.31	—	2.99
Gorbachev	3.84	3.99	3.59	3.47	3.28	2.98
Kalugin	—	—	—	3.36	3.11	2.97
Rumyantsev	—	—	—	—	2.89	2.94
Zaslavskaya	—	—	—	—	—	2.89
Yanaev	—	—	—	—	—	2.83
Primakov	—	—	—	—	—	2.77
Alksnis	—	—	—	—	—	2.74
Polozkov	—	—	—	2.34	2.35	2.37

Who Would Be the Best President of the Country?  
(in percent)

	November 1990	January 1991
Yeltsin	33	19
Gorbachev	26	19
Sobchak	4	4

There are no contenders even for the highest posts in the country, besides the same Gorbachev and Yeltsin.

Fifty-three percent of those surveyed declared that they do not see a single suitable figure for the post of president of the country. In this connection, even the chances of Yeltsin for success in the case of presidential elections in Russia in the spring become problematical. Now he might still come through. But it is very likely that his stock, too, will fall.

As far as confidence in Gorbachev as president is concerned, in the case of the referendum 34 percent expressed their readiness to support him and 48 percent—to reject him.

The growing crisis of democracy also well demonstrates the deep disappointment in the activity of both the new and the old parties and movements.

Support of the Parties and Movements in Alternative Elections (in percent)

	August 1990	November 1990	January 1991
1. CPSU	13	13	26
2. RSFSR CP	6	6	5
3. Democratic Platform (republic)	19	12	1

4. Social Democratic Party of Russia [SDPR]	14	9	4
5. Democratic Party of Russia [DPR]	21	17	15
6. Christian Democrats	3	2	3
7. Pamyat	1	1	1
8. Liberal Democratic Party	—	—	—
9. Monarchists	—	—	—

Support for the CPSU has doubled. Besides general reasons, this has also been called forth by the lack of success of the Democratic Platform, which hastened to break with the CPSU. The authority of the DPR is decreasing (together with the rating of Travkin), but is still relatively high.

Society stands at the very edge of the "abyss" of authoritarianism and on the whole (a significant part of it) is ready to throw itself into it.

	November 1990	January 1991	Including among:	
			Workers	Intelligentsia
1. Should continue along the path of democracy and glasnost	68	51	41	61
2. Should quickly establish order, having halted democracy and glasnost	20	39	45	35

The most serious economic crisis, which began in May of the past year, is still only gathering force, and it is precisely this factor which determines the political consciousness of today. The time of democracy, including in the form in which it exists today, it seems, is running out.

### Gulf War Lessons for World Stability

91UF0718A Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian  
No 15, Apr 91, No 16, Apr 91

[Article in two installments by Andrey Kozyrev, RSFSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, under rubric "New Way of Thinking": "Toward Parity in Common Sense"]

[No 15, pp 26-28]

[Text] After the war in the Persian Gulf, we are carefully rethinking the priorities of Soviet foreign policy and the new world order.

The aggression of one Arab country against another, rather than their common action against "imperialism," has placed in doubt simultaneously both the confrontational scheme of "us and the Third World against the West," and the conflict-free Utopia of achieving, practically within the confines of the decade, a nuclear-free, nonviolent demilitarized world.

### The War Is Over, But the Battle Continues

Both types of mental processes are a form of social dependency for one and the same totalitarian system. One type helped that system to justify the reinforcement of its positions within and expansionism without. The other helped to cast off part of the load that was beyond the capabilities of the country's economy, without affecting, essentially speaking, the position of the most conservative circles.

Discussions of the priority of the universal human values are too abstract (since there has not been any precise definition of what concretely constitutes those values, except perhaps for the most general concepts of global survival) to lead to a profound re-examination of practical policy. Moreover, the concept of priority leaves one the freedom to preach a completely different (and, in essence, old) faith in concrete circumstances. This largely explains why the revolutions in East Europe that occurred against the background of the unceasing assurances of the attempt to reinforce the socialist community are frequently perceived as a forced loss or a direct miscalculation. Today many people view the defeat of the Iraqi regime in the same light.

Consequently, it is necessary to return to common sense, that allows us to see ourselves and the world around us in the most realistic key, and to give priority to the interests of the survival of the peoples of Russia and the Union as a whole. And so it is in this regard that the crisis in the Persian Gulf provides much that is instructional.

First, the world community consists of national states that are pursuing their own interests, which are at times

in conflict with other interests. The growing interdependency by no means frees a state of the necessity to defend those interests, but requires that state to reinterpret them with a consideration of the changes in the international political environment. Secondly, even the most genuine declarations of a striving for a better world do not replace the necessity to observe the standards of international law. This makes it necessary for us, when encouraging this action on the part of other participants in international intercourse not only in words, but also in deeds, to link our own interests with the force of law, instead of the law of force. Thirdly, it has been confirmed that the countries that are inclined to the greatest degree toward international law and order are the developed countries with pluralistic democracy and a market economy, and those that are least inclined are the countries with authoritarian regimes. Whereas for the former the "life environment" is the observance of the rules that guarantee the freedom of enterprise and trade, for the latter it is the limitlessness of power.

And, finally, it has become clear that whereas the Cold War has ended, the worldwide struggle for democracy, human rights, and nonviolence—those genuinely universal human values—is continuing. Its successes will continue to be made up of the victories of "local significance" in individual regions and countries. And the factor that will be of decisive importance for the common course of affairs will be the direction in which the processes will develop on the one-sixth of the world's land that is called the USSR.

### The American Threat Once Again?

It would seem that our protectors of the system would like to make the new relations between the USSR and the United States, and between the USSR and the West as a whole, the victim of the "war in the desert." They have realized that it was a crude mistake to assume that it is possible to lose the freedom of choice abroad without taking a fatal risk within the country. They realized that it is impossible to betray our ideological partners and friends abroad without betraying, in the final analysis, ourselves. Therefore it is very important for our "protectors" not to allow the "trench psychology" to disappear.

For those whose dogmatism led a very rich Eurasian power to the level of the poorly developed countries of Asia and Africa with regard to the quality of life and the environment and who continue today to be obsessed by the idea of parity in strategic armaments and spheres of influence in various parts of the world, including the Middle East, the defeat of the Iraqi army, and, most importantly, the undermining of the position of the militant leaders of that country, is a seriously unpleasant situation. But paradoxically the defeat of Saddam Hussein, all things considered, has inspired those circles. They find in the very fact of the defeat of Iraq a confirmation of their thesis concerning the existence in the world of aggressive forces. However, at such time they attempt to replace of the source of the threat,

putting in the place of the authoritarian regimes in the Third World the "traditional enemy" in the person of the United States. Concealed behind this is the neoconfrontational ideology that attempts, both in foreign policy and in domestic policy, to substantiate by new arguments the necessity to preserve the old schemes.

The favorite thesis of this kind is the assertion that the defeat of Iraqi aggression will lead to a dangerous intensification of the United States. Well, the fact of the increase in the role played by the United States is already discernible. But does that mean that the threat to peace is increasing? Definitely not.

First, the fear of the diktat of the United States even previously was dispelled by our own imagination. Let us look back, but not at the ideologized interpretation from the textbooks on the history of the CPSU. Instead, let us look at the genuine results of postwar development. It was by no means in all instances that the participation of the United States, say, in European affairs or even its military presence was undesirable for us or for other nations. Unlike our allies in eastern Europe, the friends of the United States in the western part of the continent have definitely not been rushing to break the ties that bind them. Also, the standard of living and of competitiveness that has been achieved by them scarcely provides justification for speaking about haplessness. We ourselves are turning to those countries today for help, credit, and technology.

Secondly, there is no need to speak about any Pax Americana in the multipolar structure of the contemporary world community. It was not from American bases that the aggression in the Persian Gulf was begun. On the contrary, without their existence the repelling of that act of brigandage would possibly have been seriously hindered. Incidentally, it is a pity that most of our politicians were unable to find a good word to address to those Americans and other soldiers in the coalition who placed their lives on the altar of defending the peace. If we have a self-interest not in inciting passions, not in new foreign adventures—and the persons who harbor those passions and adventures, judging by their sympathies to Saddam Hussein, have by no means become extinct—then it would be desirable to take a more carefully weighed approach both to the deadlines and to the scale of the presence in the postconflict zone of contingents of American and other coalition forces, and especially the naval forces.

#### And the Minimum Losses

The crisis in the Persian Gulf is also extremely instructional from the military-technical point of view. One can only hail the fact that our generals this time are not attempting to create the impression of complete calm and are speaking outright about the advantages of the advanced military technology that were demonstrated by the American army. Of course, it would also be a good idea for us to modernize our arsenal. But, nevertheless, a

conclusion in favor of the further indiscriminate competition in the quantity, or now even the quality, of military arsenals would be a strategic miscalculation. Today, giving in to the paranoid striving to have parity with the Americans in the entire range of arms, and also in all the parts of the world, inevitably means the catastrophic and, most importantly, unjustified exhausting of our own economy. It is unjustified because American weaponry, in and of itself, does not represent any threat to the USSR. That must be stated outright and in definite terms.

The United States defeated the Iraqi military machine while inflicting casualties among the civilian population that were minimal when judged from the point of view of the broad scope of the conflict. The United States used its technological superiority to keep its own losses at the minimum. But, unlike Baghdad, the United States did not threaten to use mass-destruction weapons. Moreover, from the very first day of the war, it officially excluded that possibility. Unlike the aggressor, it did not violate other standards of international law, including those pertaining to the seizure of hostages from among the foreign citizens and diplomatic personnel. And if Saddam Hussein miscalculated with respect to the power available to those who would oppose him, that can scarcely grieve his protectors and fellow-thinkers.

It is practically inconceivable today to imagine that the Americans will attack us. They simply have no reason to do so. We are guaranteed against attack also by our abundant arsenal of nuclear-missile weaponry. But even a smaller number of nuclear warheads would provide a practically unlimited assurance that no one will make any encroachments on the Soviet borders. However, the lessons from the experience of the war in the Gulf from the point of view of the security and the future of the Soviet Union that must be learned are nevertheless extremely stern. Our technological backwardness, which was discernible even previously, is taking on a strategic nature. However we attempt to make the military-industrial complex a state within a state, the increasing gap in the area of overall economic development inevitably makes itself known also in the military sphere.

Let's be frank: that gap definitely was not formed during the last year or year and a half, when the democratic forces came to nominal power in certain cities and republics of the Union, or even during that brief period when glasnost and democratization began to develop. Let's not deceive ourselves with the illusion that a return to the "order and legality" of the Stalin-Brezhnev type will enable us to resolve that problem. Whereas industrialization could be carried out by extensive methods at the expense of the supercentralization of resources and according to a single will, computerization can be guaranteed only by an economic system that is based on the freedom of creativity and enterprise, with a sufficiently high level of development of the sphere of services and consumption. Even a semistarved convict can push a wheelbarrow, but the only person who can resolve on a

computer the questions of modern scientific-technical and economic progress is one who is sufficiently provided for and emancipated.

The ideologized state and party fervor of our military-economic nomenclatura do not leave them any chance of producing from among themselves even a Pinochet-type reformer. But strong power when conducting radical reforms is needed. It can be provided by an alliance between the Russian president who has been elected by the nation and the president of the USSR and the segment of the bureaucracy, the military, and the civilian professionals that is capable of reformation.

The person who today will be a patriot in our country is not the one who demands the modernization of armaments and the conservation of the supercentralized power at any price, but the one who will find the boldness to carry out a gradual but profound military reform that reinforces the army and protects it against any ideological blinkers or police-type functions that are not inherent in it. The one who will channel more funds into the peacetime economy, who will defend the young democracy, and who will take steps to enter the world economy on market principles. It is only by shifting the center of gravity of our efforts toward the achievement of parity with the advanced countries in the standard of living and in the quality of the economy that we will be able to count on both our reliable security and our role as a great power.

#### New Appeals for Security

It is necessary to think carefully about how the world will change after the "desert storm," while neither becoming euphoric in the spirit of the arguments that are so close to our own concerning the advent of a new era in international relations, nor intimidating ourselves by the old nightmares of American domination. What requires attention first of all is the Third World, where there continues to be an extremely large potential for instability, religious or other fanaticism, and contempt for democracy or other universally human values. We shall also have to learn how to construct our relations with that world on the basis of mutual economic benefit, rather than massive arms shipments.

Concern for security requires the switching of our attention to the areas of instability on the perimeter of the southern boundaries of the Soviet Union and Western Asia. The problem lies not so much in the fact that American bases are located in this region, as in the fact that there is a continuing arms race there between the powers that are laying claim to regional hegemony.

Even more dangerous is the fact that, by inertia, we divide those countries into pro-Western and progressive, rather than into those that more or less strive to provide themselves with mass-destruction weapons and means of delivering them. One still observes the operation of the reflex to reinforce intergovernmental relations at the expense of shipments of arms, including modern aircraft and missiles, in order to prevent friendly regimes from

going over to the "other" side. Are we really to believe that the history with Iraq will not teach us anything? Because its missiles were completely capable of carrying chemical charges, thus sharply lowering the threshold beyond which a local war could develop into a conflict with the application of the entire arsenal of mass-destruction weapons.

This leads us to the idea of the need not for confrontation with the West and competition in the rendering of military services to regional clients, but rather for close and efficient cooperation with the West in the interests of reinforcing the system of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, of banning chemical arms, and of preventing the creeping of military missiles and missile technology, or, incidentally, other more improved means of conducting warfare. But it is necessary to begin with a critical re-evaluation of our own practice. In the final analysis we are probably one of the most self-interested sides, inasmuch as it is precisely in our direction that the radioactive clouds will move in the event of the tragic development of events in any future conflict.

Incidentally, we have still not achieved a situation in which our parliamentarians or our public have a level of information that is comparable even to the slightest extent with the American level with regard to where our aircraft, tanks, and even missiles, of which kinds, and under which conditions, are being exported. It would be desirable for the bloody lesson of the war in the Persian Gulf to have a sobering effect upon us also in this regard. How, actually, can one combine morality with the stubborn attempt by many of our military at the highest level to lecture the United States and the West persistently about having employed "excessive" force in the war against the aggressor, with the silence on the part of those same authorities with respect to our own role in arming militant regimes? And with what casualties in Afghanistan was the use of missiles and other arms delivered by us linked? Where, today, are the authoritarian regimes preparing against their own and neighboring peoples combat vehicles with the marking "Made in the USSR," that were created from the best metal at our plants in accordance with the best domestic technological methods? I definitely do not want to say that we must retreat from the international arms markets. My point is that military export requires precise legislation, glasnost, and economic desirability.

#### [No 16 pp 26-27]

[Text] The curbing of the Iraqi aggressor proved that the new world order can be based not so much on a certain kind of turning toward new ideas, as on a return to the traditional standards of international law and the mechanisms for maintaining them, including, if necessary, the toughest measures. As long ago as the creation of the United Nations, the possibility of the employment of violence only in response to violence was recognized. The new political way of thinking has enabled the Soviet Union to start talking about the need to use the United Nations. The United States, which for a long time

demonstrated pessimism with respect to the seriousness of such proposals, has decided, after the conflict with the Iraqi aggression, to test them in the practical situation.

#### Were Other Alternatives Possible?

And one would have to say that things worked out well right from the start. With the initiatory role of the Americans, who were rather actively supported by many of the Western, East European, and other countries, the United Nations came out decisively in favor of the restoration of law and order. That became possible thanks to the fact that the USSR and China, unlike the situation in previous years, not only failed to take the "anti-imperialistic" Iraqi regime under their protection, but also enabled the UN Security Council successively to adopt decisions censuring the aggression, demanding its cessation, and, finally, stipulating the use of drastic measures if all that was not carried out.

True, even at that stage it was revealed that, unlike many other countries, the Soviet Union did not take part, so that the political and legal shield of the UN resolutions would not prove to be reinforced by military force. But there was a need for that, inasmuch as Iraq had obviously counted on having that shield remain only a paper one, and the economic sanctions initiated against it being filled with holes. At the next phase of the crisis, the opposition to the armed brigandage developed into armed actions, but the USSR proved to be incapable of reinforcing by military strength the defense of the civilized standards on a political and legal level. One good aspect is the fact that, from the very first days, the shipments of Soviet arms to Iraq were discontinued.

During exactly that period, units of assault troops, tanks, and BTR [armored personnel carriers] were activated within the country, and operations were carried out to seize television towers and newspaper editorial offices. Thus one was made frighteningly aware of the powerful forces that are capable not only of retarding our forward movement, but also of throwing our country far back, to the times when it was perceived as the focus of political uncivilization.

One would like to believe that the Soviet Union used the available channels of diplomatic communication with the aggressor in order to encourage him to execute the demands of the world community and thus to put an end to the bloodshed. The appeals to the cessation of military actions, however, raise a large number of questions. Such pacifism could be interpreted by the aggressor in his own way. Our diplomatic maneuverings in the last days of the fight for Kuwait scarcely evoked satisfaction either on the part of Iraq or the West. Each of them has justifications for considering the efforts undertaken by the USSR to be insufficient. Nor were too many points earned in the eyes of the Islamic world.

Could the result of the crisis have been more felicitous for the USSR? Possibly yes, if we had been able to win a more complete and more consistent victory over ourselves. That would have occurred if the new course

aimed at precise adherence to international law had been conducted without worrying about the forces that still see in militaristic regimes in the Third World their allies, and in the United States and other civilized countries their opponents. In that instance there would have not remained the unpleasant aftertaste that, while failing to take a sufficiently definite stand on the side of our old friend, we had failed to strengthen our friendship with new ones, inasmuch as both groups can experience doubts about our reliability.

But what would have happened if the USSR had proved to be a more reliable ally of Saddam Hussein? The involvement of the USSR in a widescale confrontation with the West. It is completely possible that that would have led our country once again to the brink of a large war and nuclear blackmail.

Still another alternative would have lain in having our country, at some stage in the conflict, cease voting for the Security Council resolutions, without actually being directly involved in the conflict, but not supporting the anti-Iraqi coalition. That behavior would have been definitely impeded the coalition's actions, but would scarcely have saved the aggressor from retribution.

Thus, the overall result as of today for Soviet diplomacy is positive. For the first time, Soviet diplomacy came out, albeit not completely consistently, on the side of international law and morality, and moreover that was not only on a decorative level, but also at a practically political one. At the same time, it will still be necessary for us to learn how to differentiate in a much more precise manner between those who are in the right and those who are not, and to use the shield and sword on the side of the former. For that purpose it is not mandatory to possess the tremendous military might of a global superpower. But it would be desirable to prepare for participation in the future in the UN peacekeeping operations. Obviously, even in other situations the coalition of the highly developed countries will be able to assume a large share of the burden. For a long period of time the USSR will continue to have a solid reserve for strengthening its positions in the world as a genuinely great power at the expense of the more consistent transition to the positions of defending UN principles, solidarity with the civilized countries, and the use for such purposes of its own position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Incidentally, it is obvious that representation in the Security Council is one of the most important and valuable functions that can and must be performed specifically by the Union, and this, obviously, does not exclude the participation of the republics in the UN actions or even their representation in various agencies of that world organization.

#### From the Gulf to the Union

In general, the topic of the renewal of our Union and the crisis in the Gulf deserves attentive consideration. It would seem that the crisis made it possible to give much greater credence to the thesis concerning the need for a

single defense in the renewed Union of sovereign republics. Actually, there are few people today who believe seriously that some transatlantic threat is hanging over us. At the same time this is not the first time that we are observing instability and conflicts in the Persian Gulf area. Nor should we overlook in this regard the problem of Islamic extremism. Let's speak bluntly: one can scarcely feel that indulging other countries' aggressive claims can be considered to be a farsighted policy with a consideration of their possible influences upon the Central Asian republics. On the contrary, it is in our vital interests to demonstrate that any war, any acts of violence with respect to the peaceful population of our own country of neighboring countries, cannot and will not be tolerated. In other words, here too we are self-interested not in confrontation with the West, by acting as the supporter of Muslim militancy, but rather in continuing cooperation with the West in defending the universal principles of the freedom of conscience, the freedom to profess any religion, in organic tie with all the other human freedoms and right. It is only the encouragement of the forces of democracy and of pluralism, obviously with a consideration of the local peculiarities, but without any rebates for religious or cultural exclusivity, that constitutes the only path to the rebirth of Russia and the other republics and simultaneously to prevent sliding down into the chasm of national enmity and intolerance.

#### In the Embrace of "Friends"?

It is unrealistic to think that the preservation of centralization at any price is better than the risk of the independent manifestation of unpredictable moods in Soviet Central Asia. That is tantamount to an attempt to lull oneself by means of Eastern fairy tales while sitting on a time bomb. It is necessary to consider the fact that the artificial adherence to an increasingly unviable model of the socialist type in Asia can lead only to the building up of a situation with explosive potential. After the inevitable explosion, the threat of an extremely nationalistic and fundamentalist-Islamic extremism will also prove to be inevitable. Consequently, in this regard also a reasonable response lies on the paths of the most rapid renewal of the Union as a community of sovereign states. Here too it is confirmed that true concern both for the renewed Union and for the long-term prospects for stability in Eurasia is consistent not with the opposing of the growth of a democratic Russia that is moving rapidly along the path of radical reforms and the creation of a rather attractive example for its neighboring republics, but, on the contrary, with the taking of all steps to support that process.

Although the USSR did not play a central role in eliminating the crisis in the Persian Gulf, it will have an important word to say in defining the further course of events in the Middle East. There is a small chance that, after what has happened, the forces of reason will receive a powerful impetus. There has probably never been such a graphic demonstration of the catastrophe to which

militancy and irreconcilability can lead. But one should also not underestimate the inertia of the old.

Either we maintain that inertia and return once more to the embrace of those very faithful friends that we had in the past, who secretly or openly sympathized with the Iraqi aggression, or we shall find within ourselves the strength for a more balanced and more realistic approach. In the first instance it is possible that we will succeed for a certain period of time in restoring the clamorous chorus of the "unreconcilables." In the second instance it is possible that there will be a rather rapid erosion of the positions of extremism both in the Arab camp and on the other, in Israel. The demand to implement the Security Council decisions that pertain to the Arab-Israeli conflict will combine organically with this.

#### Let Us Agree to Disagree

Within the confines of the settlement process, a place will also be taken by such a key element in that process as the acquisition by the Palestinian nation of its own state entity. In order to achieve these goals, all the means available in the arsenal of modern diplomacy are good. An international conference, consultative sessions within the framework of the Security Council, direct and indirect bilateral negotiations... All of these means can and must be used on the basis of mutual supplementation without any attempts to make progress in one area a hostage to the beginning of movement in another. And it is definitely not mandatory to bind rigidly the security in the Persian Gulf with a settlement in the Middle East. It is important only for both to be reliably guaranteed. Incidentally, in both instances the Security Council could provide such guarantees.

But what is completely necessary for both regions is the reorientation in the use of limited financial, technical, and human resources, diverting them from the arms race to the tasks of economic and social development. We need a turning away from exclusivity and distrust with respect to the surrounding world in the direction of openness both toward our neighbors and toward other countries. Turning one's face to the economy is inconceivable in this region without the constructive participation of the most developed countries of the West. But Russia, the other republics, and the Union as a whole could also participate in this process. Properly speaking, this is what our interest should be toward this region, as, incidentally, it should be toward all others. And if that is so, then our interests will scarcely diverge strongly from the West's goals.

Finally, one more thing. For too long a period, the USSR has been united with its traditional Arab friends by the silent consent that neither we nor they are ready to perceive the values of democracy and human rights. Moreover, to a large extent it was precisely in this regard that our ideological commonality with them existed. But both we and they have been convinced that this isolation not only does not provide any advantages over the

surrounding world, but leads to serious costs, and to isolation both in the economic area and—as was demonstrated by Iraq—the military area. And that means that we must not turn off the course of glasnost and democratization that we have taken, giving as our reason for so doing the crises in the Persian Gulf, the Middle

East, or our own republics. And it is necessary to serve as an example of this to our friends, whether they be in the Arab world or in other places. That, then, will be the best demonstration of the concern for the formation of realistic prerequisites for the new world order, and, in the final analysis, a nuclear-free, nonviolent world.



## Baltics

### Letter to Savisaar on Foreign Policy

91UN1438A Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian  
20 Mar 91 p 1

[Article by the political editors: "Prime Minister Not Responding to Supreme Soviet's Foreign Commission"]

[Text] As our editorial staffers know, on February 20 the Foreign Commission of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Estonia sent a letter to Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar which includes the following passages:

*"The Supreme Soviet's Foreign Commission has, in the course of its sessions, repeatedly discussed the concept of Estonia's foreign policy, and analyzed the discords that have emerged in our foreign policy matters over the past half a year.*

*"The Foreign Commission deems it necessary to point out that one of the reasons for mounting tensions in Estonia's foreign policy matters has been the fact that the government has two ministers dealing with foreign relations. Such a practice has not given the results expected. It has, however, contributed to a lack of coordination, and created controversy.*

*"The confusion has spread, not only within the government, but it has also affected the area of cooperation between the Supreme Soviet and the government. This has tarnished the image of Estonia's foreign politics, and reduced its credibility."*

At the end of the letter, the Foreign Commission offers its opinion that the government should eliminate the position of the minister-at-large and authorize one person to handle relations with both the East and the West.

The letter also proposes that the diplomatic status of the Moscow-based delegation of the Republic of Estonia be enhanced, by increasing its role in our politics and by augmenting the staff of the so-called embassy. The Foreign Commission's proposal is apparently based on the recent and successful activity in our foreign politics carried out by the Republic of Estonia's Moscow representative Jüri Kahn.

Since Mr. Savisaar has not yet responded to the letter, another one was sent by the Foreign Commission on March 11, asking that the commission be informed on the questions raised in the previous letter. As far as our editorial staffers know, the prime minister has yet to reply to the commission's letter.

### Supreme Soviet Presidium Lacks Legality

91UN1438B Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian  
22 Mar 91 p 1

[Article by Peeter Raidla: "Supreme Soviet Presidium Lacks Legality"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet Presidium, in its newly elected form, convened for the first time in Kadrioru yesterday. As usual, the Presidium members had no draft resolutions before them, because none of the laws in effect today in Estonia would permit the written formulation of resolutions by the Presidium. This is the case simply because there is no legal base.

Hence the question posed by Arnold Rüütel: what to do?

The situation was reviewed at greater length by Arno Almann, secretary of the Presidium, and by Eenok Kornel and Advig Kiris, who were present as experts. The Supreme Soviet Presidium has a right to pass legislation only when the Supreme Soviet is adjourned for its regular break. At the same time, the legal authority of the newly-created institutions has not been circumscribed. Nowhere is it fixed what is the activity and what are the rights of the Supreme Soviet chairman, the presidium, the executive board, the elders' council and the chairman's council. It is not clear how the Supreme Soviet Presidium and its executive board share their right of legislative initiative. It is also not logical that the operations of the whole Supreme Soviet apparatus be conducted by the secretary of the Presidium. Obviously, it would be necessary to set up an independent office that would be at the disposal of the Supreme Soviet and its executive board.

It was found that there is an urgency to adopt a constitution (albeit temporary), without which it would be hard to regulate the legislative process. At the very least, the basic principles of state law for the transition period should be established. The present ambiguous situation cannot last long.

It was also pointed out that we do indeed have the legislative and the executive branches, but we do not have an independent judicial branch. This is why people in other countries have sometimes asked with astonishment what kind of a state is being formed in Estonia.

Most members of the new Presidium were of the opinion that the Presidium represents a collective head of the state. To that, Ignar Fjuk added the Presidium's task of coordinating collaboration between the Supreme Soviet and the government. Liia Hänni, in her turn, added the operational management of political life.

Ulo Uluots remarked sarcastically that directors of even the smallest of enterprises have the right to issue decrees. Estonia's first man Arnold Rüütel, however, does not have such a right. U. Uluots thought that the chairman of the Supreme Soviet should be granted legal powers to issue decrees.

Vitali Menshikov pointed out that the March 14 resolution, resulting in the dismissal of the previous Presidium, was based on emotions. The deputies, apparently, were not quite aware of what they were voting for.

At the end of the discussion, an agreement was reached to start preparing a bill that would put an end to this

absurd situation. Arno Almann voiced his hope that the experts could probably have a so-called working draft ready by the beginning of next week.

And thus the meeting was adjourned. Next week, the Presidium will not be meeting. First, as mentioned before, a legal basis will have to be created for the activity of the Presidium. Second, Arnold Rüütel is getting ready for his trip to the United States.

P.S. It has been suggested that elections for a new Supreme Soviet were intended to deprive Arnold Rüütel of any real power. Yesterday's session did not leave that impression. Even though it is hard to draw any conclusions based on one single meeting, the undersigned feels that the new Presidium could easily enough develop into an effective organ. At least, as long as the members of the Presidium make a sincere effort to accomplish that. Judging by yesterday's performance, it is entirely possible.

### Muscovites' Critique of Estonian Politics

91UN1438C Tallinn RAHVA HAAL, 23 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by Riho Nõmmik: "What Moscow Democrats Think of Estonian Politics?"]

[Text] At the center of all internal struggles now taking place in Estonia's political arena is the question of how best to achieve the ideal—-independent statehood. With all the understanding of political views, and the many activities based on these views, one cannot dismiss the feeling of unease caused by the split between reality and lofty idealism. Lately, this split has been showing signs of turning into a gorge.

Whether we like it or not, the key to Estonia's independence is held by those forces who determine the policy of the superstate and command both the economic system and the apparatus for repression.

It is important to recognize that these forces make up a system that is caught up in change and can, to some extent, be changed. Thus, over the past few years, the power center has shifted considerably, moving back toward the position of brute totalitarianism. This is hardly a situation to rejoice over. It is not very likely that we could reach an agreement with such a power center. This is why we are very much interested in seeing the present center of power move in the desired direction. And this interest should be reflected in all the facets of our politics.

In analyzing the past, one must admit that the movement toward independence had an auspicious start. A well coordinated attack on the center was launched within the Soviet Union's Supreme Soviet by the Estonian group of deputies. The activity of Baltic deputies, both in and outside the parliament, reached its ultimate—by making the Union public aware of the implications of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. This was one of the more severe blows to the reactionist propaganda contributing,

indirectly, also to the success of Russian democrats in their elections for the Russian Federation, and the city councils of Moscow and Leningrad. And then ...

The success achieved up to this point, and the start of power struggle in the republics, had the effect of emptying Moscow of the last of the Baltic deputies. The results are there to see. Russia's fledgling democracy was not strong enough to deter the conservative counter-attack. The men who had helped to bring about the initial success of the Baltics—A. Yakovlev, V. Bakatin and E. Shevardnadze—have themselves disappeared, one by one, from Moscow's political arena. The charges against them included, and not on the lowest of levels, concessions made for the benefit of the Baltic states. What have the Baltics done for their defense? Nothing besides sympathy. Was there any sign of recognition that this was not only a loss to Russia, but also to the Baltic states?

At the height of this year's tragic events in January, B. Yeltsin used his authority in support of the Baltics. He promptly became the object of unprecedented political persecution. The aim of the campaign was clear: to remove Yeltsin from the political arena. And the Baltics went on following events from the sidelines, as if all problems related to independence had already been resolved, and things happening in Russia had no bearing on the future course of events. Looking in from a distance, Estonia's political infighting looks more like a bridge game played in a parlor where flood waters are about to reach the window ledge.

Estonian politicians have declared a transition period. This means that all existing social structures will have to be used to reach the declared objectives. One could question the efficacy of the deputies' continuing work on legislation in the Supreme Soviet of a state to which we no longer intend to belong. It is quite clear, however, that the rostrum of the Supreme Soviet, together with the attention of the media that goes with it, has voluntarily been relinquished to the leaders of Intermovement, who take full advantage of these opportunities, and not without success. If we add here the emissaries from northeastern Estonia, who have recently been seen making their rounds of Moscow's enterprises, we can safely say that the democratization of Russia is left entirely to the more enlightened denizens of the super-state, who will also have to defend the reputation of the Baltics.

I would like to recall another "minor" factor. An ordinary Russian citizen not only votes for the power organs of its own state, but he or she is also the person who, apart from our wishes, participates in our security and welfare. And that, according to his or her own lights.

Speaking of objective information about events happening in Estonia, I must admit that it is usually too little and too late, often arriving long after the train is gone. I am not talking here about Estonian media that gets—even to Moscow—after a full month's delay (if at all). I

am talking about information that could be prepared for distribution to Russia's independent publications and radio stations, every time the propaganda machine comes up with another fabrication.

Right now, the situation is such that news from Moscow reaches Estonia on the same day, distorted information about events taking place in Estonia also makes it to Moscow in a flash, while any objective information is left to move at snail's pace. It is urgent that additional effort be made to get vital information directly to the Russian media. Interviews with people in the know would be the best way for that, of course. Having an official representative in Moscow, however, is not enough.

Another problem with information coming from Estonia is—it is often not specific enough. I am particularly concerned with the dearth of factual materials coming out of Estonia that would refute the most outrageous of all allegations—those accusing Estonia of human rights violations. The first step taken in this direction—material prepared for a symposium called "Estonia and the Human Rights"—did not find any response in the Russian media. Besides, in its original form, it was not quite suitable for use by the media. It seems that scientific research in this area has not been properly applied, despite Estonia's relatively rich tradition in social sciences.

From my own point of view, I would like to mention issues dealing with the nature of emigration, problems of minorities in general, and living conditions of Estonians in Russia, in particular. As far as possibilities of preserving their ethnic heritage are concerned, the latter are much worse off than the Russian-speaking citizens living in Estonia.

Coming back to the issues traditionally grouped under the heading of our Eastern policy, I seriously doubt that some isolated Moscow visits made by our top leaders, or the hazy prospect of fleeting negotiations can bring Estonia any closer to the independence we all seek. The support of the West is an important, though not a deciding factor here. The crux of the problem, as before, is in the nature of the superstate as it exists today. This is a fact nobody will argue, but there is a general reluctance to draw conclusions based on it.

Now, a few words of explanation.

Estonia's cart that is headed for a more sensible life is thoroughly bogged down by totalitarianism. What can be done? A civilized Estonian would like to put on his last clean shirt and travel overseas to consult a wizard. What's more, there is always a chance that liquid refreshments will be offered that have a way of curing throats that have been parched from making patriotic speeches.

Neither will it do much good to blame the farmer, through whose offices we got bogged down in the first place, even if one could be found by the roadside. I tend to think that an Estonian oldtimer would have scratched

his head, spat into his palm, reached for a spade or an axe, and proceeded with filling up the holes in front of him.

Riho Nõmmik who lives and works in Moscow

### **Estonian Election Irregularities Cited**

91UN1431A Tallinn THE ESTONIAN  
INDEPENDENT in English No 51 Vol 1,  
21 Mar 91 pp 1, 3

[Article by Karl Hunt and Tarmu Tammerk: "Anti-Independence Groups Hold Soviet Referendum; Estonian Authorities Refuse To Assist"]

[Text] Amid numerous incidents of vote-rigging, the Communist Party and the Soviet Army held President Mikhail Gorbachov's referendum in parts of Estonia on March 17 although Estonian authorities boycotted it.

The three Baltic states boycotted the referendum, as well as Georgia, Armenia and Moldavia.

The Estonian parliament earlier this month said Estonia would not participate in the referendum, but did not prohibit citizens from taking part. The parliament also declared the results of the referendum would have no legal consequences in Estonia.

The commission that organized the referendum in Estonia announced on March 18 that more than 250,000 people in Estonia voted, of which 95 percent said 'Yes' to the preservation of the Soviet Union. The commission, headed by Communist Party Secretary Nikolai Zakharov, said that official results would be released later. These figures did not include the votes of Soviet Army personnel in Estonia, who also participated. Private individuals were also allowed to enter Soviet Army camps to cast their ballots.

In the Estonian referendum on independence held on March 3, 203,000 out of the 950,000 people who participated said they opposed independence for Estonia.

Very few ethnic Estonians participated in the March 17 referendum, observers said. Most Estonians say they expressed their position on the republic's relation to the Soviet Union on March 3, when a vast majority voted in favour of independence.

The results of the Soviet referendum in Estonia were announced amid accusations of ballot-box stuffing and other voting irregularities. At one polling station in the Soviet Officers' Club in Tallinn, ETA correspondents saw several voters receiving more than one voting slip.

### **Ballot Stuffing Alleged**

In northeastern Estonia, an Estonian television correspondent reported that voters there were permitted to vote for friends and family members. Both in Tallinn and northeastern Estonia voting slips were given to people without proper identification.

Pre-election voter lists were allegedly drawn up in workplaces and housing districts, but observers said people were allowed to register and vote in any voting station.

Raul Mälik, Estonian Supreme Soviet spokesman, said, "No figures can be trusted."

Estonian newspapers in Tallinn and Tartu printed photographs of the same person voting in as many as seven voting stations.

Sergei Puchkov, chairman of one of Tallinn's voting stations, told Estonian television there was no mechanism in place to prevent people from voting multiple times.

"It all depends on the honesty of each person voting," he said.

Official voter lists used during the March 3 referendum on Estonian independence were not made available to the organizers of the Soviet referendum because the Estonian government decided not to participate. They also refused because the Moscow-based Communist Party demanded the lists and the government said it would not release them to a single party.

Organizers of the March 17 referendum said voter lists would be destroyed after the referendum to avoid what they called possible future repercussions for those who voted.

**Lax Controls:** Estonian camera operator Erik Kuznetsov voted in eight polling stations to demonstrate how easy ballot-box stuffing was in the Soviet referendum on March 17. In the photo above he votes in a polling station in Tallinn at 30 Tartu Road...and in the picture on the left in the Soviet Army Officers' Club. Photos by Tiit Veermae (ETA). [photographs not reproduced]

**If the Voters Don't Come to you Go to Them:** A mobile voting station in Kivioli in northeastern Estonia looks for customers. Photo by Lembit Michelson (ETA). [photograph not reproduced]

### **Estonia Seeks Ties With Russian Democrats**

91UN1430A Tallinn THE ESTONIAN  
INDEPENDENT in English 28 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by Lya Oll: "Estonia Needs Ties With Russian Democrats"]

[Text] Democratic movements from throughout the Soviet Union recently met in Moscow to unite against the growth of reactionary forces in the empire. Nineteen delegations of democratic movements from Soviet republics and the Baltic states attended on March 2 and 3 the consultative council of the Democratic Congress, an umbrella group of new democratic parties.

The Estonian Popular Front was represented by Edgar Savisaar, the Estonian Prime Minister and a leader of the Popular Front. In his speech at the meeting, Mr. Savisaar

stressed the need to strengthen ties between democratic forces in Russian and Estonia.

"We are united in our intentions to defend democracy," Mr. Savisaar said. "Estonian democrats will do everything in their power to support Russian democrats."

Analyzing the political situation, Mr. Savisaar said: "Actual power in the Soviet Union is still in the hands of the Communist Party, the KGB and MVD (Interior Ministry) who continue to rule the world's last empire."

"In this political theatre we are only cast in minor roles that the stage directors of perestroika need to demonstrate their political incompetence to the spectators," he said. "And when we tried to deviate from the ready-made scenario, tanks and special task forces were sent against us."

"At present our only hope is the unity of all democratic forces in a struggle against the totalitarian system. For the Estonian people this struggle leads to the restoration of state independence; for Russia it means rebirth as a world power," Mr. Savisaar said.

"Defeat of the Baltic states today means the defeat of Russia tomorrow," he warned. "After the violence in Vilnius and Riga it has become clear that the strength of democratic movements is not only in their extent and energy but also in their unity against the totalitarian system."

### **Estonian Congress Calls for Elections**

91UN1430B Tallinn THE ESTONIAN  
INDEPENDENT in English 21 Mar 91 pp 1, 3

[Article by Tarmu Tammerk: "Congress of Estonia Calls for Parliamentary Elections"]

[Text] The Non-Soviet Congress of Estonia has called for new parliamentary elections before the end of 1991, three years before the terms expire. The year-old Congress, a representative body of the citizens of pre-war Estonia and their successors, became the first political group in Estonia to make this appeal during its fourth full session in Tallinn on March 16.

According to a resolution of the Congress, elections should be held to create a Constituent Assembly, the electorate of which should be agreed upon by the Estonian Supreme Soviet and the Congress of Estonia.

The formerly popular Congress met at a time of deep crisis—there were many appeals from Congress members and private citizens to disband the group's ruling body, the Council of Estonia, and even the Congress itself. Critics said the Council has been inefficient and has done virtually nothing to fulfil its aim: to restore the independence of the pre-war Republic of Estonia.

Sponsors of the resolution for early elections said they wanted to end what they called the unnecessary rivalry between the Supreme Soviet and the Congress. Opinion

polls, however, have indicated that most people have turned away from the Congress and consider the Supreme Soviet as their only representative.

Some delegates to the Congress opposed the idea of electing a Constituent Assembly because this would acknowledge that the Congress had failed in its work. "Is the Congress really incapable of restoring the Republic of Estonia?" delegate Kaido Kama asked the Congress.

The idea of elections for a new parliament has also been proposed by other political groups but there is no general consensus. The Estonian Supreme Soviet has not yet discussed new elections.

Contrary to earlier predictions, the Congress took place without any heated debates and calls for leaders to resign. This was largely because opposition to "the opposition," as the Congress is generally viewed, ignored the debate altogether. Since members of the Popular Front are a minority in the Congress, in contrast to the National Independence Party, the Congress's resolutions were adopted without great debate.

Besides the resolutions, repeating the Congress's earlier calls "to end the Soviet occupation" and "de-sovietize society," the Congress decided to start issuing "domestic passports" for "citizens of Estonia." The identification cards will be given only to the citizens of the pre-war Republic and their descendants.

Congress leader Vardo Rumessen, sponsor of the bill, emphasized the "psychological effect" of issuing the domestic passports. "This will unite Estonians all over the world again," he said. Some of the cards have already been printed in Canada and will cost 15 roubles each, organizers said.

Congress Chairman Tunne Kelam said the passports should have some "practical use," for example in collecting money at the post office instead of requiring people to use the red-covered Soviet passport all residents of Estonia over 16 years carry now.

But several members criticized the idea. "We don't need souvenir passports," delegate Henn Käämbere said. "We should not devalue the most important document of a fully independent Estonian state." Officials said the domestic passports are not likely to be accepted by the Soviet authorities for foreign travel of Estonian citizens.

### Collective Farm Leaders Form Party

91UN1439A Tallinn THE ESTONIAN  
INDEPENDENT in English 4 Apr 91 p 2

[Article by Joel Aav: "Collective Farm Leaders Form Party"]

[Text] Collective farm chairmen and former communist leaders of agriculture have formed their own political party in Estonia as opposed to a year-old Rural Centre Party that unites supporters of private farming.

The new party, the Rural Union (*Maaliit* in Estonian), was formed on 23 March in the central Estonian town of Paide on the basis of a two-year-old loosely organized movement of the same name.

The founding of the new party comes amid calls from some Estonian politicians to have early elections to a new Estonian parliament before the end of the year. Founders of the Rural Union said there did not exist a political party that could represent the interests of country people in parliament.

Another reason for an urgent formation of the new party was the upcoming congress of the Popular Front. It is possible that the Popular Front may turn into a political party and give up its present status as a grass-roots movement.

"We have to stop the Popular Front," said Ulo Uluots, a member of the Estonian Supreme Soviet and a founder of the Rural Union in an interview. "In new elections, the Popular Front may not include any farmers on its election list and there will not be any farming people in the new parliament at all," Mr. Uluots said.

The emergence of the Rural Union marks an increasing clash of interests within the farming community. Private farmers complain of restrictions set by collective farm leaders and local authorities on the new entrepreneurs. Collective farm chairmen, in their turn, say a slander campaign has been launched against them in the press although "it is still us who feed the country."

Founders of the Rural Union claim that their party was badly needed as the only existing farmers' party, the Rural Centre Party, lacked a following among country people. Activists of the Rural Union pointed out at its founding congress that the Rural Centre Party was too radical and scared people away. According to Lembit Arro, the Centre Party wants to distribute land quickly among new private farmers while the Rural Union favours a step-by-step transfer to private farming. Another delegate at the congress, Sven Sagris, even suggested this transfer might take as long as fifty years.

It is not clear how much support the new party will have among the farming community. But judging by the delegates at its founding congress, the Rural Union enjoys the support of collective farm chairmen and former agricultural officials like heads of the Communist Party's agriculture departments and chiefs of regional agro-industrial complexes.

### Composition of Delegations at Negotiations

91UN1439B Tallinn THE ESTONIAN  
INDEPENDENT in English 4 Apr 91 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Composition of the Delegations at Negotiations Between Estonia and the Soviet Union"]

[Text] Estonia

1. Ulo Nugis, speaker of the Estonian Supreme Soviet, head of delegation.
2. Marju Lauristin, deputy speaker of the Estonian Supreme Soviet.
3. Indrek Toome, chairman of the Estonian Supreme Soviet's Foreign Relations Committee.
4. Jüri Raidla, Estonian Minister of Justice.
5. Endel Lippmaa, Estonian Minister in charge of negotiations with Moscow.
6. Sergei Sovetnikov, chairman of the Estonian Supreme Soviet's Committee for Interethnic Relations.
7. Arno Kõörna, President of the Estonian Academy of Sciences.

#### Soviet Union

1. Nikolai Lavyorov, USSR Deputy Prime Minister, head of delegation.
2. Nikolai Gritsenko, chairman of the Committee for Labour, Prices and Social Policy, USSR Supreme Soviet's Council of the Union.
3. Aleksandr Troshin, vice-chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee.
4. Ivan Kapitanets, first deputy of the Chief of Staff of the USSR Navy.
5. Boris Topornin, director of the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences.
6. Yuri Sharipov, chairman of the Committee for Social and Economic Development of the Union Republics and Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Oblasts and Regions, USSR Supreme Soviet's Council of Nationalities.
7. Boris Tshaplin, USSR Deputy Foreign Minister.
8. Vasili Trushin, USSR Deputy Interior Minister.
9. Valeri Lebedev, deputy chairman of the KGB.

#### Popular Front To Remain Umbrella Group

91UN1433A Tallinn *THE ESTONIAN INDEPENDENT* in English No 55 Vol 2, 18 Apr 91 pp 1, 2

[Article by Tarmu Tammerk: "Popular Front To Remain Umbrella Group"]

[Text] Contrary to widespread expectation, the Popular Front, Estonia's largest pro-independence group, postponed transforming itself into a political party at its annual congress but voted to remain a broadly based movement until there are firm guarantees for Estonia's independence.

Meeting in Tallinn on April 13 and 14, the Front's third annual congress ruled that the organization must retain its existing charter and programme as a grassroots movement with a loose membership.

The more than 700 delegates voted down proposals to constitute the Front as a strictly regimented political party or as a party within the broadly based movement. But delegates adopted a resolution leaving it open for the Front to develop into a political party when conditions permit.

Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar, a Front leader since its inception in 1988, said in the main report to the Congress that it would be "shortsighted and even premature" to end the Front's existence as a movement. "We are not independent as yet," Mr. Savisaar said, "and that's why we can't disband the movement."

Mr. Savisaar said Estonia can afford to disband the Front "as a mobilizing force" only after independence has been gained and democracy and market mechanisms introduced.

Several other speakers defended the preservation of the Front as an umbrella movement for pro-independence parties and groups until a breakthrough has been achieved on the issue of independence.

According to a Front congress resolution, the top priority for Estonia is to end the transition period to independence that was proclaimed by the Estonian Supreme Soviet last March. To achieve this, the Estonian government must gain full control of its territory and the Estonian economy must be able to function independently, the resolution said.

"We have wasted most of the time set aside for us to regain independence," Mr. Savisaar said in his report. He also warned about not being able to take advantage of the crisis of the Soviet empire. "At this point the Kremlin is busy (fighting) with democrats in Russia," Mr. Savisaar said. He added the Soviet leadership has decided to delay solving the Baltic issue until the culmination of the crisis has passed.

In reference to the Front's mistakes, Mr. Savisaar criticized the inefficiency of its 'Russian policy,' and urged that a citizenship law be put forward that would make Russians feel secure about their future in an independent Estonia. He did not elaborate on who should be granted the citizenship and on what terms.

But in a sign of making Russians more involved in the Front's activity, two Russians were elected as members of the Front's leading body for the first time in the organization's three-year existence. Yevgeni Kalinin and Aleksandr Grinko were voted to the Front's 11-member board. But the rest of the Front's leadership remained unchanged. The biggest number of votes in a secret ballot went to Mati Hint, Edgar Savisaar and Marju Lauristin.

Although the current government is led by Mr. Savisaar, Front members do not hold a majority in the government or the Supreme Soviet. To improve the Front's involvement in government bodies, the congress decided to hold a conference of Popular Front deputies in May. Also, the congress called for a coalition treaty to be drawn up between the Popular Front and centrist parties.

Unlike other political forces, the Popular Front refrained from calling for early elections to a new Estonian parliament. Instead, the congress decided to hold a conference in the second half of 1991 concerning possible elections to the Constituent Assembly or parliament. One month ago the non-Soviet Congress of Estonia movement called for new elections as early as this autumn because the group boycotted elections to the present Supreme Soviet. The Supreme Soviet's term expires in four years.

Mr. Hint said a forceful dissolution of the Popular Front would bring about a political vacuum. He said the 2,000 members of Estonia's fledgling democratic parties are not able to compete in elections with the 5,000-member independent Communist Party and the 30,000-strong pro-Moscow Communist Party. "The Popular Front supports the formation of political parties as a natural process but not through forced collectivization," Mr. Hint said.

In a reaction to attacks from some speakers against the newly formed parties, Mrs. Lauristin, leader of the Estonian Social-Democratic Independence Party, said she was "sad and embarrassed at the arrogance and negative attitude" against the formation of political parties. "The Popular Front should look at the formation of new parties with an eye of a gardener," she said. Economic preparations for independence should be accompanied by political steps to restructure society, she said.

#### **Estonian Bank President on Currency, Economy**

*91UN1317A Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian  
30 Dec 90 p 10*

[Interview with Rein Otsason, Bank of Estonia president, unattributed, no title, no date given]

[Text] [RAHVA HAAL] When can we expect to see the Estonian krone in Estonia?

[Otsason] I hope that life has taught the people of Estonia to understand that the Estonian krone cannot just make its appearance, it needs the support of the economy. The Estonian economy, however, has become significantly more unstable than it was a year ago. First, we have to create conditions that are conducive to a stable development of the economy, and only then can our own currency start contributing toward that stable development. Everything depends on how well equipped we are, and how well we succeed in managing our economy.

It would be useful to draw another conclusion from the year now ending. No matter how much importance we attribute to politics, to achieve independence we also need an economy that is capable of becoming independent. This is why I would like to hope that our politicians would put the economy above everything else, to the point of making compromises on other political issues whenever necessary. It seems to me that economy—which is the welfare of all of us—has become a mere toy in the hands of our politicians during this past year.

[RAHVA HAAL] Do we finally have the foreign currency needed to print and mint our own currency?

[Otsason] First, I will have to say that the first foreign currency payments were made. However, the delay in making them has already had negative consequences that are irreversible. Our foreign partners developed a mistrust. The contract for metallic raw materials was cancelled altogether. Thus, we will have to start looking for a new partner.

[RAHVA HAAL] Do you feel the Bank of Estonia is secure at this time?

[Otsason] We have surmounted all difficulties up until now and gained valuable experience to continue the struggle.

[RAHVA HAAL] In April of this year, Rein Otsason promised that we will be getting our salaries in kronas at the start of the new year. Now he is promising the Estonian krone once Estonia's economy has gained its stability.

#### **Estonian Raw Materials Problems, Plans**

*91UN1317B Tallinn PAEVELEHT in Estonian  
19 Dec 90 p 2*

[Report by K. Mürk from the Press Bureau for the Ministry of Industry and Energetics: "Roped In By the Horns?"]

[Text] \*Moscow not allotting raw materials\* Direct agreements planned\* Barter trade to be terminated\* No to the currency union\* Eesti Tööstus is prepared even for the worst of possibilities\*

It was quite early in the game when Moscow started twisting the rope that was to bring the recalcitrant Baltic states to the table for the signing of the Union treaty. The Soviet Union's government decree number 1685, issued on October 6 over the signature of Deputy Prime Minister L. Voronin, exempted all industrial enterprises reporting to the Republic of Estonia from receiving centrally distributed supplies of raw materials. It also suggested that they be obtained directly from the supplying enterprises. As experience has shown, however, suppliers of raw materials can often stipulate terms that cannot be met by our enterprises: sometimes they call for a partial payment in foreign currency or ask for barter

items such as color television sets, refrigerators, furniture or meat. And should they be reminded of the presidential decree requiring that all of this year's economic arrangements be maintained for the coming year, they would be justified, indeed, claiming that state orders placed by the Soviet Union have not left them with enough volume to handle Estonia's orders. Another excuse is that Estonia has not even signed a trade agreement with the republic in question. This is why agreements between enterprises are so slow to materialize.

A quick reaction to this anxiety-inducing document came from the board of directors of the association Eesti Tööstus [Estonian Industry]. As early as October 18, an expanded meeting was held that also included Jaak Tamm, minister of industry and energetics, Jüri Rapoport, deputy minister of resources, and leaders from Estar and Eesti Metsatööstus [Estonian Forest Industry], all of whom were being pinched by the same shoe.

The directors found that since our industry cannot count on raw materials being allotted from Moscow—neither the imports nor those supplied by the Soviet Union—the government of the Republic of Estonia should cancel its commitments for supplying consumer goods to the Soviet wholesalers. Three quarters of the production thus freed could then be turned over to the commodities exchange committee of the Republic of Estonia. This would give Estonia something to offer in exchange for the raw materials it has to obtain through horizontal contacts. The directors also think that our enterprise-level trade agreements with the Union republics should stipulate that no barter arrangements be used, otherwise we will be stuck with a primitive model of trade: one axe, two sheep ... On the enterprise level, at least, the money in circulation should remain the standard of equivalence.

The remaining one quarter of the production should stay at the disposal of the enterprise—for securing raw material imports and for operating reserves. Up until now, raw material imports have come mostly through centralized channels, through foreign trade agreements with the Soviet Union. Moscow is prepared to keep doing that in the future, provided that Estonia would join in the Union treaty and participate in the foreign currency fund shared by the republics. The directors of the association Eesti Tööstus would not even hear of it. They recommended that the enterprises do everything they can to enter into direct agreements with suppliers of raw materials before the end of 1990. They also recommended that the government of the Republic of Estonia enter into economic agreements with Russia and Ukraine as soon as possible. This is where most of our raw materials obtained through direct contact come from.

The directors expected a prompt intervention by the government because unemployment, that usually accompanies such gaps in the flow of supplies, is bound to cause severe drops in the production and also in the

revenues due to the state budget of the Republic of Estonia, thus exacerbating the economic crisis.

However, it took a whole month for the government to take some measured steps to ward off this frightening prospect. Things started to move at the end of November, when a government delegation led by Edgar Savisaar embarked on their travels for the purpose of entering into economic agreements with Georgia, Ukraine and Belorussia. Before that, we only had agreements with Tajik and Leningrad. Russia has made any economic agreement contingent on reaching a political agreement first, but the latter has been slow to materialize because of lack of agreement on a few issues.

There has been some public criticism maintaining that economic agreements between the republics have not been specific enough. It seems, nevertheless, that the government has started to pay more attention to the urgent economic issues.

It is not known, as yet, how much raw material we have managed to purchase from our eastern neighbors through direct contacts. The greatest worry, however, is centered on the raw material imports. The association Eesti Tööstus, for example, is using roughly 10 million rubles worth of imported raw materials this year, but exports of its production only amount to five million rubles, a lion's share of it going to former socialist countries, with foreign currency sales accounting for only 0.7 million rubles.

What is one to do? Should we yield to the pull of economic ropes and let ourselves be dragged to the green pastures of the Union treaty?

**Viljar Veski**, executive director of association Eesti Tööstus:

"In the meantime, many hopes have waxed and waned for making trade arrangements with our eastern neighbors outside of politics, based on mutual interest. This is why we have had constant discussions with our directors. And we have come to the conclusion that the Union treaty should be avoided at all costs. Without the raw material imports purchased for the crude oil dollars we will be in a bind, admittedly, especially those of our enterprises who use a lot of them. But sooner or later we will have to endure that pain, anyway. The Republic of Estonia cannot forever stay dependent on the mercy of Moscow to supply us with the necessary products of the West. This is why the enterprises belonging to Eesti Tööstus have come up with a production plan to be implemented in case we should not get any import materials through the foreign trade agreements with the Soviet Union next year. We will try to get them ourselves. With foreign currency being in short supply, we shall also be considering other options (barter transactions, formation of joint enterprises, and possibly also sales of standard minutes to some foreign firm). We shall also try to use more of the raw materials obtained from the Union republics through direct contact, and to substitute certain products made out of deficit materials



with some others. This way, the decline in production, and resulting unemployment that are seen as a possibility for the coming year, would not reach catastrophic proportions, even with the blackest of scenarios. Besides, things should also be getting easier further down the road.

Necessity will teach us to trade on the foreign markets. Up until now, the enterprises have had no real need to do that: Moscow doled out the raw materials, and the bottomless Eastern market absorbed whatever production there was, regardless of price and without bickering about quality. Actually, much of our production that could be sold for hard currency today, is still going to the East. It is true that there is nobody waiting for us on the Western market. But we will have to go, just the same, without waiting for an invitation.

As we succeed in obtaining raw materials for the currency that we have earned, we also have to refrain from selling off for rubles any products that were made out of these materials.

It is extremely important that the economic borders be closed securely, and the moving of goods be placed under government control. That goes for the railroads, too. Only then could a market develop that is capable of balancing supply and demand. When our eastern neighbors would have such a market is anybody's guess."

Moscow's economic rope is not as strong as it seemed at first glance ...

### **Bank of Estonia Head on Operations**

*91UN1317C Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian  
26 Jan 91 p 2*

[Interview with Rein Otsason, Bank of Estonia president, and Urmas Kaju, legal counsel for the Bank of Estonia, by Helve Laasik: "Monday Starts a New Life for the Bank of Estonia"]

[Text] [Laasik] At the end of last year, as we know, the Bank of Estonia started the process of bringing the Tallinn branch of the Foreign Trade Bank under its jurisdiction. Although some limited currency transactions were handled for client enterprises since December 1, there was a wait for Moscow to transfer the remaining account balances maintained by Estonian enterprises from the Foreign Trade Bank. Yesterday, the president of the Bank of Estonia announced that their great problem has finally been resolved.

[Otsason] We have been waiting for a month and a half for Moscow to transfer to us the account balances maintained by Estonian enterprises. This materialized on Tuesday. Beginning Monday, i.e. January 28, we will be offering full service to our client enterprises, including disbursements for business travel. True, there have been some operations we have been able to handle on a limited basis since December 1 of last year. We have

devised a new system to expedite disbursements for business travel that simplifies and speeds up accounting for our clients.

Beginning February 1, we will also offer services to private individuals. We will try to do everything we can to raise (two to three times) the interest paid on foreign currency savings for those individuals whose accounts were classified as V-type accounts. Of course, minimum level requirements will stay in effect—interest will only be paid from certain amounts up. Also, the interest rates will fluctuate according to conditions on the world's financial markets. For example, we will be paying four percent for U.S. dollars, six percent for British pounds, and five percent for Finnish marks. But, to be able to do that, we will first have to fight for equitable interest rates from the Moscow Bank of Foreign Trade Relations. This is our task for the weeks ahead of us:

Our goal is to simplify, as much as possible, the system of saving money for the whole population, and to remove previously existing restrictions. It is by no means a simple task, and everything could not be done at once. As long as our customers' savings are deposited in the Soviet Union's Foreign Trade Bank through us, we are—to some extent—bound by restrictions that apply to that bank. We hope that, within the coming months, we will be able to remove all these restrictions. The Bank of Estonia, in accordance with its legal mandate, maintains currency accounts in Moscow and in several foreign states. The Bank of Estonia will use this advantage to combine the operations of several accounts and to offer better service to its clients. A gradual introduction of innovations will continue.

Today, a meeting was held for those clients of the Foreign Trade Bank whose accounts were made up of the currency of former socialist countries. We were obligated to let them know what will happen to this money in the Soviet Union. An agreement has been reached between Soviet Union and these countries that, beginning January 1, 1991, no further accounting will be done in transfer rubles. The transfer ruble as a fictitious currency will cease to exist, as a transition is made to a freely convertible currency. What happens to the clients' accounts has not yet been determined by the USSR Council of Ministers, but there are several options. It is important to know, however, that through the month of January, these moneys can be used to pay for goods that were shipped to Estonia during 1990, or that are subject to being shipped under trade agreements made in 1990. The Bank of Estonia gives priority to all these operations and everyone who can, should avail him- or herself of this opportunity.

[Laasik] **FURTHER**, I asked what position the Bank of Estonia has taken on the status of the Revalia Bank. The Bank of Estonia should disclose its position on the formation and operations of this bank. The questions of office space do not concern the Bank of Estonia, because

each facility has its owner and any dispute over ownership rights will be settled in court or in arbitration. **URMAS KAJU**, legal counsel for the Bank of Estonia, agreed to comment:

[Kaju] On December 29 of last year the Bank of Estonia stopped the license issued to establish the Revalia Bank. What does that mean? The validity of the license issued has been stayed temporarily. This was caused by factors not fully clarified, dealing with the formation of the Revalia Bank and the activity of its leading organs in the formation process. As of today, the Bank of Estonia has expressed its official position on the issue, and has sent a letter to this effect to all shareholders of the Revalia Bank, eight legal entities in all. Why did we do it? We did it because—legally—the Revalia Bank does not exist. The initiating group that calls itself the Revalia Bank does not have an operating license, nor is it registered, as required by the law of the Republic of Estonia, with the local authority (the Tallinn city government). Thus, the Revalia Bank as a legal entity does not really exist. At the same time we know that, under that name, banking operations have been carried out for some time now with the help of the Soviet Union State Bank. After examining the facts, the Bank of Estonia decided that there has been a serious breach of the Estonian banking law—banking operations have been carried out in the name of a legal entity that does not exist. A banking institution by its very nature should be trustworthy and honest. The founders of the Revalia Bank bought property belonging to the Republic of Estonia and paid for it to the State Bank of the Soviet Union in Moscow. When the government intervened, the deal fell through. The initiating group known as the Revalia Bank made a fictitious agreement with the branch of the Shelter and Social Bank destined for liquidation. According to the decree issued by the government of Estonia, all property belonging to the branches of the Shelter and Social Bank was to be turned over to the existing Social Bank of Estonia. This was known to both parties, but the agreement was made anyhow, and that is one of the arguments used for demanding the office space. The Bank of Estonia views it as a deliberate breach of law.

Such breaches of law are considered so serious by the Bank of Estonia that the bank's council has demanded that the president make a final determination. The matter of revoking the license for the bank's formation was under serious consideration. After due deliberation, and considering the legal anarchy prevailing around us, it was found that the basic responsibility for the violations lay with the leadership of the bank being formed, and it is not clear to us what to expect from the initiating shareholders of the bank, the legal entities. We sent them a letter today proposing that they take a position on this issue, remove from the Revalia Bank leadership such officials who are guilty of violating the law, after which the Bank of Estonia will be willing to review the applications for both cancelling the stay on the formation license and for issuing the operating license. We took the position that it may not be right for the time being

(although it could be done legally) to put the responsibility on the shareholders who invested in the bank, but on the temporary leadership of that bank. The decision is up to the general meeting of shareholders.

### **Estonian Strike Threatens Transportation**

91JUN1317D Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian  
29 Jan 91 p 3

[Article by the economic editors: "Dvigatel Threatens Transportation Stoppage Across the Whole Republic"]

[Text] Yesterday's workday, indeed the workweek, at the Tallinn Union factory of Dvigatel started out with a meeting. It was originally scheduled for eight o'clock but, actually, started out a whole hour later.

We managed to find out, thanks to some Estonian-minded people, that the big collective of the enterprise has SPLIT. The factory's coordinating council and its leadership want to stop the strike temporarily, but most of the employees are against it.

Vladimir Rudenya, deputy director and chairman of the coordinating committee, and chairman Vladislav Mitriyevichius, both of whom spoke at the meeting held near the eternal flame on the factory grounds, gave a review of events that had occurred over the weekend and revealed the intention of the Narva enterprises to start striking seriously, as of the new week. The speakers thought that Dvigatel could now pass the torch on to the Narva team.

Besides, there was a need to improve the material condition of the factory by assembling parts that had accumulated into finished production. Difficulties were also mentioned in the matter of making advance payments.

Employees participating at the meeting did not agree to this, behavior like that would not only violate their principles, but would also deprive other strikers of their support.

In the meantime, the assembly was also joined by Vladimir Yarovoy, who spoke about the Friday meeting held in Tallinn, dealing with demands addressed to the Supreme Soviet that had been handed over during a January 15 meeting at Toompea.

Also discussed at yesterday's meeting was the necessity of preparing for, and carrying out an all-across-the-republic transportation stoppage that would make an impact on the life of Estonia (the current strike of Union factories does not have much of an effect on the people of Estonia). When such an all-republic strike would take place was not specified. It was said, however, that tactics for exerting pressure should be changed, and that work stoppages should be aimed at power stations, seaports and transportation hubs.

There were also complaints pointing out that Dvigatel and the Pöögelman Electrotechnical Plant were the only ones striking, while the others had dropped out.

After the meeting, some of the higher-ups assembled at the party committee to discuss what to do next.

### **Estonian Land Bank Head Objects to Moscow Regulations**

*91UN1317E Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian  
5 Feb 91 p 2*

[Article by H. Volmer, executive director of the Estonian Land Bank: "How To Save Farmers Millions?"]

[Text] The real clout in Estonian banking, up until now, has been in the hands of the Estonian Republican Bank division of the State Bank of the Soviet Union. This bank has declared as its property not only the savings of the citizenry, but also the budget of the Republic of Estonia, plus local budgets and insurance funds (300 million rubles). Added to that are 170 million rubles in correspondent accounts that commercial banks keep in the State Bank (by demand of the State Bank's Republican Bank), and also the mandatory reserves or funds required by regulations that all commercial banks, the Land Bank among them, must, according to the Republican Bank's precepts, place on deposit with it at no interest (150 million rubles). The total of funds thus expropriated by the State Bank exceeds 600 million rubles.

The State Bank uses this money to extend credit to our agriculture, and that through the services of the Land Bank. But how? Up until September 1 of 1990, the Land Bank was charged 1.5 percent a year. Up until the start of the current year, the rate was six percent, and from then on eight percent a year. This rate is supposed to go up again after April 1.

Due to the fact that all banks have to keep their correspondent accounts at the State Bank, the bank collects all the interest unilaterally. **By raising the interest rates, the State Bank will make a net profit of 45 to 50 million rubles a year on its credit to Estonian agriculture, which is not taxable, and which will be transferred, in its entirety, to the Soviet Union State Bank in Moscow.**

To put it mildly, the situation is abnormal. To correct it, the government of the Republic of Estonia and the Bank of Estonia should draft a law and submit it to the Supreme Soviet.

One would like to hope that our Supreme Soviet, in-between all those important political debates, will find the time to pass a modest resolution that represents savings of some 50 million rubles a year to our agriculture.

**If this problem cannot be resolved, our Supreme Soviet, the government, and the Bank of Estonia will have to**

**admit that economic policies within the Republic of Estonia are made by organizations outside the republic.**

In that case we will also have to legalize the regulations and precepts of the State Bank so that they will also stand up in court and arbitration.

### **Latvian KGB on Relations With Public, Press**

#### **Media Coverage of KGB Critiqued**

*91UF0711A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
23 Mar 91 pp 1, 4*

[Report by V. Varlamov: "In The Republic KGB"]

[Text] At a 21 March briefing, disseminated among journalists was a letter of KGB Chairman E. Yekhanon that was sent to the Latvian Republic parliament and government on 11 February; to this day, no reaction of any kind has followed. Therefore, this letter was offered for publication in the mass information media. **(This document appears in today's issue of SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA).**

Press conference participants were familiarized with the special issue of the USSR KGB INFORMATSIONNYY BYULLETEN in which was published the USSR Draft Law on the Country's Organs of State Security, in addition to, for comparison, material on legal regulation, that other operational activity of the security organs and special services of a number of foreign countries.

Addressing the journalists and responding to questions of interest to them were republic KGB Chairman E. Yekhanon, his deputy Ya. Trubinsk, KGB chief for the subunit combatting organized crime Yu. Ananyev, and KGB Press Group Director M. Sasha-Zasha.

A number of serious, critical comments were expressed toward the press. Thus, it was stated that for a prolonged period now, materials, publications, and commentaries aimed, in effect, at discrediting the Latvian KGB in the public's eyes have been appearing periodically. This tendency has intensified lately in connection with the series of explosions within the territory of Latvia, which have provoked the righteous indignation of the populace; indignation fully shared by the KGB. And without substantiation, the State Security Committee is accused of insufficiently active work, and sometimes even of not wishing to defend the inhabitants of Latvia from extremism, combatting organized crime, and other types of crimes relegated to its competence by law.

Indeed, KGB investigators and operations staffers, together with militia associates, participate in the investigation of perpetrators; they function in a joint group under the direction of the Latvian Republic procuracy. This work, however, is hampered by the circumstance that the organs of power are not giving the committee

sanctions for comprehensive utilization of the operational forces and resources under its allocation, and by insufficient coordination of the work of the law enforcement organs.

The circumstance cited gives rise to the need for the KGB to appeal openly to the public of the republic in order to get out its view of the situation, as well the problems objectively complicating KGB activity, aimed at combatting armed extremism, organized crime, and other crimes relegated to the competence of the state security organs.

A rebuke to editorial boards was expressed; these thoughtlessly open the pages of their publications to the writings of former KGB associates who in the past have discredited both themselves and the department they represented. Thus, for example, were published in the newspaper belonging to the Latvian cultural foundation the utterances of former Colonel A. Demidov, which smeared the activity of the KGB. This officer, driven from the ranks of the KGB, was exposed as having exceeded his authority and participated repeatedly in illegal activities. In particular, exploiting his official position, over the course of several years he extorted goods and products in extremely short supply from trade workers.

Also cited were some data on the activity of KGB staffers in the fight against economic sabotage, mismanagement, and organized crime. Thus, over the course of recent years, a number of enterprises purchased for hard currency high-quality equipment, which even so was not used as designated and has now been reduced to partial defectiveness. The material loss amounted to many millions of hard currency rubles.

Detained recently by the KGB was a group of leading staffers of "Degvively" and a number of commercial firms, such as "LatCher," "Layks," "Dingo," and others. They are accused of illegal operations in the acquisition and sale of gasoline.

It was noted at the press conference that the installation at the KGB of the telephone trust line [telefon doveriya], or mutual contact line (37-00-75) caused a definite reaction among the population. It rings about 10-20 times a day.

The journalists showed interest in how widely the KGB system of listening in on telephone conversations is used, in particular, whether eavesdropping devices had been installed in the Press House. Explanations were given that a listening system was technically possible, but it was a very expensive luxury. And it requires the involvement of an army of "listeners." This is a very dismal assignment, and there is no need to be listening in on a massive scale. So the occupants of the Press House may hold any conversation without fear of eavesdropping. But as far as craftsmen privately making and installing special devices for the purpose of gaining commercial secrets from competing firms are concerned, that is something to think about. There have been such cases.

The KGB is combatting this phenomenon and asks to be informed of any suspicions of this.

And questions such as these were asked. What will be the fate of the KGB if Latvia secedes from the USSR? Is there the threat of a schism along political lines, as with the MVD? If so, would that lead to the formation of an alternative service to the KGB, directly subordinate to the administration of the Latvian Republic?

On this, E. Yekhanon commented that rather than guess today about the future fate of Latvia, he emphasized all the same that any state must have its own security service. As far as a schism, the creation of any structures as alternatives to the KGB are concerned, such steps today would not be to the benefit of the interests of Latvia or its inhabitants. As far as is known, the republic leadership does not intend to undertake any sort of actions in this direction. And this would be extremely burdensome simply from the economic point of view. Judge for yourself: The preparation of a qualified, professionally trained security service associate takes 10 years: five years of study in a special institution and another five years in independent operations work.

The issue of the depoliticization of the KGB organs was also touched upon by the journalists. It was noted that there is no party organization as such in the KGB. Both communists and non-party members work in the system of the department.

In responding to your correspondent's question as to whether, as previously, timely information on KGB activity reaches the leadership of the Latvian Communist Party along with other higher state structures of power of the republic, the KGB chairman said that since Article 6 of the constitution was stricken, such information does not go to the Communist Party leadership. Rather the KGB builds its work based upon contacts with all social and political organizations.

KGB leaders also responded to other questions from the journalists.

#### Latvian KGB Chairman's Letter on Republic Situation

91UF0711B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
23 Mar 91 p 4

[Letter by KGB Chairman E. Yekhanon: "To A. Gorbunovs, Chairman of the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet; To I. Godmanis, Chairman of the Latvian Republic Council of Ministers"]

[Text] The information coming in to the KGB bears witness to the fact that the complex political and operational situation in the republic is being retained; despite all measures taken, including those by the KGB, the situation is tending to worsen. The opposition of antagonistic political groupings has reached such a level that lawful parliamentary methods of fighting threaten to grow into forcible methods, and all strata of society,

including the army and the law enforcement organs, may be dragged into open confrontation. Even though the armed clashes were essentially of a local nature, the January events in Riga clearly demonstrated the danger, tragedy, and irreconcilability of such processes. An analysis of the current situation in Latvia indicates that the negative processes in various spheres of public life, particularly in politics and the economy, have in many ways been conditioned by the legal anarchy that has been established, the war of union and republic laws and other normative acts. The population, industrial enterprises and institutions, even the Soviet of People's Deputies have been divided into those who live by the laws of the USSR and the Latvian SSR, and those who acknowledge only the laws of the Latvian Republic. This is particularly keenly perceived in the law enforcement system, which is called upon to guard the rights and freedoms of citizens affirmed by the constitution, law and order, and finally, the legally elected institutions of state power. In practice, however, a situation has come into being where there are functioning in the republic two essentially hostile procuracies, each of which has criminal and civil cases in process; there is a schism in the republic militia. The organs cited were dragged into political antagonism to the detriment of their basic functions.

The continuing escalation of political tension, the complex criminogenic situation, the disbelief of a segment of the population in the capability of the law enforcement organs, and the opportunity for the peaceful development of events generate dangerous tendencies. According to republic KGB data, there has been an increase in the frequency of attempts to illegally acquire and store firearms and other weapons, explosive substances; under certain circumstances, this can lead to their utilization, the provocation of armed conflicts. A growth in social tension has again been noted in connection with the continuing price increases for goods and services, and complications in payment of compensation at a number of enterprises.

The issue of conducting the all-union referendum announced by the USSR Supreme Soviet on the future of the Union of SSRs as a renewed federation of sovereign republics is eliciting particular concern. It should be approached as even-handedly and objectively as possible, with consideration for historical, demographic, political, economic and other realities, since the situation might develop in which the supporters of a renewed USSR, if their rights are ignored, may consolidate and draw into this the Latvian SSR procuracy, part of the militia, the KGB, military servicemen of the Soviet Army and internal troops, demanding of them decisive acts aimed at defending their interests. This sort of situation threatens unpredictable consequences.

It should be noted that the Committee for State Security, which is continually concerned with retracing and analyzing the situation taking shape in the republic, practically under the conditions of a war of laws, has acted

strictly within the framework of the competence relegated to it by law, without yielding to the influence of any one of the political groupings.

The contradictions between the republic and the center cannot but be reflected in the official activity of the Latvian KGB as a union-republic organ; they have not, however, interfered with the normal businesslike cooperation with the legally elected parliament and government. At the same time, certain political groupings, as well as a number of parliamentarians, are undertaking concrete steps to create alternative structures to the security services; the groundless attacks on the Latvian KGB in the mass information media, including those by officials, have not ceased. The situation taking shape objectively nudges the committee to take up a definite position with all the consequences ensuing from the given step.

The removal of tension in relations with the organs of union-republic subordination on the whole can be promoted only by an early determination by the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the coordination with the union government of their status and place in the system of state institutions of the Latvian Republic during the transition period. Their activity must be limited by the parameters of the competence as determined by law, directed toward the good of the people and the stabilization of the situation. In this, there must be consideration for the issues of the financing, the unity of organizational, informational technology stems, means of communications, and, finally, the unity of the interests of all the republics in the fight against crime, which has taken on an international nature.

It is necessary to reconceptualize the work of the state mass information media which, as the events indicate, are a catalyst for an increase in tension, even though they are called upon to be conducive to civil peace and harmony. The fact should be acknowledged that the commentaries and conclusions permitted by individual journalists, which are in many ways contentious and frequently openly unobjective, are, according to the old tradition, perceived by the majority of the people to be the official point of view.

All in all, the current situation in the republic insistently demands a build-up of efforts—first and foremost on the part of the higher organs of power and administration—aimed at seeking a dialogue of all antagonistic forces, a rejection of mutual accusations and political ambitions, and a recognition of the entire completeness of responsibility to the people of Latvia for its future.

#### **Latvia's Nationalities' Department Chief Interviewed**

*91UN1393A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH  
in Russian 30 Mar 91 p 3*

[Article by Andrey Vorontsov: "Ethnic Groups in Latvia Can Sleep Peacefully"]

[Text] Ethnic groups in Latvia can sleep peacefully because at the last cabinet meeting a regulation on the Department of Ethnic Problems was adopted. The meeting was chaired by Ilmars Bisers, for Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis was in the parliament at that time. He had a few difficult moments. During the first day of discussions, debates on the policy of the government in the area of agriculture were rather stressful. The criticism of the Council of Ministers by the deputies smoothly turned into a demand for the resignation of Janis Aboltins, the minister of economics, considered by some to be the main enemy of the Latvian peasantry. Therefore, it is as yet premature to speak of full support of the government's farm policy.

Furthermore, Ivars Godmanis had to deliver to the deputies an entire lecture on the problem of indexing. With his frankness he disarmed even the most zealous critics of the government. This largely justified the absence of the prime minister at the meeting of the Council of Ministers. It is true that some of the questions had to be postponed for the following day, for they could not be resolved without the head of the government.

Let us now go back to the matter of the Department of Ethnic Problems. Vladimir Steshenko, who heads the department, commented on the decision of the government as follows:

We finally have been given a legal base for the activities of this department. Frankly speaking, I thought that within a month we would be able to resolve basic organizational problems. The department must start virtually from scratch. There are neither premises, nor personnel nor proper facilities. This turned out to be quite complex and difficult.

Despite this, however, the moment the press announced the creation of our department, many people began to submit their suggestions to us. They even found my home phone number and rang up until late in the evening. Literally every day five to six people visited the newly established department. Amazingly, the number of submitted complaints was relatively small.

It is true that it was necessary to postpone the solution of many problems until the regulation on the department was adopted. Yet suggestions which were made were truly quite interesting: they pertained to the study of the Latvian language, conducting comprehensive sociological studies, the publication of translated works, poetry in particular, which is not always commercially profitable. Naturally, the ethnic groups which would like to adapt to Latvian culture should be familiar with the latest prose and poetry writings.

The government realizes the need to resolve problems of nationalities in Latvia. It was literally only today that Prime Minister Godmanis saw representatives of the Ukrainian community in the Republic. They suggested the creation of a Ukrainian cultural and economic center. In time, this center could become a Ukrainian

mission in Latvia. They would like to help the establishment of direct horizontal relations among republics. We are ready to support them, the more so since the adoption of the regulation made the making of specific decisions possible.

### **Latvian People's Front Policy on Ethnic Processes Criticized**

*91UN1291A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 28 Mar 91 pp 1, 2*

[Article by S. Beskrovnov, deputy of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet: "Dangerous Cliches: Or Can One Believe the Slogans of the Latvian People's Front?"]

[Text] More than once agitation cliches have caught the eye—the theses of the so-called democrats in favor of the absolute independence of Latvia. Loud and muddled in form, and even openly misinforming in content, I think, they nevertheless deserve analysis.

**THE FIRST CLICHE.** Only in an independent state is it possible to stabilize the democratic processes, otherwise there will be a continuation of the migration from the East, which will lead to the complete assimilation of the Latvians.

**THE SECOND CLICHE.** In an independent republic, the nationality relations will be harmonized, thanks to the deep cultural roots of Latvian democracy. It will be possible to build a multinational European state of the type of Belgium and Switzerland.

**THE THIRD CLICHE.** The vicinity of a great power—the USSR or Russia—will not allow the infringement of Russians in Latvia.

The authors of the theses do not even try to conceal that all the "misfortunes" for Latvia come from the East.

And if the migration would be carried out from the West, then, you see, everything could be different. I doubt whether the Western migrants would not also precisely supplant the Latvian language. The point is not the migrants, but in politics the power of the wealthy.

Hardly more than a year is left before 5 May 1992, when the implementation of the Law on Languages will be summed up in the republic. The examination, more precisely—the discrimination, commissions will establish that during these years the government did not do anything for the development of the Latvian language and even forgot to adopt the promised state language program. So is not better to declare directly that ahead of us is not a democratic future, but at least a national socialist one under the slogan of the Latvian People's Front "Latvia for the Latvians." And there is nothing strange in the fact that there is a shortage of specialists in the republic, that there have not been any changes in the methodology of teaching up to now. The main thing, there is the force of the law, and be so kind and submit to it. It is even possible to introduce an article in the Law

on Public Education, saying: "In institutions of higher education the language of instruction will be Latvian."

There are also other ways of stabilizing the democratic process, which were approved during the "deep cultural democracy." True, to talk about the depth of democracy in Latvia, in my view, is not sound. Its term runs from June 1922 to May 1934, from President I. Chakste to the dictator K. Ulmanis. But even during those times, demographic stability was attained through the combination of political and economic pressure with language discrimination, making people renounce their nationality, including legally. Thus, during the period 1930-1935, the number of Latvians increased as the result of natural growth by 26,624, and through assimilation—by 51,031. The draft laws being prepared in Latvia do permit, but it seems to me, also urge the election of a person of any nationality. It is not difficult to guess which one.

The authors of the theses assert that in an independent Latvia it will be possible to build a multinational European state of the type of Belgium or Switzerland. I doubt this. On 4 May, the day of the adoption of the Declaration of Independence, the deputies from Daugavpils proposed and insisted on the recognition of Latvia precisely as a multinational republic. This proposal called forth the anger and indignation of the radical democrats: There will have to be a wait for the multinational state. And as far as Switzerland and Belgium are concerned, in questions of democracy, oh dear, how far they are from present-day Latvia. For example, Switzerland is not even a member of the United Nations, where today Latvia is so longing to be, and legislative authority there belongs to the Federal Assembly, consisting of two chambers: The National Council and the Council of States (Cantons). In Latvia, the very idea of a national chamber is firmly rejected. In that same Switzerland, three languages: German, French, and Italian, are recognized as state languages although the French account for 18 percent and the Italians—10 percent. What is more, in Belgium there is the same picture—a bicameral legislature, the state languages are French and Dutch, and the government is always a coalition government. In my view, it is still early for Latvia to be trying on European clothes.

Now about the thesis: The vicinity of a great Russian power—the USSR or Russia—will not allow the infringement of the rights of Russians. As regards the "Russian Power," it seems to me, the authors went too far. This is also how one can run into an international conflict, for example, with Tatar, Yakutia, or Kazakhstan. The idea of the thesis, in essence, in present-day conditions are aimed not at the attainment of national consent, but at confrontation from the position of strength. The "night-time agreement" between Latvia and Russia, signed by Gorbunov and Yeltsin, does not at all touch on the problem of the Russians in Latvia and of the Latvians in Russia. But, following it, many "democrats" already consider themselves citizens of an independent state. Thank goodness that in Russia there were sensible people, and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet did not

ratify this document. But what does the phrase "does not allow" mean? The multimillion-strong United States "did not allow" the hundred thousand-strong Grenada to infringe on the rights of a few hundred Americans, and the no less powerful Great Britain "did not allow" the Falkland Islands, where the population is no more than 2,000 in all, to express its will. Nevertheless, these are independent states. Latvia, whether we like it or not, is a small part of the Soviet Union. In short, the authors, voluntarily or not, gave rise to a thesis whose realization may unpredictable consequences.

**THE FOURTH CLICHE.** The top Soviet leadership maintains itself in power very well, but is unable to lead the country out of the crisis, which will be of a very protracted nature and may lead a military dictatorship to power. In a small independent state it is easier to establish order.

**THE FIFTH CLICHE.** The government of Godmanis does not intend to break off economic ties with the Union. Thus, Latvia, having kept all the pluses in regard to its linkage to the union market, will become still wealthier by developing parallel ties with the West.

**THE SIXTH CLICHE.** The present enterprises of union subordination will be developed further because they are economically advantageous to the republic.

**THE SEVENTH CLICHE.** One can expect a broad program of economic assistance on the part of the West, like the one which was extended in its time to Germany, Japan, and South Korea.

Without a doubt, the tone of these theses has a somewhat different coloration than the previously dominant reckless aspiration to separate from the union at one stroke. If Prime Minister Godmanis understood this, the same cannot be said about the parliament. The slogan "people abroad will help us" remained only a slogan. But, evidently, many radicals dream about preserving all the pluses of the union market at the expense of the other republics, forgetting in so doing that we ourselves are participants in the creation of these very pluses.

New things began to sound in the assessment of union enterprises, which quite recently were declared to be the chief misfortune of Latvia. It turned out, we cannot live without the Ventspilsskiy Port Plant, we have a shortage of energy resources, and for the development of animal husbandry it is necessary to obtain 1.2 million tons of feed. Moreover, even if we sell all the milk that is produced in the republic during a year, we will clear only as much as the RAF Plant produces during a month of work.

We are told: In a small independent state it is easier to establish order. But, as I. Godmanis acknowledged in his speech of 26 February in the Supreme Soviet, the tendencies of disorganization of the economy in Latvia are progressing more quickly than in the Union. One hundred ninety three enterprises are in the state of bankruptcy, there is a production shortage of 119 million



rubles, and the production volume has fallen by 25 percent. These indicators are only for the month of January. If things continue to go further like this, the "small, independent state" will become impoverished by the middle of this year.

At the same time, the aspiration to "establish" order is very noticeable even. The budget of the Ministry of Internal Affairs increased from seven to 142 million rubles; plans call for the investment of 41 million rubles in the creation of structures of an independent state security [service], five million—for the maintenance of a separate battalion of the militia, and on the order of six million for control posts of the customs department. For the maintenance of the institutions of state power, the court, and other administrative units, 255.4 million rubles are envisaged. All of this is written in the Latvian Republic Law on the State Budget.

Finally, on "the broad program of economic assistance on the part of the West. I think: It was precisely the attempts to obtain such assistance that led to the realization of the fact that, without the USSR, the "small state" cannot survive.

**THE EIGHTH CLICHE.** The building of a nationalist authoritarian state in the republic will not be permitted by the strong democratic international political organizations: The Council of Democratic Forces (of the type of our Daugavpilsskiy Council), the Communist Party, which will a place for itself in the political structure of an independent Latvia.

This thesis is no more than a propagandistic trick, calculated for an uninitiated person, since practice demonstrates the opposite. Two hundred years ago, America required less than a year for the adoption of 10 amendments to its constitution, which proclaimed a number of political and procedural rights of its citizens. In Latvia, the building of an independent state followed the opposite course—with the infringement of rights and freedoms, with the division of people into categories, and attempts to create laws for a concrete situation. Let the democrats caring for the people answer this question of mine: Why have a Law on Referenda, a Law on the Recall of People's Deputies, and a Law on Citizenship, etc., not been adopted in the republic? Why did they begin the creation of the "democratic state" with the Law on Languages, the decree on migration, the Law on Alternative Service, the decree on holidays, with the creation of the protection of order? By way of example: If in the European Council only one vote against is heard, the decision is not adopted. The present majority in the parliament is not going after compromises, and no Councils of Democratic Forces of any kind, of the type of the Daugavpilsskiy Council, can realistically influence the situation.

But how many discussions there were about pluralism and glasnost! But all of them turned into the monopoly of the leaders of the Latvian People's Front over the mass media. In support, I will cite an excerpt from the

letter of the director general of the LITA Publishing House addressed to the printing presses of the republic: . . . You have been sent an order concerning the termination of the printing of all publications and orders of the organizations of the Communist Party and Interfront on the printing presses of the republic. This instruction remains in force, regardless of the situation with printing material." There you have it! Simple and clear.

**THE NINTH CLICHE:** If Latvia continues to remain within the structure of the Soviet Union, this will seriously delay the process of the replacement of incompetent and corrupted leaders of various ranks.

Indeed, cadres decide everything. This problem can be "solved" today in one stroke: It is sufficient to repudiate the former political delusions of our youth. The former secretary of the Latvian CP Central Committee for questions of industry, J. Oherins, completely ruled industry during the old regime. Today he is minister for questions of the same industry, but already on the team of the Latvian People's Front. Has something changed from the replacement of the signboards? And who prevented the former chairman of the Council of Ministers, V. Bresis, from managing the economy competently? It turns out, the party ticket?

Having left the Communist Party, its former leaders—now Messrs. A. Gorbunovs, I. Daudiss, J. Skapars, A. Cepanis, J. Blazevis, and many others—they did not leave the helm of power, but they have strengthened their power still further. I do not think that there was an increase in the professionalism of the dozen and a half chairmen of city and rayon ispolkoms who were successfully depoliticized. I will not continue, I will only emphasize the fact that to connect the negligence of the leaders of various ranks with Latvia's being part of the USSR is senseless and, excuse me, stupid.

I hope the resume is clear. In no case can one accept on faith the popular ideological cliches and slogans of the Latvian People's Front. As is evident to any sensible person, they are extremely far from the realities of life.

#### **Katkus Comments on Lithuania's Changing International Contacts**

*9JUN1412A Vilnius VECHEARNIYE NOVOSTI  
in Russian 22 Feb 91 p 1*

[Interview with Valdemaras Katkus, acting Lithuanian foreign minister, by Giedre Milkeviciute; place and date not given: "The World Is Taking Lithuania's Pulse"]

[Text] A heart-shaped piece of land on the world's map—this is Lithuania. On both sides of the globe now people know the location of this country which is so doggedly and insistently seeking independence. Its heart is beating even more strongly following the bloody



January events, calling on people to rise up. We interview Valdemaras Katkus, acting Lithuanian foreign minister, on how the world is taking the pulse of Lithuania and on the contacts that are being established with foreign countries.

[Katkus] The legal foundation of the foreign policy of the Republic of Lithuania was laid on 11 March of last year. Our state's independent contacts with the world began to be established and to strengthen in April, following the formation of the government.

[Milkeviciute] What has changed in Lithuania's international contacts since the tragic events in January?

[Katkus] It is a great pity that it is only after this upheaval that Western states have realized that Lithuania should be recognized not only in words and that a passive policy is no use to anyone. It took the blood of innocent victims for this, alas. The world has finally understood what is happening in the Soviet Union, understood that the democracy declared by M.S. Gorbachev is only words. We have managed to have the question of Lithuania and the other Baltic republics discussed by the European Parliament. NATO meetings have for the first time dealt with the restoration of the independence of the illegally occupied Baltic republics. A corresponding resolution has been adopted. Many Western states are now reconsidering their position in relation to us. A great deal of work overseas has been performed in this field by Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas and Bronius Kuzmickas, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council.

[Milkeviciute] Did Iceland's recognition of Lithuania as an independent state come as a surprise to you?

[Katkus] No. We have warm and mutually beneficial contacts with this country, as with the other northern countries. They understand us well. Our missions and information offices have opened in the Scandinavian countries. This is the window which we have punched through into Europe. It is also a bridge to the world. The significance of the Scandinavian countries in the restoration of the state's independence has yet to be fully appreciated here in Lithuania.

[Milkeviciute] But negotiations with our eastern neighbor—the Soviet Union—remain a hard nut for us to crack. You have just become a member of the commission for these negotiations. Are new paths being found?

[Katkus] First, there has been a change in the composition of the commission on the Soviet side, and we are attempting to elucidate the extent of its competence. Second, it is difficult to embark on negotiations under the present conditions. The Lithuanian Supreme Council Presidium has put to the Kremlin four official questions connected with the events of 13 January and has not as yet received any reply.

[Milkeviciute] The negotiations with Russia are progressing more easily, apparently?

[Katkus] Quite right. Normal relations with the Russian Federation were established last summer, when cooperation documents were signed in Jurmala. A declaration on recognition of the sovereignty of the Baltic states was signed at the end of January in Tallinn. The signing of a Russian-Lithuanian treaty is scheduled for this month. The draft has already been prepared. A meeting in Vilnius recently of deputy ministers of the Baltic states and the Russian Federation discussed ways of realizing mutually profitable agreements and also points of contact in foreign policy. This is all the more important for us in that the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry is attempting also to influence the USSR's policy in respect to the Baltic countries. We are hoping for considerable assistance on the part of former USSR Foreign Minister E. Shevardnadze and the association of independent politicians and experts which is being formed. All this, possibly, will help bring USSR politicians to the negotiating table somewhat more quickly.

[Milkeviciute] Thank you for the interview.

#### **Lithuania's Deputy Prime Minister Interviewed on Legislative Issues**

91UN1412B Vilnius LETUVOS RITAS in Russian  
1 Mar 91 p 2

[Interview with V. Pakalniskis, deputy prime minister of Lithuania, by A. Maldekiene; place and date not given: "Poetry Prefers the Element of Business?"]

[Text] [Maldekiene] You have coauthored the drafts of many laws, economic included. But it seems to me that the property laws, for example, may function normally only after the approval of documents guaranteeing the priority of the interests of the individual over the interests of the state.

[Pakalniskis] In order to subscribe to international human rights conventions, Lithuania has to achieve official recognition. The fundamental idea of contemporary law resides in the priority of international over national rules in all that concerns human rights. In other words, any state adheres in its laws to the principles of international law. Only then is it accepted in the civilized community. I have not noticed any deviations from these rules in our laws. That we do not have a judicial system which guarantees unswerving compliance with the proclaimed principles is another matter.

[Maldekiene] Yes, indeed! And the stamping of the ID? Are the market and privatization conceivable given such a limitation of civil rights?

[Pakalniskis] Registration of the Soviet model is a serious violation of human rights and a limitation of the individual's opportunities. But people have become accustomed to this and feel more at ease if they are registered. After all, only registration guarantees service in a clinic, a job, and an improvement in housing conditions. This is a vestige of the past. A whole number of old laws, whose execution is closely linked with the

idea of registration, still operates. Abandoning this institution at a stroke is impossible.

[Maldekiene] What laws concerning protection of the individual is the government devising currently? Will the right of everyone to objective information soon be secured legislatively?

[Pakalniskis] A group is working on preparation of the concept of the Lithuanian Constitution. It is essential to record therein the basic human rights: the right to property and legal protection and the supremacy of the rules of international law in respect to human rights. This is what is most important. But the constitution must not be a hollow declaration. It is necessary that the judiciary may, if necessary, rely directly on its wording.

[Maldekiene] As soon as discussion of the mechanism of the price increases and the compensation mechanism began, journalists were kicked out of the meeting. Is this not contrary to the current laws of the Republic of Lithuania?

[Pakalniskis] Everywhere in the world there are discussions of a confidential nature. There is the following comparison: It is better that whoever likes spicy sausage not know how it is made. It is a question of the result. So with laws also. Much that we are doing is as yet incompetent, but sincere. This is, of course, a shortcoming of ours as politicians.

[Maldekiene] Is the privatization law sufficiently democratic? Will it help people become wealthier?

[Pakalniskis] It does not set itself far-reaching tasks. It is merely a question of the prerequisites of enterprise. I do not believe that everyone will rush to engage in business immediately.

[Maldekiene] And you?

[Pakalniskis] I am already a spent force in this respect. New people are needed. The privatization act is connected with the legislative status of enterprises. This is why we are paying so close attention to mixed (state-joint stock) ownership. Immediately transferring everything to private ownership would be the same as pushing a person off a roof so that he might fly. The main shortcoming of this law is the difficulty of its existence. There are problems with investment payments here and with their differentiation and with the cash quotations. It will be particularly difficult for the executive. We are trying to manage with the current structures of administration (the ministry, self-government, the plant management). Funds have been provided.

[Maldekiene] How much of them will be allocated for teaching people to invest their money profitably?

[Pakalniskis] Television and a special academy will handle this. The self-governing bodies are faced with a great deal of work. It is they which will hold the auctions

and issue the stock. But the main work is valuation of enterprise property. This will be done mainly at the enterprises themselves.

[Maldekiene] Many people are currently smacking their lips merely at the word "market." But can they live under its conditions?

[Pakalniskis] We should not worry. We should work.

[Maldekiene] Before becoming vice premier, you lectured at the university....

[Pakalniskis] It was there that my thinking was shaped. I am deeply grateful to Professor A. Zurlis, thanks to whom, as of the second year, I really developed a liking for study and for science. It is now the done thing to speak derisively about the social sciences, but it was at the philosophy and political economy lectures that critical thinking began to take shape in me. I subsequently lectured at the university in the Civil Law Department. I defended my dissertation in Moscow.

[Maldekiene] What kind of books do you like?

[Pakalniskis] As a child, I was keen on adventure literature and did not care for poetry. Now it is poetry which I like the most: Ju. Marcinkevicius, V. Mikolaitis-Putinas and F. Tyutchev. I believe that a real book should be reread many times. I read "Don Quixote" again after university and only then understood that this is a book among books. If I had the time to return to it now, I am sure that I would once again discover much that was instructive. It contains great wisdom and a whole theory of state and law. Or, for example, E. Zola's "Money." In one's youth the risqué details are entertaining, but at a mature age one realizes the depth with which economic problems are expounded there. We imagine that the market will save us from all troubles. I believe that it will create new problems also. A new type of person—the entrepreneur—will emerge. And this will mean a new type of relations also.

[Maldekiene] Are you a member of any party?

[Pakalniskis] No. Everything is too much ideologized with us. In democratic countries party programs are devoted mainly to ways of solving economic, legal, and social problems. I wish the same for Lithuania also.

### Lithuania Moves Toward Creation of Armed Forces

91UM0594A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
23 Apr 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by Captain 2d Rank V. Gromak: "We Will Have Our Own Army' Is What They Are Saying in Lithuania. But in Fact an Army Has Already Been Created"]

[Text] It is a secret to no one that the new Lithuanian authorities are about to acquire their own army. Last autumn no one was taking such actions seriously, even

though the process itself had been initiated in a practical way following the proclamation of independence in March of last year. However, the republic leaders are trying not to make too big a show of these matters to world opinion..

With what is this linked? I think that it is linked first and foremost with the "domestic tasks" that will be assigned to the Lithuanian army. And I shall try to show that here in some detail.

It was announced last autumn that 1991 would be the year for the creation of their own army. Already by then their own defense structure was planned in the form of a government department for defense of the region. Now it is planned to institute a draft of young men into its ranks. Even the figures are being cited—from 10,000 to 15,000 men. And all of this is quite realistic.

On 17 January associates from the department took more than 100 firearms from collectors. A training regiment has been openly set up. On 11 April, the chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council himself, V. Landsbergis, offered his congratulations to 400 volunteers who had taken the oath. For what is all this being created?

At a recent meeting with foreign journalists, the general director of the department, A. Butkevicius, was still quite open about this, and he repeated it for the nth time: "Our goal is to defend Lithuania, to defend the motherland." Grandiloquent words but, as they say, just for foreign consumption. In the "domestic market" there are more concrete things. It can be seen immediately for whom all this fuss is being made with the department. All we need do is quote from a statement by that same Butkevicius:

"As of today the regional defense for our republic has four main directions of activity.

"One is the so-called special services, in the border zone and to protect important objects. I am sure that today we in Lithuania should, are obligated, to protect a number of objects. The second important direction is a rescue service, fire-fighting service, and civil defense.

"The third direction is a system of volunteer service to protect the region of Lithuania, and the creation of the nucleus of our national guard. We shall, therefore, strive to have in each rayon of Lithuania a detachment of patriotic people, volunteers who would make up a reserve for primary training, that is, so that if necessary there would be people on whom we could call for help. This group of people would be trained in the best way and would have a thorough knowledge of its business.

"Well, the fourth direction is the nucleus of a regular army, a core, if the republic government decides that it should be set up...

"It is quite clear that as in other republics and countries, in Lithuania what is needed is a stabilizing force, that is, a force that could cull from the party or some other organization the desire or thought that it could with the

help of that force guarantee for itself a path to power. I think that the only such force there can be should be a strong system to defend the region."

I have deliberately quoted this television statement so fully. If we discard all the asides then we can immediately see that the new army and national guard will serve not so much the defense of the region from the outside but will rather exercise political functions within the republic. The more so since purging the republic of "unpatriotic elements" has in fact already started. And here a by no means minor role is being played by Butkevicius' department, with its "patriotic people."

Few journalists are now in the rural areas. But it precisely there that the Butkevicius "company" has assumed the duties of "propagandist and organizer." For example, they are trying to convince the peasants that the paths of the republic and the Union have diverged. But these are words, and they may not be heard. And when the moral arguments fail to work, what then? As a rule, the department employees are not squeamish about using threats.

First of all, of course, they move against the Communists. There are many examples of this. J. Razminas, an inspector with the department for the defense of the region in Siauliai Rayon, demanded that the secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Siauliai rayon committee "quit the premises." This is still just a threat. But this same Razminas with his two aides conducted an armed search of the work place of the secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party organization at the Sakine sovkhos, J. Kucinskiene, and then beat a woman...

True, the department still has few forces. It leaders have recently tried repeatedly to remind the republic leaders of this. The Lithuanian Supreme Council reacted quite quickly to the "comments," passing a law on the volunteer service to defend the region.

What is it proposed to do? First of all to find recruits. For the time being this will be done on a voluntary basis. Here, those selected are being divided into combatants and noncombatants, and honorary volunteers. Militarized formations are being set up on a territorial basis. Companies, detachments, and militia units will be operating. The general director of the department appoints the militia commander, and the chief of staff appoints other command personnel.

It is also proposed that the forces will have their own officers. Whom do they think they will recruit for the service? The trump card is that after serving eight years as an officer, anyone who so wishes may resign and be given a gratuity to build his own house or acquire an apartment on favorable terms. True, it is unclear where the apartments will come from. Deputy Prime Minister Z. Vaisvila helped here, stating openly that the housing problem would be solved through the officers of the Soviet Army, who "in any event will be forced to leave Lithuania."

Officers' courses are already under way in Kaunas, and in Vilnius there is a training unit where warrant officers are being trained. Planned training for volunteers is going on.

"The volunteer," says the chief of staff of the department, I. Gecas, "is a person who does not give up his permanent work but only comes to us for training part time under the terms of a contract."

In undergoing this "thorough and comprehensive check" (I cite from the document), the future professional, the volunteer, undergoes training four times a week. Then each year he must spend 20 days at a training center where, if required, he can also be used "to carry out various missions" "if the circumstances warrant."

We see that the appeal from the president of the USSR to disband all illegal military formations has not been met with a proper understanding among the Lithuanian parliamentarians. On the contrary, they have created a powerful lever with whose help they will easily influence the situation in the republic. And it must be said that they are already succeeding on that plane.

### Caucasus

#### Amendments to Azerbaijani Constitution

91US0464A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 2 Apr 91 p 2

["Law of the Azerbaijani Republic: 'On Changes and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Azerbaijani Republic in Connection With the Improvement of the System of State Administration'"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijani Republic decrees:

1. To introduce in the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Azerbaijani Republic the following changes and additions:

1. In Article 71, replace the words: "Government of the USSR" with the words "USSR Cabinet of Ministers".

2. To exclude Article 88.

3. In Article 92:

to set forth the last sentence of part one as part two of this article; to consider parts two, three, four, and five correspondingly as part three, four, five, and six;

to replace in part five the words "Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers" with the words "Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers" and to exclude the words "state arbiters".

4. In Article 104:

to set forth paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 27, 28, 32, and 34 in the following wording:

"8) election of the first deputy chairman of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet and the deputy chairmen of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet;

9) confirmation, upon recommendation of the President of the Azerbaijani Republic, of the candidature for the post of Prime Minister, giving consent or refusal of the candidatures of the members of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Azerbaijani Republic, giving consent to the dismissal of the indicated persons from their post;

10) formation and abolition, upon recommendation of the President of the Azerbaijani Republic, of ministries of the Azerbaijani Republic and other central organs of the state administration of the Azerbaijani Republic;

11) election, upon recommendation of the President of the Azerbaijani Republic, of the President of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Court and the Chairman of the Azerbaijani Republic High Court of Arbitration;

12) election of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Court, the judges of the Baku city court and the people's judges of the rayon (city) people's courts of the rayons (cities) of republic subordination, and the Azerbaijani Republic High Court of Arbitration;

13) appointment, upon recommendation of the President of the Azerbaijani Republic, of the Procurator-General of the Azerbaijani Republic; confirmation of the collegium of the Azerbaijani Republic procuracy;

27) ratification and denouncement of international and interstate treaties of the Azerbaijani Republic;

28) execution of the monitoring of the granting of loans, economic and other assistance to other states by the Azerbaijani Republic, as well as the conclusion of agreements on state loans and credits being received from other states and from foreign sources;

32) decision of the question of confidence in the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers;

34) abolition of decrees of the Presidium of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet, decrees and orders of the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers in case of their lack of correspondence with the Constitution of the Azerbaijani Republic and the laws of the Azerbaijani Republic;

to supplement with Paragraph 41 of the following content:

"41) examination of questions concerning the disbandment of local Soviets of People's Deputies in case of the systematic violation, by them, of the Constitution of the Azerbaijani Republic, laws of the Azerbaijani Republic and other acts of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet, decrees and orders of the President of the Azerbaijani Republic, and decrees and orders of the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers; the establishment,

until the holding of new elections to the local Soviets of People's Deputies, of a special form of administration on their territory."

5. In part one of Article 110, to exclude the words "to the Azerbaijani Republic Council of Ministers" and "to the Azerbaijani Republic Committee of People's Control", and to replace the words "to the Azerbaijani Republic Chief State Arbiter" with the words "to the Azerbaijani Republic High Court of Arbitration"; and to replace the words "to the Azerbaijani Republic Procurator" with the words "to the Azerbaijani Republic Procurator-General".

6. To supplement Article 113 with part two of the following content:

"The decisions of the Presidium of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet are registered in the form of decrees."

7. To set forth part two of Article 116 in the following wording:

"The appointment or election of officials to membership in the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers, the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Court, the Azerbaijani Republic High Court of Arbitration, the collegium of the Azerbaijani Republic Procuracy, as well as the judges of the Baku City Court, and the people's judges of the rayon (city) people's courts of the rayons (cities) of republic subordination is effected in the presence of a conclusion of the corresponding permanent commissions of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet."

8. In article 117, to replace the words "to the Azerbaijani Republic Council of Ministers" with the words "to the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers."

9. In Article 119-1:

in Paragraph 2, to replace the words "of the Azerbaijani Republic Council of Ministers" with the words "of the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers;" in Paragraph 3, to replace the words "of the Council of Ministers" and "of the State Committees and Departments" correspondingly with "of the Cabinet of Ministers" and "of the central organs of state administration";

in Paragraph 5, to replace the words "of the Azerbaijani Republic Council of Ministers", "Azerbaijani Republic Procurator", and "Azerbaijani Republic Chief State Arbiter" correspondingly with the words "of the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers", "Azerbaijani Republic Procurator-General", and "Azerbaijani Republic High Court of Arbitration"; to exclude the words "of the Azerbaijani Republic Committee of People's Control."

10. To set forth part one of Article 119-2 in the following wording:

"The Azerbaijani Republic Committee for Constitutional Oversight has the right also, on its own initiative,

to present conclusions concerning the conformity of the acts of the highest organs of state power and administration of the Azerbaijani Republic and other organs that are formed or elected by the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet with the Constitution of the Azerbaijani Republic and the laws of the Azerbaijani Republic";

in part three, to replace the words "to the Council of Ministers" with the words "to the President."

11. In Article 120, to exclude parts two and three.

12. To supplement Article 121-1 with part two of the following content: "The President of the Azerbaijani Republic exercises the highest executive power in the Azerbaijani Republic and directs the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers."

13. To set forth part four of Article 121-2 in the following wording: "The President of the Azerbaijani Republic cannot be a deputy of Azerbaijani Republic Councils of People's Commissars."

14. In Article 121-4:

to set forth Paragraphs 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 11 in the following wording: "2) takes measures to protect the sovereignty, guarantee the defense, state security, and territorial integrity of the Azerbaijani Republic, guides the activity of the state organs of the Azerbaijani Republic in these spheres;

4. heads up the system of the organs of state administration and secures their cooperation with the highest organ of state power—by the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet.

6. presents for confirmation to the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet the candidature for the post of Premier of the Azerbaijani Republic; by agreement with the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet forms the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers and introduces changes in its membership; by agreement with the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet, dismisses the Premier and the members of the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers;

7. introduces for review of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet proposals concerning the formation and abolition of ministries of the Azerbaijani Republic and other central organs of state administration of the Azerbaijani Republic; forms under the President of the Azerbaijani Republic and the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers, main administrations and other organs of administration and abolishes them, and appoints and dismisses the executives of these organs;

8. presents for confirmation to the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet the candidatures for the posts of Chairman of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet, Azerbaijani Republic Procurator-General, and Chairman of the Azerbaijani Republic High Court of Arbitration; goes to the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet with a recommendation to dismiss the indicated

persons from their duties, with the exception of the Chairman of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Court;

11) has the right to abolish decrees and orders of the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers, acts of ministries of the Azerbaijani Republic and other organs subordinated to it, decrees and orders of the Council of Ministers (of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic), acts of the executive committees of the local Soviets of People's Deputies, during the period between sessions of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet, has the right to abolish acts of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic Supreme Soviet, Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, the rayon and city Soviets of People's Deputies, with subsequent submission for confirmation of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet";

to supplement paragraph 12 after the words "international" with the words "and inter-state, concludes international inter-governmental treaties"; to supplement with Paragraphs 17 and 18 of the following content:

"17) has the right to suspend the activity of local Soviets of People's Deputies in case of the systematic violation of the Constitution of the Azerbaijani Republic by them, the laws of the Azerbaijani Republic and other acts of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet, ukases and orders of the President of the Azerbaijani Republic, decrees and orders of the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers, and submits proposals for their dismissal for review of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet;

has the right to dismiss from their posts the chairmen of the executive committees of the local Soviets of People's Deputies in case of the violation, by them, of the requirements of the Constitution of the Azerbaijani Republic, the laws of the Azerbaijani Republic and other acts of the the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet, ukases and orders of the President of the Azerbaijani Republic, decrees and orders of the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers, or in case of their lack of fit for the post being occupied;

18) takes measures to carry out the legal policy and exercises guidance of the activity of the law enforcement organs, has the right to form an organ for the coordination of law enforcement activity in the republic."

15) To exclude Article 121-5.

16) To consider Article 121-6 as Article 121-5 and set it forth in the following wording:

"Article 121-5. The President of the Azerbaijani Republic, on the basis and in fulfillment of the Constitution of the Azerbaijani Republic and the laws of the Azerbaijani Republic, issues ukases and orders that have mandatory force throughout the entire territory of the Azerbaijani Republic."

17) To consider Article 121-7 as Article 121-6.

18) To exclude Article 121-8.

19) In Article 121-9, to exclude the words "but if this is impossible—to the Chairman of the Azerbaijani Republic Council of Ministers" and to consider it Article 121-7.

20) To set forth the title of Chapter 14 in the following wording: "Chapter 14. The Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers."

21. To set forth Articles 122, 123, and 124 in the following wording: "Article 122. The Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers is the executive-administrative organ of the Azerbaijani Republic and is subordinated to the President of the Azerbaijani Republic.

Article 123. The Azerbaijani Cabinet of Ministers consists of the Premier, his deputies, the ministers and executives of other central organs of state administration of the Azerbaijani Republic.

The structure of the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers is determined, upon the recommendation of the President of the Azerbaijani Republic, by the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet.

The Chairman of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic Council of Ministers may participate in the work of the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers with the right of a deciding vote.

Article 124. The Cabinet of Ministers of the Azerbaijani Republic is held responsible to the President of the Azerbaijan Republic and the Supreme Soviet. The newly formed Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers presents for review of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet the program of forthcoming activity for the term of its powers.

The Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers, at least once a year, gives an account of its work before the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet.

The Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet may express lack of confidence in the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers, which involves its dismissal. The resolution concerning this question is taken by a majority of votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of deputies of the people's deputies of the Azerbaijani Republic."

22. To set forth Articles 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, and 130 in the following wording:

"Article 125. The Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers is authorized to decide questions of state administration of the Azerbaijani Republic, in so far as they are not included, according to the Constitution of the Azerbaijani Republic, in the competence of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet.

The Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers secures:

the administration of socio-economic development and cultural construction, the execution of financial and credit policy, the implementation of the republic's economic programs, the creation of republic development funds, funds for the liquidation of the consequences of natural disasters and catastrophes, the administration of fuel-energy and transportation systems, communications and information systems, the conduct of policy in the sphere of environmental protection, ecological safety and the use of nature;

implementation of republic programs for food, health protection, social security, employment of the population, concerns for maternity and childhood, youth, culture, education and science, and stimulation of scientific-technical progress;

execution of inter-republic economic, scientific-technical and cultural relations;

regulation of the foreign economic activity of state organs, enterprises, and commercial organizations; customs business;

the carrying out of measures to protect the sovereignty, to secure state security and the defense of the republic;

the carrying out of measures to secure the rights and freedoms of citizens, the protection of property and the public order, and the struggle against crime.

Article 126. The Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers, on the basis and in fulfillment of the Laws of the Azerbaijani Republic, other decisions of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet, ukases and orders of the President of the Azerbaijani Republic, promulgates decrees and orders and verifies their implementation.

Decrees and orders of the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers are subject to mandatory fulfillment throughout the entire territory of the Azerbaijani Republic.

Article 127. The Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers combines and directs the work of the ministries of the Azerbaijani Republic and the other organs subordinated to it.

Article 128. The ministries and other central organs of state administration of the Azerbaijani Republic direct the sectors of administration entrusted to them or carry out inter-sectoral administration, being subordinated to the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers.

Article 129. The ministries and other central organs of state administration in the Azerbaijani Republic bear responsibility for the state and development of the spheres of administration entrusted to them; within the limits of their competence, they promulgate acts on the basis and in fulfillment of the laws of the Azerbaijani Republic and other decisions of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet, ukases and orders of the

President of the Azerbaijani Republic, decrees and orders of the President of the Azerbaijani Republic, decrees and orders of the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers, and organize and verify their fulfillment.

Article 130. The competence of the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers, the procedure for its activity, the relations with other state organs, as well as the list of ministries and other central organs of state administration of the Azerbaijani Republic are determined by the law of the Azerbaijani Republic."

23. In Article 134, to exclude the word "USSR" and to replace the words "of the decrees and orders of the USSR Council of Ministers" with the words "of the ukases and orders of the President of the Azerbaijani Republic, to replace the words "of the Azerbaijani Republic Council of Ministers" with the words "of the decrees and orders of the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers."

24. To set forth Article 150 in the following wording:

"Article 150. The executive and administrative organs of the local Soviets of People's Deputies are obligated to carry out the laws of the Azerbaijani Republic and other acts of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet, the ukases and orders of the President of the Azerbaijani Republic, and the decrees and orders of the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers.

The executive and administrative organs of the local Soviets are directly accountable both to the Soviet which elected them and to the higher executive and administrative organ."

25. To exclude part one of Article 152.

26. In Article 154, to replace the words "by the Azerbaijani Republic Council of Ministers" with the words "by the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers," to exclude the words "proceeding from the state plan of economic and social development of the USSR"; to replace the words "of the state committees and other organs of state administration" with the words "of other central organs of state administration."

27. To set forth Article 155 in the following wording:

"Article 155. The President of the Azerbaijani Republic submits the state plan for economic and social development of the Azerbaijani Republic for review of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet.

The Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet, on the basis of the report submitted by the President of the Azerbaijani Republic and the conclusions of the corresponding permanent commissions of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet, discusses and approves the state plan for the economic and social development of the Azerbaijani Republic."

28. In Article 156, to replace the words "Council of Ministers" with the words "Cabinet of Ministers".

29. To exclude Article 158.

30. To set forth Article 161 in the following wording:

"Article 161. The state budget of the Azerbaijani Republic is developed by the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers on the basis of the state plan and the programs for economic and social development of the Azerbaijani Republic and is confirmed by the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet on the basis of the report submitted by the President of the Azerbaijani Republic and the conclusions of the corresponding permanent commissions of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet."

31. To set forth the title of part IX in the following wording:

"IX. Judicial Proceedings and Procuratorial Supervision".

32. To set forth the title of Chapter 21 in the following wording: "Chapter 21. Courts".

33. To set forth part three of Article 163 in the following wording:

"The organization and order of activity of the courts of the Azerbaijani Republic are determined by the Azerbaijani Republic Law on Justice."

34. To set forth part six of Article 164 in the following wording:

"Judges and people's assessors may be recalled in the manner established by law."

35. To set forth part three of Article 165 in the following wording:

"The organization and order of activity of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet are determined by the Law on the Supreme Court of the Azerbaijani Republic."

36. To set forth the first sentence of Article 171 in the following wording: "Judicial proceedings in the Azerbaijani Republic are conducted in the Azerbaijani language or in the language of the majority of the population of a given locality."

37. To set forth Article 175 in the following wording:

"Article 175. The resolution of economic disputes in the Azerbaijani Republic is carried out through the Azerbaijani Republic High Court of Arbitration.

The interference of any organs, organizations, and officials in the activity of courts in the resolution of disputes is not allowed.

The organization and the order of the activity of the Azerbaijani Republic High Court of Arbitration is determined by the law of the Azerbaijani Republic."

38. To set forth Articles 176 and 177 in the following wording:

"Article 176. Supervision of the exact and uniform execution of the laws by all ministries and other central organs of state administration of the Azerbaijani Republic, enterprises, institutions and organizations, executive and administrative organs of the local Soviets of People's Deputies, political parties, public organizations and mass movements, officials, as well as citizens on the territory of the Azerbaijani Republic, is carried out by the Azerbaijani Republic Procurator-General and the procurators subordinated to him.

Article 177. The Procurator-General of the Azerbaijani Republic is appointed and dismissed, upon the recommendation of the President of the Azerbaijani Republic, by the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet and is accountable to the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet.

The Procurator of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, the rayon and city procurators, and the Azerbaijani Transportation Procurator, and the transportation procurators subordinated to him are appointed and dismissed by the Procurator-General of the Azerbaijani Republic and confirmed by the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet.

39. In Article 179, to exclude the words "being subordinated only to the Procurator-General of the USSR" and to supplement with part two of the following content: "The organization and order of activity of the organs of the procuracy of the Azerbaijani Republic are determined by the law of the Azerbaijani Republic."

II. The present law enters into force from the moment of its adoption. The organ and officials accountable to the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet retain their powers until the formation of the corresponding state organs and the appointment of the officials in accordance with the present law."

A. Mutalibov, president,  
Azerbaijani Republic  
Baku, 5 March 1991.

### Corrections to Azerbaijani Constitution Amendments

91US0464B Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian  
3 Apr 91 p 4

#### [Corrections to Azerbaijani Constitution]

[Text] In the text of the Law of the Azerbaijani Republic: "On Changes and Additions of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Azerbaijani Republic in connection with the improvement of state administration" published on 2 April 1991, inaccuracies were permitted.

Article 128 of the Constitution should read: "The Ministries and other central organs of state administration of the Azerbaijani Republic directs the sectors of administration entrusted to them or carry out intersectoral administration." In Article 165, instead of "of the Supreme Court", "of the Supreme Soviet" was printed.

Deputy editor  
M. Sh. Shukurov



**Georgian Commission on 9 April Events Responds to USSR Procurator's Report**

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[Report by Tamaz Shavgulidze, doctor of juridical sciences and chairman of the Georgian Supreme Soviet Commission To Investigate the Events of 9 April 1989 in the City of Tbilisi, and by subcommission chairmen: Academician Tamaz Gamkrelidze; Academician Malkhaz Zaalishvili; Academician Bidzina Naneyshvili; Shota Nadirashvili, corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences; Tengiz Liluashvili, doctor of juridical sciences; Dzhoni Khetsuriani, candidate of juridical sciences; and Eldar Shengelaya, director: "Statement Regarding the Memorandum of USSR Procurator General N.S. Tribun: 'Concerning the Results of the Investigation of the Criminal Case Concerning Officials and Military Personnel of the USSR MVD Internal Forces and the Soviet Army, Who Took Part in the Stopping of an Unauthorized Mass Meeting in the City of Tbilisi on 9 April 1989'"<sup>1</sup>; passages in boldface as published]

[Text] According to the conclusion of the Georgian Supreme Soviet Commission to Investigate the Events of 9 April 1989 in the City of Tbilisi, the crime committed in Tbilisi on 9 April was one of the most serious in the history of the Soviet state. It had the characteristics of a punitive operation. It was a bloody battle against innocent people, organized in advance, carried out with particular ruthlessness, and it involved the use of prohibited chemical substances. It possessed the indications of an international crime, specifically a crime against humanity. The commission denounced as the perpetrators of this serious crime Georgia's leadership at that time, leaders of the Soviet Army and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), as well as the military personnel who directly carried out this punitive operation. The commission established by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies to investigate the 9 April events came to essentially the same conclusions. The conclusions of the two commissions were shared by the Georgian Supreme Soviet and the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

As a result of a nearly two-year investigation of the crime committed on 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi, the Office of the Chief Military Procurator halted the criminal proceedings brought against officials and military personnel of the USSR MVD internal troops and the Soviet Army for the lack of corpus delicti in their actions. USSR Procurator General N.S. Tribun confirmed the legality of dropping the case and found no basis for adopting a different decision. The case was dropped not due to inadequacy of the evidence but because the military personnel in general had not committed a crime. From this only one conclusion can be drawn: either the officials of the USSR Procurator's Office were covering up for the criminals and in this way committed a new

large-scale crime, or the commission consciously slandered a whole series of officials and military personnel by falsely accusing them of having committed a serious crime.

We state with a full measure of responsibility that the cessation of criminal proceedings is based on a false representation of the facts, by an obvious distortion of the essence and content of the normative acts and by a completely unjustified judgment by the institutions of criminal law:

**1. According to the conclusion of the Georgian Supreme Soviet's investigative commission, the actual decision to halt the mass meeting by force was illegal as a result of the following circumstances:**

a) "The mass meeting which took place from 4-9 April in front of Government House was peaceful and did not give rise to violence for the purpose of overthrowing the Soviet system, nor did it pose a threat to people's life and health; for this reason there was no legal basis or necessity for the decision to halt the mass meeting by calling for sub-units of the Soviet Army. The decision adopted by the republic's leadership and officials of the USSR Ministry of Defense to halt the meeting was an illegal act for which they must be held accountable as stipulated by the law."

b) The decision to halt the mass meeting was adopted in gross violation of Point 14 Article 119 of the USSR Constitution because sub-units of the Soviet Army were called in to halt the meeting without the USSR Supreme Soviet having declared martial law or a state of emergency in the Georgian capital.

c) Contrary to the statement made by A. Lukyanov at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the commission thinks that from the very first day of the mass meeting the central authorities were informed of the Tbilisi situation and all actions which were carried out by the republic's leadership were coordinated with the center...

d) The 8 April 1989 order of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers, according to which the internal troops and the Soviet Army units were assigned to remove the meeting participants from the square in front of Government House, and the implementation of other measures to preserve public order constituted an illegal act because the existing constitutional legislation and other normative acts do not invest the republic's Council of Ministers with such powers.

e) The process of deciding whether to start criminal proceedings against the leaders of informal associations according to a plan of measures compiled by the secretariat of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee and the examination of this issue at a meeting of the party aktiv constituted a gross violation of legality.

Because the decision to halt the meeting was an illegal act and the implementation of this resolution resulted in very serious consequences, the commission sets before

the Georgian SSR Procurator's Office and the USSR procurator general the issue of examining and resolving according to established procedure the question of the responsibility of all officials who took part in the adoption of this decision. (pp 193-195)<sup>2</sup>

**2. The USSR Procurator's Office comes to the opposite conclusion. In its opinion, the decision to halt the mass meeting in front of Government House and to call in sub-units of the Soviet Army for this purpose was lawful.** The investigation substantiates this position by claiming that the "leaders of the informal associations changed the slogans to nationalistic ones, openly propagandizing the ideas of chauvinism and national exclusiveness; they demanded complete independence for Georgia and its withdrawal from the '...Russo-Soviet Empire.'" At the mass meeting "an appeal was read out to the U.S. Congress and the NATO member countries requesting assistance to help Georgia leave the USSR and to recognize 25 February 1921 as the 'day of Georgia's occupation by the Bolshevik forces of Russia.'" (pp 3-4)<sup>3</sup>

Based on the situation described, the procurator's office concludes that "numerous materials, documents and depositions provide evidence of the extreme incandescence of passions and the aggressive condition of the meeting participants; as a result, the decision adopted on 8 April 1989 by the Buro of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee and the GSSR Council of Ministers to halt the unauthorized mass meeting in the city of Tbilisi was justified and necessary." (p 7)

The investigation says nothing about how the spreading of "propaganda for the ideas of chauvinism and national exclusiveness" was specifically manifested. If the procurator general thinks that the demand for Georgia's independence means spreading propaganda for national exclusiveness and the ideas of chauvinism, this is an obvious distortion of the facts. The demand for Georgia's independence is based not on the idea of chauvinism but on the sovereign right of the Georgian people to control their own destiny, on the right of free withdrawal from the Union of SSR's, which is established by the USSR Constitution itself. (p 72). While the USSR procurator general considers the demand by the meeting participants for recognition of 25 February 1921 as the date of Georgia's annexation by Bolshevik Russia to be propaganda for the ideas of chauvinism and national exclusiveness, this was, after all, only a demand to recognize a historical fact and—what is most important—this demand was confirmed subsequently, during the Communist Party's rule in Georgia, by the Supreme Soviet of Georgia on 9 March 1990.

It is difficult to deny the peaceful nature of the mass meeting, and without this it is impossible to substantiate the need and lawfulness of the decision to call in sub-units of the army to halt the meeting. Nor can the procurator's office deny that before the rally was halted the participants were singing and dancing, but it tries to explain this in its own way: "...at 3 hours 50 minutes (10 minutes before the start of the operation) music and

singing were heard, and in certain spots along the prospect small groups of demonstrators were beginning to dance. The dances organized at several spots were for show and reflected a gaiety which was unnatural during a time of impending danger, while the presence on the square of media representatives equipped with cameras to take still photographs and videos, including specialists who had come from Moscow, provides evidence that the leaders of the informal organizations were acting according to a previously worked out scenario in attempting to give the mass meeting the appearance of a harmless, peaceful demonstration." (pp 8-9)

The main point is not what kind of motives the leaders of the informal associations had, but rather the fact that before it was crushed, the meeting was objectively peaceful in nature, and, as one could see on many videotapes, people were standing with lighted candles and singing.

**3. The peaceful nature of the rally substantially determined the illegality of executing the decision to halt the rally through the use of military force.** According to the conclusion of the Georgian Supreme Soviet investigative commission: "The decision to halt the rally was carried out on 9 April 1989 at 4 AM. Colonel General I. Rodionov led the operation. Subordinate to him were military formations from all service branches, headed by I. Kuznetsov, first deputy commander of troops in the Transcaucasian Military District, and I. Yefimov, head of the operational command of the internal forces.... The actions of I. Rodionov and the military units subordinate to him were in fact directed not at dispersing the meeting but at crushing it. The following circumstances confirm this:

- a) Dispersal of the meeting began when the number of participants exceeded 10,000;
- b) Complete calm reigned before the meeting was crushed;
- c) Before the start of the rout the military authorities presented no ultimatum demanding the dispersal of the rally;
- d) Before the direct actions by the troops no effort was made to use methods less harmful to human life and health (aiming streams of water, etc.);
- e) Before the rout all exits from the square, which is located in front of Government House, were blocked by military personnel and equipment, with the exception of one narrow street adjacent to the Kashvetskaya Church. In fact, all paths of retreat for the meeting participants were closed off in advance;
- f) Military units surrounded the meeting participants and beat them mercilessly with truncheons and sapper shovels especially used for inflicting injuries on people; poisonous chemical substances which are prohibited were used, as were firearms. The soldiers pursued those fleeing; they burst into buildings in which citizens were

hiding, and beat those who had fallen, showing no mercy to women, minors or old people. They broke shop windows, and they deliberately damaged state and personal property;

g) Those wounded and maimed by the military included the hungry, medical workers who were giving aid to the victims, and unarmed employees of the Georgian militia, who were carrying out their official duties."

"As a result of the crushing of the peaceful demonstration 19 people died, including 16 women (two of whom were minors, one of whom was pregnant). There were no deaths among the military." (pp 195-196)

Thus the illegal crushing of a peaceful mass meeting led to very serious consequences. First of all, the actual participation in the rout by army sub-units was illegal. The only basis for army participation in the crushing of the rally could have been the declaration of martial law or a state of emergency in Tbilisi. Nothing of this kind took place; thus I. Rodionov's actual leadership was unlawful. But this is not the main point; the main point is that the investigation did not establish who precisely appointed I. Rodionov as leader of the operation.

Dzh. Patiashvili explained that I. Rodionov stated to him that he (Rodionov) had been appointed as leader of the operation, but who appointed him, he did not know. In response to our persistent questioning I. Rodionov stated that of all the possible leaders he was the most senior in rank, for this reason he took the leadership upon himself. If this is so, then in his actions I. Rodionov must be considered to have exceeded his official powers. That is a criminal offense. The answer to this question should have been given by the investigation carried out by the procurator's office. It studied in detail the circumstances of the case and came to the following conclusion: "In accordance with the USSR Law: 'Concerning the Obligations and Rights of the Internal Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Protection of Public Order,' leadership of the internal troops is exercised by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, while direct control is exercised by the commander of the internal troops... According to the law, responsibility for ensuring public order is entrusted to the leader of the territorial organ of internal affairs or to another authorized official of a higher organ of internal affairs. Taking this into account, as well as the requirements of Articles 60, 597 and 598 of the Charter of Combat Service of the Internal Troops, it is the republic's minister of internal affairs who must exercise leadership of operations to halt violations of public order. At the same time, according to the law, leadership of the forces and other resources of the organs of internal troops may be assigned to a representative of the USSR MVD... Major General Yefimov was such a representative." (pp 20-21) The procurator's office acknowledges that "Colonel General I.N. Rodionov, as commander of the troops in the military district, possessed the rights of chief (commander) with regard to all troops within the territory of the district only on questions of guard and garrison duty

(Article 4 of the Charter of Garrison and Guard Service of the USSR Armed Services). The legislation does not stipulate any other case in which the internal troops of the USSR MVD are subordinated to representatives of the Soviet Army." (p 21) From this the Procurator's Office could have drawn only one conclusion: I. Rodionov's leadership of the "operation" to halt the 9 April rally was an illegal act. In fact, however, absolutely the opposite conclusion was drawn: "As is evident from the materials of the case, after troops from the USSR MVD" and the Soviet Army were concentrated in Tbilisi, a situation arose in which the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs was represented by Major General Yefimov, who was head of operational control of the USSR MVD GUVV (Main Directorate of Internal Troops), while the USSR Ministry of Defense was represented by Army General Kochetov, i.e., by leaders varying in rank. The commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, Colonel General Rodionov, in terms of position and rank occupied a higher official position than Yefimov and Lieutenant General Gorgodze, minister of internal affairs of the GSSR MVD." (p 21) On the basis of such incorrect arguments, the Procurator's Office concludes that "I.N. Rodionov was appointed by a decision of the Buro of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee as leader of the operation upon the representation by his superior, Kochetov, to whom he owed unquestioning obedience." (p 22)

It is an obvious lie that the Buro of the Georgian Communist Party (CPG) Central Committee appointed Rodionov as leader of the operation. No document confirming this exists, and indeed the CPG did not have the right to do so.

There is also no doubt that a "representation" is not an "appointment." So why should the general have been obedient "in a representation?" The investigation did not provide an answer to the question of who appointed Rodionov leader of the operation! It is thought that the Procurator's Office is obviously covering up for that high official who gave the order appointing Rodionov.

#### 4. The operation to halt the rally was obviously criminal.

According to the conclusion of the Georgian Supreme Soviet investigative commission, there was a violation of the 28 July 1988 ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium: "Concerning Obligations and Rights of the Internal Troops of the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs in the Protection of Public Order," which contains an exhaustive list of the circumstances under which arms are to be used by the internal troops. During the crushing of the meeting arms were used under circumstances in which they are forbidden by the ukase. "In particular, the following were used as weapons: a) sharpened shovels, which are "cold" weapons if they are especially used to inflict injury on people...b) "bird cherry" (cheremukha) of various kinds, which contains mainly a toxic agent—chloroacetophenone (CHAPH), a stronger toxic chemical agent called "CS," and chloropicrin...The use

of such chemical substances as "CS" (K-51) and chloropicrin is forbidden in those instances in which the law permits the use of weapons. The list of special means which can be used by the internal troops does not contain "CS" (K-51) or chloropicrin. And it was precisely the use of prohibited chemical agents which resulted in especially serious consequences. Thus, a crime was committed which contained the signs of premeditated murder carried out with particular cruelty and in a manner which endangered the life of many people (Point 6, Article 104 of the Georgian Criminal Code).

Only Major General I. Yefimov could have given the order to use forbidden chemical agents. For this reason the responsibility for the above-mentioned crime must rest with him and the general leader of the operation, I. Rodionov.

In addition to the sharpened shovels and toxic chemical agents, firearms were also used on 9 April. The case of D. Payldze, who was seriously wounded, confirms this; he lost both eyes. He was the victim of attempted murder with aggravating circumstances. (pp 198-200)

In order to cover up the crime committed on 9 April in Tbilisi the USSR Procurator's Office embarked upon the obvious falsification of the facts, first of all by covering up those serious consequences which occurred as a result of the crushing of the mass meeting.

The number of victims resulting from the action carried out by Soviet Army sub-units and the internal forces on 9 April was reduced artificially by the procurator; it was indicated that only 167 people received injuries of various kinds.

In reality the medical facilities in the city of Tbilisi registered 4,053 cases of injuries resulting from the conduct of this action. It is understood that some victims went to various institutions more than once, which had some effect on the number of victims. And it is natural that in an extreme situation the process of counting victims was not without inadequacies, but the errors amounted to only an insignificant percentage, which was confirmed subsequently by repeated counts.

Out of approximately 4,000 victims, 707 were treated as in-patients. This figure is accurate and based on official clinical documentation. The following were observed among the in-patients: wounds (eight), fractures (12); closed skull injuries (94) and contusions (64). There were also soft tissue injuries of the head and body, hemorrhages, traumatic injuries of the eyes, etc. As indicated above, one person suffered an injury caused by firearms with irreversible damage to both eyes. Not one word about this serious case is mentioned in the procurator's memorandum. The investigation points out that a total of 13 people were poisoned as a result of the use of the special toxic chemical agents by military units. In reality, more than 300 of those treated in hospitals were poisoned as a result of the use of toxic chemical substances. In general, however, up to 3,000 people went to medical facilities complaining of poisoning. It should be noted in

particular that a report by a USSR Ministry of Health commission, whose work is led by the director of a Union center for the treatment of acute poisonings, takes note of 350 cases of poisoning.

A report by a delegation of specialists from the International Red Cross emphasizes that the 314 people whom they studied had toxic injuries (poisoning). The delegation persistently demanded the creation of a dispensary to provide long-term treatment for the purpose of conducting observations and catamnestic treatment of patients who were poisoned on 9 April. A dispensary of this kind was founded, and it continues to function; our doctors as well as foreign ones are still treating many hundreds of patients who were poisoned. All of the above is confirmed by Physicians for Human Rights, an international organization whose conclusion was published in 1990 (J. Lenining, Ruth Barron, Barry Remak).

The USSR procurator general points to disturbances in the psychological sphere, in this way supposedly attempting to mitigate the severity of the poisoning. In fact, in addition to those who were poisoned by chemical substances and received traumatic injuries, there were many others among whom neuro-psychological disturbances were observed. This proves only that the action of 9 April was carried out with particular brutality; the reactive states which developed took the form of "reaction-to-catastrophe syndrome." Moreover, under "catastrophe" what is understood in this case is not some natural disaster, but a psychological stress (a feeling of social and legal defenselessness, fear of unrestrained cruelty and aggressiveness, etc.). The maimed included considerable numbers of children, adolescents and women.

In the document the procurator general categorically points to the cause of people's death during the crushing of the demonstration as being "pressure," "mechanical asphyxiation arising from compression of the thorax." Such is the conclusion of the forensic medical examination, which was held in Moscow. Before that there was the conclusion of the forensic medical examination which was conducted in Tbilisi, which confirmed that in 12 cases the cause of death was the effect of toxic chemical substances. Thus the materials of the investigation contained two different conclusions. According to the decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet special commission (Chairman A. Sobchak) the existing materials and preparations were studied in detail by well-known Moscow specialists, who came to the conclusion that the development of asphyxiation, which caused the onset of death, resulted from both the compression of the thorax and the inhalation of toxic chemical agents. The investigation had available two opposite views on the cause of death; it was completely unjustified in naming "pressure" as the sole cause of death. It is difficult to imagine that for all the people who were subjected to compression in the thoracic area, asphyxiation proved to be fatal; it is difficult to imagine that there was not a single person

who could survive this state and go to a medical facility for help due to the traumatic asphyxiation he had received.

Based on all of the above, there would seem to be very substantial grounds for saying that the cause of death was not mechanical asphyxiation arising from compression of the thorax, but, rather that toxic chemical agents played the more significant role.

The effective treatment of those who were poisoned was complicated by the fact that the military at first categorically denied that military units had used toxic agents. Only the persistent demands by the broad community forced the military forced to acknowledge after a long delay that when they crushed the demonstration they had used the so-called "CHAPH" (cheremukha) and "CS" (K-51). The procurator general's document contains virtually nothing about this.

If one is to believe the USSR procurator general, the results from studies of fabric samples taken from the clothing of those who died, as well as from control subjects, who were lifted up in the the place where people died, no signs of their having come into contact with the gases "CHAPH" and "CS" or any other toxic substances were discovered.

It should be noted that these substances are easily absorbed by fabrics when they are used. It is as a result of the analysis of clothing from those who died that the Georgian Supreme Soviet commission established that on 9 April in Tbilisi the armed forces used "CHAPH" and "CS." We should note that in contrast to the Leningrad specialists, who took only small pieces of fabric from the clothing of the deceased (and for this reason they had no absolute guarantee that the toxic substances had been applied on exactly those spots), the commission had at its disposal the remaining parts of the clothing, and for this reason it was established as a result of analysis by special equipment that a majority of those who died were in direct contact with the toxic substances "CHAPH" and "CS." Here, too, we should note that the information cited on the 10th page of the procurator's memorandum that only 27 units of "bird cherry" (cheremukha) and four units of "CS" were used on 9 April during the action on Rustaveli Prospect does not correspond to reality. As a result of experiments in which N. Loshadkin, doctor of chemical sciences and senior instructor at the Military Academy of Chemical Defense imeni Timoshenko, and A. Druzhinin, leader of the Scientific Research Laboratory of that same academy, participated directly, it was established that on 9 April at the site of the events, significantly more units of the toxic agents were used. There is evidence of this in the distribution of chloroacetophenone and "CS" shown on the map compiled from the results of the analyses and attached to the conclusion of both the USSR Supreme Soviet commission and the Georgian Supreme Soviet commission.

It should be noted in particular that the degree of poisoning depends on the method of application and the direction of the flow of the toxic substances. According to the depositions by the meeting participants, the soldiers sprayed the poisoning agents directly into the faces of women, which caused the serious forms of the victims' poisoning. Thus the special resources were not used "with consideration for their tactical-technical indicators."

The clinical picture of the poisoning was not explained by the use of the two varieties of toxic agents established by the Georgian Supreme Soviet commission—chloroacetophenone and "CS." For this reason it should be assumed that another substances was also used. This was specifically pointed out in the conclusion compiled by the special commission of the International Red Cross. An analysis of soil taken from the land in front of Government House and Kashvetskaya Church, carried out by modern physico-chemical methods led the commission to the discovery of a third substance—chloropicrin. In the opinion of the commission the possibility cannot be excluded that on 9 April yet another type of agent was used against the meeting participants—a neurotropic substance, which specifically acts on the neurons of the central and peripheral nervous systems and causes the blocking of those neurons. However, it has not been ruled out that this effect could be caused in part by chloropicrin because the latter is a general-action neurotropic substance.

**5. The commission to investigate the events of 9 April especially singles out the crime committed against employees of the internal affairs organs of Georgia.**

In the commission's conclusion we read that on 9 April, at the request of the respective organs, militiamen were positioned on the square in front of Government House. The military personnel fell upon the militiamen and ruthlessly beat them only because they were trying to get people in serious condition to the first aid vehicles. Many of the militia workers received serious injuries.

In this case the indications of a crime were present, specifically, encroachment on the life of militia workers while they were protecting public order.

The commission focuses attention on the circumstance that in accordance with the 8 July 1988 ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet, "it is forbidden to use weapons ... toward women and minors with the exception of cases of armed attack on their part." Despite this, out of 19 who died 16 were women, including two minors. Of those who were maimed and poisoned the young women were in the majority.

The commission also emphasizes that the military interfered with the first aid brigades—medical workers dressed in white coats—as they attempted to help the maimed. The military personnel also smashed the first aid vehicles. As a result of all this, the victims included medical workers. These actions constitute a gross violation of the public norms of international law.

All of the above gave the commission grounds for drawing the following conclusions: "The illegal decision to halt the mass meeting was executed by illegal means and methods. This was not a dispersal of a meeting, it was a punitive operation, which resulted in especially serious consequences, criminal responsibility for which must rest, first of all, with I. Rodionov as the organizer of the indicated criminal operation, and also with his assistants: the generals I. Kuznetsov and I. Yefimov."

"Those people who directly instigated and concretely executed this very serious crime must be identified by the USSR Procurator's office; it must investigate this crime and resolve the question of the criminal responsibility of the indicated persons." (p 201)

**6. The USSR Procurator's Office investigated the case for nearly two years and came to the conclusion that not a single crime had been committed by a single military person; they had all acted in accordance with the law.** The investigation arrived at this through a gross distortion of the factual circumstances of the case, but in places where this kind of gross distortion was impossible, it was arrived at by an obviously incorrect legal judgment of people's actions.

First of all, the investigation is trying to present the meeting participants as the attackers and the military as the victims who were trying to defend themselves against people armed with metal sticks, knives, and explosive devices. (p 6) In the procurator's conclusion we read that the fact that more military personnel, who were protected by special vests, helmets and shields, were injured than civilians, who had no such means of protection, provides evidence of the degree of physical resistance. According to data from the investigation, 189 military personnel suffered injuries, of whom not one was injured seriously (pp 14-15). Even if one is to believe the accuracy of these figures, can it really be claimed that this is more than 19 dead, one person with eyes shot out by bullets, and hundreds maimed and poisoned?

The investigation justifies the restationing of a paratroop regiment in Tbilisi by saying that it had been given a specific mission to protect the most important state facilities. (p 18) In the opinion of the Procurator's Office, the officials who made the decision to send to the city of Tbilisi operational units of the internal units of internal troops and special subdivisions of the militia, did not violate the law because these measures "were aimed at maintaining public order in the Georgian capital, were not permanent in nature and did not limit the rights of citizens." (p 19) This would be correct if martial law or a state of emergency had been declared in Tbilisi or if it had all ended with military units entering Tbilisi and protecting special facilities, but these units crushed a peaceful mass meeting and destroyed people. Does this "not limit the rights of citizens?"

To this question the investigation gives the following answer: "The plan of the operation did not call for participation by a paratroop regiment in forcing out the

meeting participants. However, while it was being carried out, groups of actively resisting demonstrators on the left flank, armed with sticks, stones and other means of attack, penetrated beyond the troop sub-units and attacked the military personnel from the rear. At that point I. Rodionov gave the order to stop these actions using the forces of a paratroop company. The participation of the paratroopers in the operation did not last long and was localized. In defending themselves against the attackers, the paratroopers were forced to use against four people (men) small infantry shovels, which are part of their equipment. For purposes of self-defense some of the paratroopers inflicted on the attackers blows with their hands and feet, and they used belts and other objects. The paratroopers did not use force, specifically the shovels, against women and adolescents. No serious consequences resulted from actions of the paratroopers. None of the the Soviet Army servicemen came into direct contact with those who died, and the people's deaths are not directly related to the actions of the paratroop company." (pp 27-28) The investigation considers it established that Kvasoliashvili died from a serious cranio-cerebral trauma received when he struck a blunt hard object as a result of a fall during the action while he was using karate techniques to resist military personnel. (p 12)

In general, the investigation came to the following conclusion with regard to the actions of the paratroopers: "The paratroopers were subjected to illegal encroachment by a large group of demonstrators, in the situation which developed they had the right to actively oppose the attack. The means of defense which they chose—inflicting blows against the attacking men with small infantry shovels, their feet and other means—corresponded to the nature of the attack and were commensurate with the means used by the attackers. Given these circumstances, the military paratroopers were operating in a state of necessary defense and on the basis of Article 15, Chapter I of the GSSR Criminal Code, the criminal case in this part was halted due to lack of corpus delicti. (p 28)

If the military paratroopers did not commit a crime, they themselves were victims and were only defending themselves against attack by the meeting participants. Naturally Rodionov is not subject to criminal proceedings because his order (to force out the meeting participants with the help of paratroopers armed with infantry shovels) did not lead to the onset of serious consequences: that is the conclusion to which the investigation came. In its opinion, I. Rodionov's actions in introducing paratroopers were not a crime because they resulted from the changed situation, which threatened the operation with failure and with possible harm to the life and health of military personnel and citizens. (p 28)

Thus, the investigation justifies the paratroopers and I. Rodionov in the commission of a serious crime, in a

massive pogrom against the people, while crudely distorting the circumstances of the case and the facts, as well as manifesting a fundamentally mistaken legal judgment of the circumstances.

The short passage quoted from the USSR procurator general's memorandum makes it completely clear that the paratroopers attacked the meeting participants. They, however, as the investigation itself recognizes, "actively resisted them." The fact that the attack was illegal can be seen from the very materials of the investigation. In the first place, the paratroopers in general had no right to participate in the "struggle" against the meeting participants and, in the second place, they had no right to use sharpened infantry shovels against unarmed people. In this case, and these are the rudiments of a school truth, it was the meeting participants who were in a state of necessary defense, and they were the ones who, in accordance with Article 15 of the Georgian Criminal Code had the right to actively defend themselves, or as the investigation itself recognizes, to offer active resistance to those attacking. Moreover, if their lives were threatened, they had—for the purpose of self defense—the right even to kill an attacker, and it would be considered necessary defense. If, however, the meeting participants were in a state of necessary defense for the purpose of self-protection, and they offered active resistance to those attacking, even causing them harm, this cannot put the attacker in the state of necessary defense because necessary defense against necessary defense is not acceptable—this is an elementary legal truth recognized throughout the world. But that is not the main point, the main point is that the meeting participants were not armed and their "resistance" did not endanger the life and health of the military personnel. This is clearly confirmed by the videotape made by the Georgian Procurator's Office after the crushing of the mass meeting on 9 April; the tape also confirms that during the examination of the site of the events neither "cold" weapons nor firearms, nor any other objects designed to inflict bodily harm on people was discovered.

One is struck by the primitiveness of the very gross distortion of the factual circumstances of the case. The investigation claims that the paratroopers used infantry shovels only against four men; as for Kvasroliashvili, he used karate, he himself took up this technique, hit his head on the asphalt and died. It cannot be denied that during the pogrom of the meeting participants an extreme situation was created, and the participants and the military were mixed up together. In this terrible battle who could count how many people the paratroopers were threatening and how many they were hitting with infantry shovels, and who could determine that they were beating only men? How did the investigation prove that Kvasroliashvili used karate? This fact is clarified by the forensic medical examination, which is signed by the forensic medicine expert of the Transcaucasian Medical District, as well as other specialists. The report of the examination indicates that the

death of Citizen Kvasroliashvili came as a result of a penetrating gash to the head. Kvasroliashvili could not have received such a wound by hitting his head on the asphalt.

It would have been much simpler and more logical if the investigation had acknowledged that Kvasroliashvili was killed by a blow to the head from a shovel, if the investigation had said that it could not establish a specific murderer and as a result it had closed the case. This would be difficult to dispute, but the investigation did not proceed along these lines because in that case I. Rodionov would not have avoided criminal responsibility. In violation of the law, he added the paratroopers to the operation to force out the mass meeting participants and, if this had led to serious consequences, then it would have been difficult to exonerate I. Rodionov.

**7. The Procurator's Office completely exonerates the military personnel in the internal sub-units of the USSR MVD and their commanders, based on the following circumstances:**

"The investigation has established that the direct cause of people's death was pressure, which resulted in bodily injuries incompatible with life. The pressure came about as a result of the increased resistance on the part of some of the meeting participants to the military personnel, the passive disobedience of other meeting participants, and the improper performance of their duties by the organs of the Georgian SSR MVD, as well as other circumstances... i.e., as a result of all the factors." (p 32)

It is for precisely this reason, in the opinion of the investigation, that the pressure eliminates the criminal responsibility of the military personnel, because they did not enter into direct contact with the victims. (p 32)

The investigation rules out the criminal responsibility of the military personnel for inflicting on the meeting participants massive bodily injuries, resorting to the following as proof:

"The fact that a large proportion of those who suffered directly from the actions of the military were males provides evidence that rubber truncheons were used mainly against men, who showed active resistance." (p 33)

At the same time the investigation cannot deny that some women were among those who received blows from rubber truncheons. According to their claim, only 21 women stated that they had suffered blows from truncheons. The investigation considers that there is objective confirmation of light bodily injuries for 12 women out of the 21. The investigation cannot establish who specifically used the rubber truncheons on the women, but it notes here that even if it had established who used the truncheons, they still would not have been held criminally responsible because in an extreme situation "it is not excluded that the injuring of women could



have taken place imprudently, but for imprudently inflicting light bodily injuries criminal responsibility is not stipulated. (p 34)

It is blasphemous to claim that the military personnel were not in contact with those who died. The investigation itself cannot deny that the military personnel beat the meeting participants with truncheons; consequently, they were in contact with them. Who then analyzed with whom they were in "contact?" Was it only with those who received light bodily injuries? And how can it be claimed that inflicting bodily injuries on women should qualify as imprudence? Depositions from hundreds of witnesses, including people who suffered, medical workers who were at the site and militia workers, as well as videotapes, have shown without a doubt that the military mercilessly beat women in the head and face with truncheons. Where is imprudence here? In this case the investigation undoubtedly has in mind carelessness (*nebrezhnost*), but according to the Georgian Criminal Code, it is carelessness when the person committing it did not foresee the possibility that socially dangerous consequences could result from his actions at a time when he should have and could have foreseen them. Is an attempt really being made to prove that trained soldiers who strike women with all their strength using truncheons on uncovered heads cannot foresee that this can lead to bodily injuries (even if they are light ones)? But this is not the main point; the main point is why the investigation avoids the issue of the opportunities for causing serious and less serious bodily injuries which occurred during the crushing of the rally?

**8. As was indicated above, military servicemen beat and caused bodily injuries to unarmed workers of the Georgian internal affairs organs.** It is impossible to say that the militia workers were offering serious, active resistance to the military personnel because they (the militia workers), located in front of Government House, were performing their official duties. Despite this, the investigation here, too, considers the actions of the military personnel to be correct and justifies them in the following way: "In the area of greatest resistance, in front of Government House, some militia workers not only failed to act but even interfered with the operation to force people out. Some of the military personnel who observed this behavior on the part of the militia workers became upset and inflicted bodily blows with rubber truncheons. The actions of the militia workers obviously were not in line with their duties." (p 14)

The illogic of the investigation's deliberations reaches its highest point here. If the military ruthlessly beat the militia workers (many of whom received serious bodily injuries), then should the investigation discuss the lawfulness of the militia workers' behavior, or should it clarify whether or not the signs of a crime were present in the actions of the military? The investigation does not even ask this question. It recognizes as sufficient the indication that the military "were upset" by the "failure of the militia workers to perform their official duties." But is being "upset" sufficient to justify the military?

Criminal law does not know this term. If the investigation has in mind a "suddenly aroused strong emotion" which may have developed among the military servicemen during this carnage, then such an emotion does not exclude criminal responsibility; it only mitigates it and then only if the emotion is aroused by illegal violence or a serious insult on the part of the victim. It has been established without a doubt that the militia workers did not resort to either illegal violence or to any serious insults. On the contrary, they were attempting to help get the hungry out and clear the road for the meeting participants so that they could save themselves.

**9. The most serious and undisputed accusation against the military personnel involves the use against people of toxic chemical substances which had serious consequences.** Here, too, the investigation sees no signs of a crime. The investigation considers that the special agent "bird cherry" (*cheremukha*) was lawfully used by General Yefimov; moreover, the law was observed before the application of *cheremukha* as well: the meeting participants were informed of this through megaphones. (p 34) In the opinion of the investigation, special chemical agents were not used "against women, minors, invalids and the aged." In reality, 13 civilians suffered from the use of chemical agents. (p 34)

It is an obvious lie that the meeting participants were informed by megaphone that toxic chemical agents would be used. Not a single witness nor a single victim supports that statement. It is an obvious lie that only 13 citizens suffered from the use of toxic agents; this was already mentioned above. But it is also an obvious lie that *cheremukha* was not used against women and minors. After all, a majority of the rally participants were women, among whom there were many minors—this is undisputed, and, in general, how is it technically possible to use *cheremukha* to disperse a rally, causing harm only to adult males?

The commission cannot deny that a violation of the law took place when *cheremukha* used. In particular, Yefimov did not inform the procurator in advance about the use of special chemical agents. Moreover, Yefimov and Lieutenant Colonel Baklanov did not, as required by law, inform the residents who were not participating in the violation of public order about the use of toxic gases, nor did they take measures to evacuate them if necessary. (p 34) Here, too, the investigation justifies the actions of Yefimov and Baklanov, arguing in the following way: "The lack of contact with the procurator did not have the purpose of concealing the indicated facts, but was caused by the extreme nature of the situation." Also, Yefimov reported this to the republic's population in a televised speech, but for reasons that did not depend on him, his speech was not broadcast immediately. As for "preliminary notification or evacuation of those people living on Rustaveli Prospect, this was not realistic in the given situation. In addition, many residents were throwing objects at the troops from windows, balconies and roofs. Thus the investigation considers the military's use of the special chemical agent *cheremukha* to be



"lawful." (pp 34-35). The proof is obviously illogical and artificial. In the first place, Yefimov was supposed to report to the procurator on the possible use of chemical agents before the so-called operation, not during it, "in an extreme situation." Also, the residents living on Rustaveli Prospect were supposed to be notified in advance. And as for the allegation that bottles were thrown at the military personnel from windows, that is an obvious lie, but even if it did take place, does that justify the actions of Yefimov and Baklanov? After all, there is no doubt that those buildings contained minors and old people, who at four in the morning were probably sleeping and in any case would not have been able to take part "in bottle throwing." Justifying the commission of a crime by saying that Yefimov supposedly made a report on television, but for reasons which did not depend on him, it was not televised—is completely inappropriate because what is being talked about here is an announcement supposedly made by Yefimov on the second day after the crushing of the mass meeting. The law, however, demands that this kind of announcement be made prior to the use of toxic substances.

10. The investigation does not deny the use of "CS" (K-51) to disperse the meeting participants but considers that in this case as well a crime was not committed. The investigation recognizes that the right to use "CS" is not established by any normative act. The decision to use it was taken individually by Lieutenant Colonel Baklanov. His adoption of this decision was not reported either to a superior, nor to the procurator, which violated the requirement of the law. Despite this, the commission does not see a crime in Baklanov's action for two reasons. In the first place, from the viewpoint of the investigation, the legislation does not stipulate the use of K-51 along with the use of cheremukha and, in the second place, this was done by Baklanov for the purpose of preventing additional injuries to both the military personnel and the demonstrators. At the same time, the investigation took into account the fact that the use of K-51 did not cause any poisoning. (p 37) If massive and serious poisonings were not caused by the use of cheremukha, nor by the use of "CS" (K-51), and in this case there was no violation, then the investigation should agree with the conclusion of the Georgian Supreme Soviet commission on the use of chloropicrin, a still stronger poisoning agent. On this subject the military are silent even today, because no one can escape the fact that those who were poisoned on 9 April are still receiving hospital treatment two years later.

Baklanov's crime is undisputed. He used an unlisted toxic chemical "CS" (K-51). It is true that the normative acts do not directly ban the use of "CS" to disperse a mass meeting, but neither do the normative acts specifically ban for this purpose mustard gas, lewisite, napalm or the atom bomb. But this in no way means that the use of these weapons is permissible against one's own people. From the deliberations of the USSR procurator general one could conclude that it is. In reality—and a very high official in charge of seeing that the law is observed should know this—the law provides an exhaustive list of those agents, the use of which is permitted "to

protect order," and this means that the use of other agents is forbidden. Here a universally recognized principle of law is operative: "In the areas of administrative and state law only that which is directly stipulated by the law is permitted"; otherwise a citizen will not be protected against the actions of officials.

11. The investigation in fact passed over the crime which took place in Tbilisi after the pogrom of the meeting, specifically in connection with the introduction of a curfew. It passed over the murder of Giya Karseladze, which was committed by Captain Lokhin and the attempted murder of two minors—15-year old Dato Mkhatchvishvili and 12-year old Levan Chanadiri (the first was injured by a bullet in the leg and the second by a bullet in the buttocks); it passed over everything which revealed that a crime had been committed by members of the military. It rejected all the evidence; this included not taking into account videotapes which document all the details of the pogrom and accusing the direct Eldar Shengelaya of tendentiousness, although it is well known that a documentary film cannot be tendentious. Moreover, this film brings together all the materials which reflect the events which were taking place on the site, including official KGB documentary materials. In this way the investigation came to the following conclusion:

"The criminal proceedings against the officials and servicemen of the USSR MVD internal troops and the Soviet Army, which were instituted on the basis of indications of a crime specified by Point 'a' of Article 278 of the GSSR Criminal Code, were dropped for lack of corpus delicti in their actions" (p 38). Point "a" of article 278 and 278<sup>1</sup> of the Georgian Criminal Code have provisions which deal with abusing power, exceeding one's authority or taking a negligent attitude toward one's duties. Thus, the investigation did not see in anyone's actions even a negligent attitude toward one's duty, which is nothing other than nonfulfillment of official duties by an official as a result of a negligent attitude toward them, if it has caused substantial harm. And this at a time when the investigative commissions established by the Georgian Supreme Soviet and the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, had accused military and civilian officials of having committed a very serious crime. This is substantial and cannot be explained by accidental circumstances or by ignorance on the part of the investigation alone.

12. The investigation rules out the existence of a causal link between the tragic events which took place on 9 April in the city of Tbilisi and the actions of the servicemen. And whose actions are causally related to the serious consequences, the massive slaughter of the people and the poisoning? In the opinion of the investigation, "the tragic events which took place on 9 April 1989 are causally related (our emphasis) to the illegal activity of the organizers and the active participants in the unauthorized mass meetings" (p 25).

If the investigation had claimed that a direct causal link existed between the actions of the organizers and the

active participants in the mass meeting, on the one hand, and the actual conduct of the meeting, on the other hand, it would be understandable, but it is completely incomprehensible in what way their actions have a direct causal relationship to the serious tragic events which took place on 9 April in Tbilisi. The processes taking place in Georgia after 9 April, particularly the defeat of the communist party in the 1990 elections, the majority vote received by the national movement opposed to the communist party, as well as the election of Zviad Gamsakhurdia in democratic multiparty elections as chairman of the Georgian Supreme Soviet, obviously proved that the entire Georgian people was an active participant in the 9 April mass meeting. And it turns out that the investigation accuses only the Georgian people of committing this international crime, which is nothing other than the extermination of its own people using a forbidden weapon. The history of the Soviet state is being repeated. A victimized people is again being declared the criminal.

The action of the USSR procurator's office is dropping the criminal case brought against the officials and military personnel of the USSR MVD internal forces and the Soviet Army, and the exoneration of everyone who took part on 9 April in the crushing of the meeting and the massive slaughter of innocent people are not a local, accidental phenomenon, which can be explained only by the incompetence of the investigation. It is a logical continuation of the 9 April tragedy; it reflects the will of those very high officials of the USSR who were the organizers of the very serious crime committed against the people and requires that general political conclusions be drawn:

1.) The main reason that the USSR Procurator's Office covered up the very serious crime committed on 9 April in the city of Tbilisi is that in the USSR the law and the law-enforcement organs cannot carry out the function of protecting citizens and society when the highest state, military and party authority goes against the law. In the USSR the dictates of the command-bureaucratic apparatus continue to operate; at the head of this apparatus is the USSR president, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In the state structure of the USSR there is no real force capable of going against his will.

2.) In the USSR the supremacy of the highest organ of state authority is a fiction. The obvious confirmation lies in the almost complete neglect by the USSR procurator's office of the decision by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. All three functions of the state, specifically the legislative, executive and judicial functions are in reality concentrated once again in the hands of one person—the president of the USSR, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In the USSR the state pyramid characteristic of a totalitarian regime has in fact been preserved; once again it resorted to its tested method of falsifying the investigation, of covering up for the criminals and of declaring the victims to be the criminals. It has also become clear that under the Soviet system and the rule of the Communist Party the creation

of a law-based state and the implementation of the principle of the supremacy of the law are impossible.

3.) One of the indications of a state's sovereignty is the independent administration of justice within its own boundaries. The resolution of the USSR Procurator's Office, which the republic, in accordance with existing legislation, cannot in any way influence, clearly provides evidence that justice in the republics is in a puppet-like condition. There is no guarantee that people will be protected against arbitrariness and excessive force by the military and administrative organs of the USSR, or that very serious crimes committed by the latter will not go unpunished. The events in Baku, Lithuania and Latvia can serve as examples of this.

4.) The representatives of the highest organs of administration and justice in the USSR have not changed their totalitarian-imperial thinking, in accordance with which anti-Soviet slogans or words are viewed as a far more serious crime than violence against the individual. The ideology of preserving the existing regime and empire at any cost in fact rejects the fundamental principle declared by the Constitution concerning the right of the Union republics to freely withdraw from the USSR. It is for this reason that the USSR procurator's office substantiates the necessity and lawfulness of calling in the army against a peaceful mass meeting by citing the demand of the meeting participants for withdrawal from the USSR and the declaration of radical anti-Soviet slogans.

The memorandum of the USSR procurator general was compiled as if a bloodless revolution had not taken place in Georgia, as if the Georgian people had not expressed their will through constitutional methods. The memorandum talks about "extremists," "leaders of the informal organizations," "statements which go against the interests of the Communist Party and the existing Soviet system," and this at a time when multiparty, constitutional elections had already shown in an obvious way that those "extremists," and "informal" leaders of the national movement had expressed the will of the Georgian people, and that the people do not support the Communist Party and the Soviet system.

5.) The Commission of the Georgian Supreme Soviet to Investigate the Events of 9 April denounced the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, which was then headed by the second leader of the party, Ye.K. Ligachev, as well as the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, A. Lukyanov, for committing a crime in Tbilisi on 9 April. The commission considered it essential to hold accountable all those officials of the central authority who are guilty in the commission of the crime of 9 April. If this demand is not met, in the opinion of the commission, the responsibility should rest fully with the highest state authority of the USSR.

The investigation by the USSR procurator's office has been completed. All the officials and military personnel have been exonerated. The guilty party in the tragedy of

9 April has been declared to be in fact the Georgian people. All this and the statement made publicly more than once by Ye. K. Ligachev that the decision to halt the mass meeting held on 9 April in Tbilisi by calling in army sub-units was coordinated with M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, E.A. Shevardnadze, minister of foreign affairs, and others, forces one to reflect that the responsibility for the tragedy of 9 April must rest fully with the highest state and party authority of the Union of SSR's, headed by the president of the USSR, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

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#### Georgian Telavskiy Rayon Prefect on Duties, Plans, Finances

91US0470A Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian  
26 Mar 91 p 2

[Interview with Avtandil Rtskhiladze, prefect of Telavskiy Rayon, by VESTNIK GRUZII correspondent Igor Pashalishvili; place and date not given: "Avtandil Rtskhiladze: 'So Many Unsolved Problems Have Accumulated'"]

[Text] Meeting with Avtandil RTSKHILADZE, prefect of Telavskiy Rayon, turned out to be complicated because

his business day is very tightly scheduled. Nonetheless, Avtandil Parnaozovich made some time, and our interview took place after all.

[Pashalishvili] Mr. Avtandil, recently you, a deputy of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet, were appointed prefect. How do you feel in this new position?

[Rtskhiladze] Frankly, this was an unexpected appointment. Apparently, the leadership of the republic took into account the fact that I was elected as a deputy from Telavskiy Rayon or, more precisely, from the 61st Vardisubanskiy Electoral District, and that previously I worked in Telavi. Telavi has usually been a city rich in historical and cultural traditions. It has become the location for holding all kinds of conferences, meets, symposiums, and festivals. International contacts have also been augmented. The bonds of friendship and cooperation tie Telavi to the sister cities of Biberach (Germany) and Napovel [as transliterated] (State of California, the United States). New treaties are expected within the framework of the Association of Sister Cities.

As you can see, even these few circumstances test me seriously, and double if not triple my personal responsibility as prefect.

**Details in the portrait of our interlocutor.** Avtandil Rtskhiladze was born in 1939 in Tbilisi. Like his entire generation, he experienced all the troubles of the years of wartime hardship, and remembers the hard times after the war, to the best of a child's recollection. The year 1946, when he started attending first grade and, as fate would have it, ended up at the same desk with the future national hero Merab Kostava, became an event in his biography. His destiny would bring him together with this childhood friend of his many years later, on the thorny road of struggle of the Georgian people for freedom and independence. Having graduated from school, Avtandil Rtskhiladze continued his studies, graduating from a railroad vocational school, and subsequently a conservatory. He is married, and has three children.

[Pashalishvili] Almost two months have passed since you assumed the post of prefect. What have you managed to accomplish in this time?

[Rtskhiladze] Actually, I have been absorbed in work since a parliamentary commission was created which I chaired. Therefore, the process of getting used to the sociopolitical life of the rayon began long ago. At present, we are engaged in accomplishing quite a variety of tasks. They include economic and social issues, issues associated directly with ensuring the life of the city and the rayon as a whole. I have to make very many appointments. All of those who come to us have problems of their own, and we resolve them and give people the help they expect of us whenever possible. We have interceded vigorously in the distribution of foodstuffs and consumer goods in short supply; we will see to it that due order is maintained in this sphere continuously. At present, the crime situation in the republic is tense, and

our rayon is no exception. Our priority task is to protect the citizens against encroachments upon their life and property. To some degree, we have succeeded in this. For example, militia organs have neutralized several bandit gangs; the Mkhedrioni group operating in the territory of the rayon has ceased to exist. Conducting this operation required a maximum of effort, and caused us a great deal of anxiety. However, the people breathe easier now.

[Pashalishvili] Could you please tell us about your plans for the immediate future?

[Rtskhiladze] It is difficult to respond to this question unambiguously. So many unsolved problems accumulated in the years of the so-called triumphant procession of developed socialism that at present it is hard to say which particular problem is the main one. All of them need urgent solutions. Nonetheless, it is necessary to begin with economics. In particular, we make purposeful efforts to develop agricultural production by propagating and implementing progressive forms of economic operations locally. The development of lease relations is the only correct avenue at this stage.

The situation that has developed in industrial production is catastrophic. All of us will have to work a great deal before we make up the arrears. This is when labor collectives and their leaders should have a say; a lot depends on the organizational talents and skills of the latter.

We will have to pay close attention to the issues of construction. The rayon needs new buildings for a hospital and a maternity ward. Design documentation for the latter is almost complete, and construction workers will soon embark on their job. We intend to finish refurbishing city sewers and upgrading water mains this year. These are priority issues. They cannot be put on the back burner; otherwise, the outbreak of an epidemic may become a threat. The housing issue is quite acute. The number of families in need grows faster than the rate of construction. We must begin erecting two 30-apartment houses urgently in order to provide for families that need housing particularly badly.

[Pashalishvili] With what funds do you intend to implement this costly program? After all, as far as I know, the deficit of the rayon budget accounts for one-fifth of it, and exceeds 4 million rubles [R]?

[Rtskhiladze] True indeed, our coffers are not exactly overflowing, but we do have some initial funds available. They promised to allocate to us through centralized channels a certain amount for construction. However, a large segment of the funds will have to be drawn from the local budget. At present, we are looking for additional ways to attract money to the coffers of the region. Thus, for example, the management of the Napareuli Agricultural Company concluded an advantageous transaction in one of the Baltic republics: In return for the deliveries of wine materials, the citizens of Napareuli will receive 12 brand-new Japanese passenger cars. We want to auction them off, securing as high a profit as possible.

According to preliminary calculations, the funds generated will cover the outlays in full, and earned profits will make it possible to complete the building of the aforementioned 30-apartment houses.

In addition, we approached the government of the republic with a request to allow the rayon to dispose on its own of 20 percent of the agricultural products it generates, which in turn will yield additional profits for us.

**Details in the portrait of the interlocutor.** When he was 17, Avtandil Rtskhiladze witnessed a massacre of young Georgians in March 1956. He saw the blood of his peers, he saw how people were crushed by tanks. One cannot forget this.

In 1978, Avtandil was among those who boldly rose to the defense of their native language. From this day on, he clearly determined his goal in life—to fight for the independence of Georgia. Subsequently, Avtandil Rtskhiladze became a member of the Helsinki Union and one of the comrades-in-arms of Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Being a member of the board, he worked directly on creating the structural subdivisions of the union in the field.

[Pashalishvili] What is your view of the opinion of a certain segment of our society which believes that the introduction of the institution of prefects in the republic is a direct path towards a dictatorship?

[Rtskhiladze] A lot has been said about this, and I do not want to repeat myself. Let me give only this example. As prefect, I have never made a decision on my own while resolving a particular issue, and I do not intend to do this in the future. Indeed, prefects have the last word. However, this is preceded by collective discussions, and persons competent with regard to given issues are invited. Final decisions are made only after collective opinions are formed. Is this state of affairs viewed as a dictatorship?

[Pashalishvili] What is the progress of preparations for forthcoming elections to the assembly and a referendum?

[Rtskhiladze] The first stage is behind us. Electoral commissions have completed the registration of both independent candidate deputies and those nominated on party tickets. At present, an election campaign is under way. A schedule for meetings with the population in the villages of the rayon was adopted at a joint conference of parties belonging to the bloc "Round Table—Free Georgia." It is gratifying to note that people everywhere express their support for us, and are ready to stand up to any adversity for the sake of freedom and independence of our long-suffering Georgia. The dirty machinations of local communists who have, in essence, organized a campaign to spread disinformation and slander the existing institutions of power is the only depressing thing. Naturally, we denounce the instigative actions of these would-be patriots.

[Pashalishvili] My last question: Is there a substantial difference between Rtskhiladze-the prefect and Rtskhiladze-the deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia?

[Rtskhiladze] There is no difference in principle, except perhaps that work of a purely administrative nature was added in the position of prefect. However, I never forget that I was elected by the people; this is why I am always the deputy first and the administrator next.

## Central Asia

### Kazakh Law on Amnesty in Adopting State Sovereignty Declaration

#### Text of Law

91US0454A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 6 Mar 91 p 1

[Law signed by N. Nazarbayev, president of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, Alma-Ata, February 16, 1991: "Law of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic: "On Amnesty in Connection With the Adoption of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic"]

[Text] In connection with the adoption by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, and proceeding from principles of humanitarianism, the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic hereby **DECREES THAT:**

1. Those convicted persons be released from serving sentences in the form of imprisonment, or punishment not entailing imprisonment, irrespective of length of sentence, who:

a. have participated in combat operations to defend the Soviet Fatherland;

b. have been awarded orders and medals of the USSR;

c. are invalids of Groups I and II;

d. are women with minor children, and pregnant women;

e. are men over the age of 60 years and women over 55 years.

2. Women convicted for the first time and sentenced to imprisonment for up to five years, inclusive, and who have served no less than one-third of their sentence, as well as women convicted and sentenced to a punishment not entailing imprisonment, be released from serving their sentences.

3. Minors who have served no less than one-third of their sentence under imprisonment, as well as minors

sentenced to a punishment not entailing imprisonment, be released from serving out their punishment.

4. As of the effective date of this Law, that portion of the punishment entailing imprisonment, for those convicted of crimes committed through carelessness, be decreased by one-third.

5. Those convicted, and included under Articles 1 and 2 of this Law, be released from additional punishment in the form of exile or deportation.

6. All investigation proceedings and cases not examined by the courts prior to the effective date of this Law, of crimes committed by persons listed in Articles 1 and 2 of this Law, be terminated.

7. The amnesty shall not apply to those persons:

a. convicted of especially dangerous state crimes: banditry; actions disrupting the work of correction-labor institutions; forgery or sale of counterfeit money or securities; violation of laws on currency operations, as well as currency speculation;

b. recognized as especially dangerous habitual criminals;

c. convicted for premeditated murder (except for murder committed when in a state of high emotional stress or when excess force was used for necessary self-defense); premeditated great bodily harm (except for that caused when in a state of high emotional stress or when excess force was used for necessary self-defense); attempted murder of a member of the militia or the voluntary people's militia patrol; aggravated rape; kidnapping; embezzlement of state or public property in especially large amounts; embezzlement of state or public property by theft through illegal entry into a building or other kind of repository; theft through illegal entry into a residence; aggravated burglary; robbery; receiving or giving bribes or complicity in aggravated bribery; aggravated speculation; aggravated extortion; especially malicious hooliganism; involving minors in criminal activities; theft of firearms, ammunition, or explosives; theft of narcotics; inclination to use narcotics; illegal preparation, acquisition, storage, transport, mailing, or sale of narcotics; organization or maintenance of dens for use of narcotics, or providing building space for these purposes; driving while intoxicated;

d. convicted earlier more than twice and sentenced to imprisonment for premeditated crimes;

e. freed from punishment earlier by pardon or amnesty and who again committed crimes;

f. who maliciously caused disruptions while serving their sentence;

g. who have not completed the full treatment for alcoholism, drug addiction, or venereal disease.

8. The present Law applies to persons convicted by courts of the Kazakh SSR, goes into effect on the date it is adopted, and will be executed within a period of four months.

#### Decree on Implementation of Law

91US0454B Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 6 Mar 91 pp 1- 2

[Decree signed by Ye. Asanbayev, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR, Alma-Ata, February 16, 1991: "Decree of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet: 'On Implementation of the Law of the Kazakh SSR: On the Amnesty in Connection With the Adoption of The Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic'"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic hereby decrees that:

1. Subject to the Law of the Kazakh SSR: "On the Amnesty in Connection With the Adoption of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic" are those persons who committed crimes prior to the adoption of this Law, i.e., prior to February 16, 1991, inclusive.

2. Implementation of this Law shall fall on:

a. organs which are responsible for carrying out the punishment, specifically, in relation to those convicted who are imprisoned or in correction-labor detention centers, as well as those conditionally convicted and sentenced to imprisonment with mandatory labor, and those on parole from prisons with mandatory sentencing to perform labor.

Application of this Law is effected by a resolution of the chief of the correction-labor institution, educational-labor detention center, or special commandant's office, in agreement with the observers' commission of the executive committee of the local Council of People's Deputies, and sanctioned by the prosecutor. Appended to the above resolution are certificates regarding rewards and penalties, the individual case of the convicted person, and other documents needed for making a decision on the applicability of this amnesty.

With regard to persons who have been sentenced to prison, but not yet in custody, or those conditionally sentenced to imprisonment with mandatory labor, but not yet sent to the place of labor, as well as those persons now undergoing punishment in the form of exile or deportation, correctional labor without imprisonment, or deprivation of the right to hold certain jobs or engage in certain activities, the application of this Law is effected by a resolution of the district (or municipal) section chief of internal affairs;

b. organs of inquiry and preliminary investigation, with regard to persons whose cases and files on their crimes are in the possession of these organs;

## c. courts:

with regard to persons whose cases and files on their crimes are in the possession of courts and which, prior to the effective date of this Law, have thus not been examined, as well as in regard to persons whose cases have been examined, but sentencing is not yet legally effective;

with regard to persons conditionally convicted under Article 40 of the Criminal Code of the Kazakh SSR and with regard to persons whose serving of sentences has been deferred in accordance with Article 41-1 of the same code;

with regard to persons whose basic punishment consists of a fine, if—prior to the effective date of this Law—the fine has not been paid (the issue of granting the amnesty is decided by the court that imposes the punishment);

with regard to persons released early and conditionally from their punishment, and persons whose unfinished sentence was replaced by a milder form of punishment prior to the effective date of this Law (the issue of granting the amnesty is decided by the court that determined the early and conditional release or replacement of the unfinished portion of the sentence with a milder form of punishment).

With regard to persons who are serving their sentences outside the republic, the issue of granting the amnesty, upon a presentation made by the organs of internal affairs, is decided by the courts of the Kazakh SSR which imposed the sentence.

3. Resolutions of internal affairs organs, as well as organs of inquiry and preliminary investigation, regarding the granting of the amnesty are approved by the prosecutor.

The participation of the prosecutor is mandatory with regard to implementation of the Law on Amnesty by the courts;

## 4. Clarification be made on the granting of amnesties:

a. under the provision of Articles 1 and 2 of the Law are persons convicted under Articles 40 and 41-1 of the Criminal Code of the Kazakh SSR, as well as persons conditionally sentenced to imprisonment with mandatory labor, and those conditionally released from prison with mandatory labor, as well as those sent to serve their sentence in educational-labor detention centers;

b. persons subject to Point "a," Article 1, of the Law, include:

those who served in the Armed Forces of the USSR during the Great Fatherland War, 1941-1945, as servicemen or civilians;

those who took part in the war in partisan units, home guard, commando battalions, as well as underground organizations which operated against the German fascist invaders during the Great Fatherland War;

those who served in units and formations of the Armed Forces of the USSR as servicemen or civilians and took part in combat operations against the Japanese imperialists in 1945.

Subject to Point "a," Article 1, of the Law, are also all other persons who were awarded the medal: "For Victory Over Germany in the Great Fatherland War of 1941-1945," or the medal: "For Victory Over Japan," as well as those who took part in combat operations to defend the interests of the Soviet Fatherland during the period preceding the Great Fatherland War or after its conclusion, and who have proof of these awards;

c. subject to Point "b," Article 1, of the Law, are those persons who were awarded orders of the USSR or medals: "For Valor," Ushakov, "For Combat Services," Nakhimov, "For Labor Heroism," "For Distinguished Service in Labor," for "Distinguished Labor. In Commemoration of the 100th Anniversary of the Birth of Vladimir Ilich Lenin," "For Distinguished Military Service. In Commemoration of the 100th Anniversary of the Birth of Vladimir Ilich Lenin," "To the Partisan of the Fatherland War" - 1st and 2nd degrees, "For the Defense of Leningrad," "For the Defense of Moscow," "For the Defense of Odessa," "For the Defense of Sevastopol," "For the Defense of Stalingrad," "For the Defense of Kiev," "For the Defense of the Caucasus," "For the Defense of the Soviet Trans-Polar Region," "For Victory Over Germany in the Great Fatherland War, 1941-1945," "For Victory Over Japan," and "For Distinguished Labor in The Great Fatherland War, 1941-1945."

Point "b," Article 1, of the Law does not apply to persons whose orders and medals of the USSR were taken away in the manner prescribed.

5. Subject to Point "c," Article 1, of the Law are invalids of groups I and II, who were recognized as such, in the manner prescribed, prior to the adoption of this Law.

6. Subject to Point "d," Article 1, of the Law are women not deprived of parental rights, whose children were born after February 16, 1973; and women who were pregnant on the date that their cases were examined relative to the granting of the amnesty.

7. Subject to Point "e," Article 1, of the Law are men born before June 16, 1931, and women born before June 16, 1936, inclusive.

In the absence of documents verifying the day and month of birth, those who have attained the age specified



in Point "e," men will be considered to have been born before January 1, 1932 and women, before January 1, 1937.

8. Subject to Article 2 of the Law are women sentenced to imprisonment for up to five years, inclusive, who have completed one-third of their sentence as of the time the amnesty is implemented and who are not subject to Article 1 of the Law, as well as women sentenced to punishment without imprisonment.

9. Subject to Article 3 of the Law are both men and women born after February 16, 1973, who have completed—as of the effective date of this Law—no less than one-third of their sentence in the form of imprisonment; males and females who are minors, sentenced to punishment without imprisonment; females who are minors are also subject to point "d," Article 1, and to Article 2 of the Law.

10. On the basis of Article 4 of the Law, persons who have been convicted of committing crimes through carelessness—if they are not subject to Articles 1 and 2 of the Law—are subject to having that portion of their sentence reduced that still remains as of the effective date of this Law.

A court, in sentencing persons found guilty of committing crimes through carelessness, will reduce their sentence by one-third.

11. Persons released in accordance with this Law from their basic punishment will not be released from additional punishment, except for exile and deportation.

12. Sentences being served in the form of correctional labor without imprisonment, or exile and banishment, will be dropped as of the date that the resolution on applying the amnesty is implemented by the organ of internal affairs and approved by the prosecutor.

13. This Law does not apply to persons subject to administrative penalties, including those administratively accountable and released from criminal responsibility, in accordance with Article 45-3 of the Criminal Code of the Kazakh SSR.

14. In applying the amnesty to persons whose sentences have been reduced in accordance with an amnesty or pardon, it is necessary to proceed from the length of sentence that was set in accordance with acts of amnesty or pardon.

15. Regarding aggregate crimes, if one of the crimes does not fall under the Law, the amnesty shall not apply.

16. In clarifying the application of Point "c," Article 7, of the Law, with regard to persons found guilty of theft of state or public property in especially large amounts, subject to this point are those persons who, individually or in a group, were found guilty of committing theft of government or public property amounting to a sum of 20,000 rubles or more.

Those convicted of aggravated rape, as defined in Point "c," Article 7, of the Law, include persons who committed the crimes listed under Parts Two, Three, and Four of Article 101 of the Criminal Code of the Kazakh SSR.

Those convicted of aggravated robbery include persons who committed the crimes listed under Parts Two, Three, and Four of Article 76-1, and Parts Two, Three, and Four of Article 133 of the Criminal Code of the Kazakh SSR.

Those convicted of taking or giving bribes, or complicity in aggravated bribery, include persons who committed the crimes listed under Parts Two and Three of Article 146, Part Two of Article 147, and Part Two of Article 146-1 of the Criminal Code of the Kazakh SSR.

Those convicted of aggravated speculation include persons who committed the crimes listed under Parts Two and Three of Article 1 of the USSR Law, dated October 31, 1990, "On Strengthening Responsibility for Speculation, Illegal Trade Activities, and Wrongdoing in Trade." Persons convicted under Article 168 of the Criminal Code of the Kazakh SSR, as worded by the Decree of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, dated March 22, 1990, shall have the amnesty applied to them without special preferences.

Those convicted of aggravated extortion include those persons who committed the crimes listed under Parts Two and Three of Article 76-7 and Parts Two and Three of Article 135 of the Criminal Code of the Kazakh SSR.

Those convicted of especially malicious hooliganism include those persons who committed the crimes listed under Part Three of Article 200 of the Criminal Code of the Kazakh SSR.

17. Investigations and cases not examined by the courts may not be terminated with regard to persons listed in Article 1 of the Law who are not subject to being released from punishment, as specified by Article 7 of the Law.

18. In applying this Law, there is no consideration given to convictions that were withdrawn or cancelled in accordance with this Law.

In addition, no consideration is given to prior convictions of persons for crimes committed through carelessness or for premeditated crimes when punishment does not entail imprisonment.

19. In accordance with Point "d," Article 7, of the Law, the amnesty does not apply to persons released earlier from penal institutions (regardless of the withdrawal or cancellation of the conviction) due to reduction of their sentences, in the period after February 16, 1981, as a result of a pardon or on the basis of the following Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:

September 14, 1981 decree: "On the Release of Certain Categories of Convicted Persons From Penal Institutions";

December 27, 1982 decree: "On the Amnesty in Connection with the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics";

April 26, 1985 decree: "On the Amnesty in Connection with the 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Fatherland War, 1941-1945";

November 6, 1986 decree: "On the Release of Certain Categories of Convicted Women from Penal Institutions";

June 18, 1987 decree: "On the Amnesty in Connection With the 70th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," and the resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet, dated November 28, 1989, "On the Amnesty for Former Servicemen of the Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan Who Have Committed Crimes."

Those convicted persons released prior to completion of their sentences also include persons who, through pardons or on the basis of the above-listed Decrees of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and resolutions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, were released in connection with a reduction of their sentences, and persons whose uncompleted portion of imprisonment was replaced by another, milder form of punishment.

20. Malicious violaters of order include those persons who:

a. systematically violate established discipline and order while serving their sentences, or systematically refuse—without good reason—to perform useful public work, as well as those conditionally sentenced to penal institutions with mandatory labor and released from penal institutions on condition of mandatory labor; and those who violate labor discipline, public order, or rules established for their conduct.

Systematic violation of discipline and order while serving a sentence is understood to be actions for which the convicted person was formally penalized no less than three times. If, then, in the course of one year from the date of having paid this penalty the convicted person does not receive a new penalty, or if the penalty was removed as a formal reward, it is considered that the person has no existing penalties;

b. commit premeditated crimes while they are serving sentences in penal institutions, educational-labor clinics, or while in exile or banishment, or during their period of mandatory labor at construction sites or enterprises of the national economy;

c. are conditionally sentenced to penal institutions with mandatory labor and those released from penal institutions on condition of performing labor; those who

are sent to penal institutions for violating labor discipline, public order, or rules established for their behavior; as well as those kept in colony settlements or sent to other kinds of correctional-labor colonies, if after the execution of the decision to commit them to correctional-labor institutions they were under arrest for less than one year from the date that documents were examined relative to granting an amnesty. The period is counted from the date of close confinement of the convicted person;

d. are conditionally convicted in accordance with Article 40 of the Criminal Code of the Kazakh SSR, if during their probationary period they committed a new premeditated crime or were sent to serve out their punishment, as specified by their sentence, on the basis of the same article of the Criminal Code, if less than one year has passed since sentence was pronounced or since the determination of the court;

e. had their sentences deferred in accordance with Article 41-1 of the Criminal Code of the Kazakh SSR, if during the period that their sentence was deferred they committed new premeditated crimes or were sent to penal institutions, as specified by the sentence, on the basis of the same Article of the Criminal Code, if they were under arrest for less than one year from the date that documents were examined relative to granting an amnesty;

f. have been sentenced to correctional labor without imprisonment, if—prior to completing their sentence—they committed a new premeditated crime or, if for maliciously refusing to serve their sentence the uncompleted portion of their correctional labor was replaced by a court with imprisonment, and if they were under arrest for less than six months from the date that documents were examined relative to granting an amnesty.

21. Material with regard to persons subject to the Law, who—in accordance with the prescribed order—are assigned to receive treatment for alcoholism, drug addiction, or venereal disease will be examined during the implementation of the Law, and the decision on releasing them will be effective only after completion of the treatment.

The basis for recognizing the completion of treatment for venereal disease of the convicted person consists of a medical conclusion; with regard to persons assigned by the court to mandatory treatment for alcoholism or drug addiction, the court will determine when this mandatory treatment can be terminated.

22. Executive committees of oblast, Alma-Ata municipal, district, municipal, and municipal district Soviets of People's Deputies are required to guarantee:

a. the organization of a timely accounting of all persons released from punishment on the basis of this Law and their mandatory hiring at a place of work, no

later than one month from their date of arrival to their place of residence, as well as subsequent control over these persons' conduct;

b. room in the invalids' home for released invalids and aged persons who have no relatives who could take them in as dependents.

23. Executive committees of district, municipal, and municipal district Soviets of People's Deputies be required to guarantee timely placement of minors released from punishment on the basis of this Law, to account for their arrival at their place of residence, their hiring at a place of work or transfer to the control of their parents, organs of guardianship or trusteeship, and, if necessary, room in childrens' homes, boarding schools, or professional-technical schools.

24. A report on the implementation of this resolution is to be presented by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Kazakh SSR, the Prosecutor of the Kazakh SSR, and the Ministry of Justice of the Kazakh SSR to the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR no later than July 1, 1991.

**Kazakhstan Under Nazarbayev Leadership Viewed**  
91US0488A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 27 Apr 91 pp 1-3

[Article by Almira Kozhakmetova and Yuriy Kirinitsyanov, special correspondents: "Nazarbayev Convincing"]

[Text] Brought to the point of exhaustion by our politicians' "bullfight" and no longer anticipating any good outcome from it, we have suddenly begun focusing our attention more and more on Central Asia. It is from there, from the Ala-Tau Foothills, that notes of hope have reached us like the sounds of a bell: "A moratorium on political meetings, demonstrations, and strikes has been proclaimed in Kazakhstan. Doctor Chan Yan Beng from California, the vice-chairman of the republic-level Committee of Economic Experts, has begun working here. He intends to invite prominent scholars and economists from the United States, Korea, Singapore, and Japan to Kazakhstan."

How could it happen that within our country—badly shaken by political, social, and interethnic explosions—there has remained this virtually solitary "island" of stability? Why is it that foreign entrepreneurs—while avoiding other regions—have striven to come specifically here? And, finally, wherein lies the secret of the strengthened interest in the personality of Nursultan Nazarbayev, this republic's leader?

In order to find the answers to these questions, our special correspondents arrived in Alma-Ata, the capital of Kazakhstan.

### The Beginning

"Don't write anything about our plans; don't 'advertise' them!" That's the way we were greeted by the person who has been called the right-hand man of this republic's president, his deputy on the Supreme Economic Council. One can understand Daulet Sembayev. People do not have unlimited patience; they are in a hurry. Are the economists at work? They are. Are the Americans arriving with businesslike proposals? They are. Well, where's the "beef"?

Yes, things are just as "tight" with regard to meat, milk, butter, and flour in this region as they are everywhere. The store shelves are empty. And there are lines, lines, and lines. They are as similar as two drops of water to the lines in Riga, Ryazan, and Tashkent. But the surprising thing is that no matter who we talked to here—students, workers, rural leaseholders, or simply passers-by on the streets of Alma-Ata—what was striking was the lack of the signs of that "disease" which has infected Muscovites, for example—the signs of hopelessness and despair.

Why so? We spent a long time trying to figure this out. It would seem that all the "beauties" of the sixth year of perestroika are present here—the coupon nightmare, the cutbacks at enterprises, the fear of new prices and inflation. But all this is not surrounded by the multicolored "soapbubbles" of politics. This republic's present-day leadership is simply and clearly explaining to people how and when they can extricate themselves from the crisis.

The weekly presidential television hour has not been turned into a lesson in "political ABC's." With a delicate sense of the society's need for the language of specific figures, President Nazarbayev speaks primarily in this "language." In contrast to the leaders of the other republics, Nazarbayev does not promise "mountains of gold" for the purpose of pulling the rug out from under the opposition or to "knock" the "hand of Moscow." Instead of this, he unfurls before the people a specific and unique chart showing the pluses and minuses of Kazakhstan's economy. He does this so that everyone listening and watching him can clearly be convinced of the following facts: This republic is fabulously rich; the resources concealed within its depths and what the earth produces can satisfy the life of many, many generations and make them happy. But because of the most diverse reasons, a processing or manufacturing industry has not been developed here. What takes place here is primarily the mining or other extraction of raw materials; and so what is needed is new technology and new equipment.

"What an idyll!" the reader will say. "Isn't this just a new 'narcotic' in the form of the president's confidential chats with his people?" But the matter is not confined to merely chats and plans. Nazarbayev is a sufficiently intelligent politician to understand the following: inert or flaccid reforms would be a road to nowhere. And,

therefore, he is making the transition from one stage of the reforms to another. He has begun by treating some old "sore spots."

For many years the Baykonur Cosmodrome was a state within a state here. There were hundreds of hectares of land which, in essence, did not belong to this republic.

Of course, the beginning of the negotiations between Kazakhstan's authorities and the cosmodrome's leading officials was preceded by a great deal of hard work; and, most likely, its result did not come easily. But, after all, there was a result! Nursultan Nazarbayev and the military people signed an agreement providing that the space-research center would not remain a secret wrapped in "seven seals," that it would help the republic to double its telephone communications facilities, ensure television relays from a special satellite, and establish a base or center for opening up a space-research institute.

...Things are quiet nowadays on the proving-grounds at Semipalatinsk. It is certainly true that stopping the nuclear missiles from tearing off into space from here required many years of efforts on the part of this republic's scientific scholars, writers, and the "Green" Movement. But the fact remains that this bloody wound of the people here began to be healed under Nazarbayev's administration.

And what have the enterprises under Union-type administration provided for the local inhabitants? Until recently in Kazakhstan 93 percent of the republic's enterprises were under Union-type administration! Tens of declarations concerning state sovereignty can be passed, but what good can be derived from this figure? Recently Nursultan Nazarbayev met with the leading officials of such plants, associations, and institutes. We do not think that the president's proposal will be implemented immediately, but it had a certain resonance. Its essence boils down to the fact that this republic's interests dictate the necessity of converting several Union-type enterprises to Kazakhstan's jurisdiction.

In our opinion, it is sufficient to specifically designate certain concrete steps taken by Nazarbayev to understand why the overall attitude of Kazakhstan's people is evolving in his favor. People are hearing the talk of an economist from a politician, and they are seeing the genuine results of his activity.

There will be discussion later about the plans of the president and his "team" with regard to privatizing property, curbing inflation, and making the transition to a market-type economy under the conditions of an Asian republic. For the time being we would like to consider the question of why it has been possible to carry out these reforms in general. How has it been possible to maintain monitoring controls on the situation in Kazakhstan with its many languages? It seemed to us that one of the reasons lies in the extreme depolitization of the society.

### 'Alash,' 'Azat,' and 'Yedinstvo'

Alma-Ata is separated from Moscow by a distance of 4,000 kilometers. By Aeroflot standards this is a trifle—scarcely more than three hours of flying time. But when we returned to the "city of white walls," i.e., Moscow, it was as if we had arrived from another planet, so great is the difference in "political temperatures." Here in Moscow there is an apotheosis of opposition between two political forces; here, just as before, people are arguing with fury-glazed eyes as to who is better—Yeltsin or Gorbachev. But there in Alma-Ata an almost "stagnant" calm prevails. People are working, studying, and getting ready for the spring planting.

Not everybody in this republic likes this peaceful tranquility. "Everything here is just as it was in the old days; there's no democracy at all," the local dissidents grievously complain. Well now, they could call people out onto the streets, streets which are still calm. They could tear down from the rooftops the slogans which have been hanging there since time immemorial—slogans such as "Glory to the CPSU" and "The Party's Plans Are the People's Plans" (truthfully speaking, they are a shocking surprise to someone arriving from Moscow). They could remove the bust of D. Kunayev, which now is standing peacefully amidst the blue fir trees on Tulebayev Street. It is said that someone tried to obliterate this bust by pouring white paint all over it. But people washed it off. When we asked rank-and-file inhabitants of Alma-Ata why this bust had not been removed, we encountered a complete lack of understanding. "Why should we?" they asked in reply. "We do not intend either to bow down to him or smash him with a sledge-hammer. He did lead our republic for 14 years; that is part of our history and cannot be rewritten."

All in all, those who complain here about the squares being too quiet should not despair. It is only a single step from peace to war. It's interesting to speculate as to who could take such a first step. Granted that the party mosaic here is not so diverse or motley as it is in the European part of the USSR, political parties, civic groups, and public movements, nevertheless, do exist. We have identified three of them and one in particular which has openly declared its aspiration to power.

That is the political party called "Alash." One of its leaders, Bolatbek Akhmet Ali, defined the party's program goals as follows—to overthrow the communist regime and to revive the independent Islamic state of Alash-Orda, which existed on the territory of Kazakhstan from 1917 through 1919.

"What nonsense! It's like little boys playing games," we thought as we emerged into the daylight after a difficult conversation in a clay-walled cottage, where people sit with their legs crossed under them on rugs surrounded by bare walls. "Do they really want present-day Alma-Ata to take a backward leap into the past? Who among this city's women would consent to wear a yashmak or share her husband with two or three other wives (the laws of

the Shariat permit polygamy)? And, in general, what kind of Islamic state can we talk about when, for example, only one-fifth of the inhabitants of Kazakhstan's capital are Kazakhs?

At this very point in the discussion the slanting eyes of our fellow-conversationalist would flash triumphantly, as he said the following: "But have I not spoken about the rebirth of our nation, i.e., our ethnic group? About the fact that the Kazakhs are gradually becoming a national minority on their own territory? And unless we say now: 'Kazakhstan for the Muslims', it will be too late tomorrow." To a certain extent he is right, this leader of the new party. The poorly thought-out migration policy, the deployment of hundreds of Union-type enterprises on this republic's territory, the virgin-lands campaign, and the transformation of Kazakhstan into a region of exile for many ethnic groups have all distorted this republic's demographic situation.

There are whole regions here where one cannot hear the Kazakh language spoken at all. The indigenous population is composed of herdsmen and shepherds who have lived for centuries distant from the cities, to which most of the national income flows; what is left goes to the auls, i.e., Central Asian villages. The following message resounded at the political meetings convoked by the "Greens" a year ago in Semipalatinsk Oblast: Only Kazakhs live around the proving grounds, in localities where the climatic conditions are the harshest. Their children become ill more frequently than others. Nor should we allow ourselves to speak about a stably high level of infant mortality.

We can no longer dismiss or ignore what is obvious. And whereas people in Alma-Ata do not take the members of the "Alash" group seriously nowadays—that group which is complaining in a targeted and purposeful manner about its "sore spots"—far from the capital, in the South, and in several of this republic's western oblasts, where the Kazakh population is in the majority, "Alash" can rally many people to its banner. The latter has already been flying over the steppe for six months; it is a banner depicting a wolf's head.

At approximately the same time, during the summer of last year, the civic movement named "Azat" was organizationally formed in this republic. It does not set itself up in opposition to the official power structures; it preaches the ideas of internationalism and ethnic cooperation. As asserted by this movement's co-chairman M. Isinaliyev, Kazakhstan's former minister of foreign affairs and a former member of this republic's Communist Party Central Committee, the "Azat" members advocate this republic's territorial integrity, development of the indigenous people's traditions, and a thoroughgoing study of the native language. All things considered, such moderate, realistic ideas as espoused by this movement are more attractive than what "Alash" is preaching. The calls for studying the native language have fallen on particularly receptive soil. Since the beginning of this century the alphabet used by the

Kazakhs has been changed from Arabic to Latin, and then to Cyrillic. Since the late 1940's official business, the instruction of students and pupils, legal processes, and court trials have all been conducted in the Russian language. And whereas up to a few years ago the Russian language was needed by the Kazakhs as a "window onto the world," nowadays, especially in the cities, it has crowded out the native language. Older persons do not understand what their grandchildren are saying.

But people have come to their senses. Even now the Kazakh kindergartens and schools are filled to overflowing. The instructors at the capital's university are translating their lectures from Russian into Kazakh with a great deal of difficulty. The reason why it is so hard is, of course, that Kazakh is a literary type of language rather than a spoken or conversational one. It is easier to forget it than to learn it all over again. However, let's return to the topic of the "Azat" movement. Yes indeed, it is popular among the most diverse strata of the population. But from our conversation with its leader we still could not figure out how this movement's goals differ from those proclaimed by the republic's Communist Party. The decisions of this Communist Party's congresses and plenums contain everything for which the "Azat" stands.

And the third—perhaps most monolithic political force—is the civic movement known as "Yedinstvo" [Unity]. In certain respects it is similar to the Baltic "Interfronts" and to the Russian-language movement in Moldova. According to the "Yedinstvo" co-chairman, Yu. Bunakov, who is an engineer at the Alma-Ata Giprottrans Institute, some 40 enterprises under Union-type administration have joined this movement with the rights of collective members. And they were impelled to band together because "they did not wish to become victims of violence or force; they also wanted to struggle for peace within this republic." So far they do not have any particular reasons for taking definite actions, and, therefore, this cause has not proceeded any further than expressing objections in written protests against, for example, according the Kazakh language sole status as the official state language; they are likewise opposed to drawing up lists of occupations wherein a knowledge of the Kazakh language would be required.

#### Elevate the Steppe Without Lowering the Mountains

"Oh, come on now!" the carping reader will say. "You mean that there are political forces but no opposition? That's really bad. Perhaps such opposition has been artificially driven underground and will burst forth when the pendulum swings back again." It has already burst forth on one occasion. That occurred in December of 1986. Almost nobody in this republic has attempted to paint those days merely in the black-and-white colors of interethnic dissension or strife. That would be too simple—Kazakhs against Russians, and so forth. No, the square seethed and stormed for two days, and subsequently demonstrators were subjected to legal procedures and trials over a period of some 18 months. And

the wave of repressions was indifferent to the question of Kazakhs vs. Russians. And even the legal consultants who drew up the text of the sentence charging an entire people with nationalism were also Kazakhs—members of this republic's Academy of Sciences.

Truth and justice burst through to the light, bringing a lightening of the sentences to the victims. However, the old wounds are still painful, and every year on 17 December the capital seems to be desolate. The windows in the Central Committee building are lit up all night, nor do the police sleep. Nobody says anything out loud, but there is a throbbing, pulsating fear: What is someone should feel like taking revenge?

This region's difficult history will still resound for a long time with the echoes of people's heads butting against each other. The Voznesenskiy [Ascension] Cathedral—a work of high craftsmanship and artistry—still stands in Alma-Ata. It was once crafted by master artisans without a single nail. The Russian population here is asking that this cathedral be given back to the believers and that the tongues of the bells be loosened once again. Is this a worthy cause? Undoubtedly. But here come some older Kazakhs bringing photographs to S. Abdrakhmanov, the deputy chairman of the Alma-Ata Gorispolkom. They say: "Look at the inscription dating from many years ago; it reads 'Kirghiz and Dogs Keep Out'; this was what was announced to our forefathers." Who knows now whether this was true or merely some concoction. But such a knot cannot be cut with one blow.

What should be done under such conditions by a far-sighted politician standing at the helm of power? Nursultan Nazarbayev summons everybody to a roundtable. Last November his discussion with the leaders of the republic-level parties and movements lasted for six hours without a break. And the president acted and spoke so informally that they trusted him. Yes, economic changes are possible only on condition that there is complete political calm or tranquility. As a result of these talks, a moratorium was declared on all political meetings, demonstrations, and strikes. The party has kept its word; Nazarbayev is speeding up the reforms.

There is a saying that the East is a subtle matter. What happened in Osh and Fergana has "shaken up" this truism. But the more deeply one tries to penetrate the essence of the policy being conducted by Kazakhstan's leader, the more one becomes convinced that these words were not spoken in vain. Certain extremely radically minded Kazakhs do not accept Nazarbayev; it seems to them that he lacks the traits of a nationalist-type leader. But the Russian population basically speaks about his actions with approval. And how could their reaction be otherwise when, for example, at the time of the above-mentioned November roundtable he allowed the "Yedinstvo" movement the chance to speak first? When, during any television interview, he uses Kazakh in responding to a question put to him in that language, and then, after a polite request, repeats his reply in Russian? When on more than one occasion he has

declared for all to hear: "Nationalists are my personal enemies"? How else can his policy be perceived by those Tatars, Jews, Germans, Kurds, Greeks, Chechens, Ukrainians, and people belonging to dozens of other nationalities and ethnic groups for whom this republic has become their homeland?

On the Talgarskiy Sovkhoz, which is near Alma-Ata where 11,000 Meskhetin [?] Turks live, we were told how Nazarbayev conducted himself on the day when Turkey's President Turgut Ozal arrived in this republic. A group of Turks came to the airport, all excited and in the mood to create a scandal. It must be understood that all Nazarbayev had to do was give the word, and they would have been removed; and the meeting with the Turkish president would have taken place "in a calm, friendly atmosphere." However, Nazarbayev went over to those people and introduced his wife to them. People are people, and their faces brightened up; the conflict had been nipped in the bud. According to an agreement reached with Turgut Ozal, Kazakhstan, acting jointly with Turkey, will assist Turks to study their language, young persons will be able to travel to their historical motherland, and ties will be restored. One of the leaseholders told us: "We even pray for Nazarbayev."

The reason for the president's attitude of respect for the Turks lies not merely in the fact that he grew up in Kaskalena, a region with a dense population of ethnic Turks. And, in general, what good is to be derived from slogans such as "Kazakhstan for the Kazakhs," or, for example, "Ivan, take your suitcase and go back to Russia."? Why put mines under this multifaceted, multistory house, where there is enough room for everybody?

But let's recall that other saying: The East is a subtle matter. Nursultan Nazarbayev is firmly opposed to the private ownership of land in this republic. Most likely, this is not a matter of ideology, and he is saying this not as the first secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee, but rather as the chief of state. Historically speaking, the Kazakhs were not farmers or agriculturalists, and, therefore, only those who, for various reasons, came here to live began to work the land. To turn over the land to private hands would mean cutting the indigenous population off from it. Nazarbayev does not favor this.

### Reformers Do Not Go to Political Meetings

Nursultan Nazarbayev is one of four presidents who combines this post with the position of first secretary of the Central Committee. Such a situation still pertains in Uzbekistan, Turkmenia, and Tajikistan. The mere listing of these republics suggests the following thought: Under the conditions of Central Asia, the Communist Party, whose position is undoubtedly a strong one, is being transformed from a purely political force to an administrative structure. In Kazakhstan, for example, obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms still remain and carry out their authoritative functions. But let anybody

attempt to prove that in tormented, neglected Moscow, for example—where a battle for power is taking place amid an utter paralysis of authority—things are better than in Alma-Ata, with its more or less set rhythm, and, finally, with its well-maintained, clean streets. We do not attribute the maintenance and repair work performed by janitors to the merits of the communists. But we want so much to live like human beings that it is no longer important what a party calls itself just so long as it **knows how to and is capable of governing**, i.e., of running things.

Without heading down the road to a break-down or the disintegration of the evolved party structures, and while remaining the Number One person in the party, Nursultan Nazarbayev in carrying out the economic reforms is relying on the party as well as on the local soviets. It is interesting that in Kazakhstan these elective organs of power and authority have not been transformed into an arena of "gladiatorial combats" among factions and blocs. Meanwhile, however, the leaders of the Moscow and Leningrad soviets are still saying that we need to reorganize the soviet organs of power—that they are too undeveloped and too numerous—and that, finally, we need to investigate the functions of the ispolkoms and the soviets. As early as last November Nazarbayev without any lengthy conversations proposed that this republic's parliament adopt a decision to eliminate the ispolkoms' presidiums and make the executive organs strictly and directly subordinate to Kazakhstan's Council of Ministers. And this was accomplished.

It is interesting that the leaders of the democratic movement are clearly in sympathy with Nazarbayev, although it is impossible not to see that many decisions here in Kazakhstan are being taken exclusively within the perspective of the new, completely specific policy being conducted by Nursultan Nazarbayev. This policy could be provisionally termed **authoritarian modernization**.

The lack of coordination or incommensurateness between these two words is illusory. In point of fact, serious economic changes have virtually nowhere and never been carried out in the absence of a powerful, centralized authority. Unless unstable neighbors hinder this republic, we believe that within a few years it could be listed among the flourishing, prosperous ones. It is to be fervently hoped that they do not hinder or interfere! That emissaries from other republics do not go to Karaganda's miners and "acquire" or lead these people "astray." Not everything here should be measured by someone else's "yardstick."

The gate which stands on the path to the economic miracle has many locks. But some of the keys already lie in Nazarbayev's pocket. With a leader capable of influencing this republic's political climate, who knows the disposition of forces within its Communist Party and who has an excellent idea concerning the possibilities of executive power (for five years Nazarbayev was the head of Kazakhstan's Council of Ministers, and nowadays the

Cabinet of Ministers is subordinate to him as the president)—with such a leader a serious leap forward is possible. But as of now he is still just at the beginning of the path.

In breaking through to a market-type economy, Kazakhstan has enormous advantages over other Union republics. Let's listen to what the American economist Beng has to say; at Nazarbayev's suggestion, he has taken the post of vice-chairman of the committee of economic experts. He considers this region to be an ideal place for conducting economic reforms, since it has extremely abundant reserves of raw materials, a colossal industrial base, and no over-population. However, the plusses of this republic's economy will not "come into play" until major repairs are carried out on the routes linking it with the Union as a whole. The worst headache is that caused by prices. This republic exports products (raw materials) at firmly fixed prices, whereas it imports items at negotiable prices, i.e., those arrived at by contractual agreements. It sells a ton of zinc, for example, to a country for 800 rubles, while the world price for such a ton is 2,600 dollars. This same is true in the case of copper, iron ore, etc. But at this point it would be a good thing to remind ourselves of the following factor: To begin to trade solely with the West would mean recognizing that there is no more Union.

Let's not be too tricky or play games: It is advantageous for Kazakhstan to remain within the USSR if only because that same South Korea assumed the acquisition of a similar sales market. Moreover, whereas the wheat which is produced here in Kazakhstan is highly valued (it contains 32 percent gluten and measures up to world standards), the wool produced here is not so good and would bring a very low price on the foreign market. In short, Kazakhstan needs to import at least as much as it exports. And would it not bode new troubles for it to turn its back on the Union?

And so this republic is still only at the starting line. And all its present-day innovations must be perceived merely as innovations. These include the plan worked out by Doctor Beng for privatizing state property, the attempts by the economist Grigoriy Yavlinskiy to carry out the basic provisions of the "500 day" program in Kazakhstan, and the signing of hundreds of contractual agreements with Western entrepreneurs. Experiments lie ahead of us for this people and for its leader. There is an old Kazakh proverb which runs as follows: When you sit on a horse, remember that it's painful to fall off. Here everything works depending upon the leader—his ability to talk with people, his undoubted political sensitivity and tact, and even his messages to the obstinate Center. It's spring here now. **But we remember that in April 1985 it was also spring throughout the entire country.**

#### **Reorganization of Kazakh Higher Party School Reported**

PM1704153791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
12 Apr 91 Union Edition p 1

[Item in roundup of IZVESTIYA, TASS, REUTER, UPI, and SIBINFORM reports: "Higher Party School No Longer Exists"]



[Text] Alma-Ata Higher Party School is changing its signboard. After merging with the Kazakh CP Central Committee's Political Research Institute, it has been reorganized as the Institute of Political Science and Management.

This decision by the republic Politburo was motivated by the need for radical changes in the system of the party's scientific and educational institutions.

The institute will train and improve the qualifications of political scientists, sociologists, journalists, and a wide range of managers. Specialists who already have higher education will study there, and the contingent of students is being widened—nonparty people will also be able to enter the institute. And those who are studying now will complete their course according to an amended, accelerated plan, AZIYA-PRESS reports.

## Kyrgyz Law on Social Organizations

### Text of Law

91US0486A Bishkek SLOVO KYRGYZSTANA  
in Russian 4 Apr 91 p 3

[Law: "Law of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan on Public Associations"]

[Text] The right to form associations is an inalienable right of a person and citizen, a right that has been proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and firmly established in the Constitution of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and the USSR Constitution. The Republic of Kyrgyzstan, which has a self-interest in the development of the citizens' creative initiative and social and political participation, and their participation in the administration of the state and society, guarantees the citizens of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan the freedom to create public associations.

### Chapter I. General Principles

#### Article 1. Concept of the Public Association

A public association is a voluntary formation that arose as a result of the expression of the free will of the citizens of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, who have united on the basis of a commonality of interests, goals, and principles of operation.

The following are recognized as public associations: political parties; mass movements; trade unions; women's and veterans' organizations; organizations of disabled individuals; youth and children's organizations; scientific, technical, cultural-educational, physical-cultural and sports, and other voluntary societies; creative unions; associations of people with a common ethnic or geographical background; foundations, associations, and other citizens' associations.

The action of this Law does not extend to cooperative or other organizations pursuing commercial goals or that promote the extraction of profit (income) by other

enterprises or organizations; to religious organizations; to agencies of territorial public self-government (soviets and committees of microrayons; building, street, block, settlement, and rural committees; etc.); public-action agencies (people's *druzhinas*, comrade courts, etc.); the procedure of creation and operation of which are defined by other legislation.

#### Article 2. Legislation Concerning Public Associations

The legislation concerning public associations consists of this Law, that defines the foundations of the legal status of the republic's public associations, and other laws of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

#### Article 3. Purposes of Creating and Operating Public Associations

Public associations are created for purposes of implementing and defending civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights and freedoms; developing the citizens' participation rate and spontaneous action, and their participation in the administration of state and public affairs; satisfying occupational and amateur interests; developing scientific, technical, and artistic creativity; protecting the public's health, and their participation in charitable activities; conducting cultural-educational, physical-cultural, physical-improvement, and sports work; protecting the environment and monuments of history and culture; conducting patriotic education and education in the humanities; expanding international ties and reinforcing peace and friendship between peoples; and carrying out other activities that are not banned by law.

It is not permitted to create or to operate public organizations that have as their goal or method of operations the overthrowing or the forcible change of the constitutional system or the violation of the unity of the territory of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the other union and autonomous republics, or autonomous formations; the propagandizing of war, violence, and cruelty, the incitement of social, including class, racial, national, or religious enmity; the discrediting of the army and the law-enforcement agencies; or the commission of other criminally punishable acts. It is forbidden to create public militarized associations or armed formations.

The creation and operation of public associations that encroach upon the health and morality of the public, or upon the rights and legally protected interests of the citizens, is prosecuted in accordance with the law.

#### Article 4. Principles of Creation and Operation of Public Associations

Public associations are created and operate on the basis of voluntary action, the equal rights of their members (participants), self-government, legality, and *glasnost*.

All the public associations, when fulfilling the functions stipulated by their charters or other acts, operate within



the framework of the USSR Constitution, the Constitution of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, and the laws of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

The participation or nonparticipation of a citizen in the activities of a public association cannot serve as the basis for limiting his rights and freedoms, including the serving as the condition for his occupying a position in a state organization, or as the basis for his nonexecution of the duties stipulated by law.

The requirement concerning the indication in official documents of the person's membership in a particular public association is not allowed.

The legislation governing labor, as well as the legislation governing social security and social insurance for the workers, extends to workers in the apparatus of public associations.

#### Article 5. The State and Public Associations

The Republic of Kyrgyzstan guarantees the observance of the rights and legal interests of public associations and, in conformity with the Constitution of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, guarantees the conditions for their fulfillment of their tasks as stated in their charters.

The state renders to youth and children's organizations material and financial support; guarantees the carrying out of a preferential tax policy with respect to them; and grants to children's organizations the right to use the facilities at schools, nonschool institutions, club houses, palaces and houses of culture, and sports and other structures free of charge or on preferential terms.

The interference of state agencies and officials in the activities of public associations, or the interference of public associations in the activities of state agencies and officials, is not allowed, other than instances when this is stipulated by law.

The measures sponsored by the organizations of political parties and other public associations are carried out during the nonworking hours of their members (participants) and are paid for from those associations' funds.

It is not allowed to have the state finance the activities of political parties or mass public movements that pursue political goals, with the exception of instances of financing the election campaigns in conformity with the legislation governing the election of people's deputies.

Questions that touch upon the interests of public associations, in the instances that have been stipulated by legislation, are resolved by state agencies and economic organizations with the participation of, or the coordination of, the appropriate public associations.

#### Article 6. Republic-Level and Other Public Associations

Republic-level and local associations are created and operate in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, and organizations

of unionwide, interpublic, and international associations can also be created and operate.

Republic-level public association include those associations whose activities, in conformity with the tasks stated in their charters, extend to the territory of the entire republic or the majority of its rayons and cities. At such time the republic-level political party or trade union must have as their members no fewer than 500 cities of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

Local public associations include those associations whose activities extend to the territory of individual administrative formations.

Unionwide public associations include those associations whose activities, in conformity with the tasks as stated in their charters, extend to the territory of all the union republic or the majority of them, and that have their own organizations in those republics.

#### Article 7. Unions of Public Associations

Public associations have the right, on a voluntary basis, to unite into unions of public associations.

The procedure for formation and operation of unions of public associations and the procedure for discontinuing their activities are defined by this Law.

### Chapter II. Formation of Public Associations and Discontinuation of Their Activities

#### Article 8. Creation of Public Associations

Public associations are created on the initiative of no fewer than ten citizens.

Public associations other than political parties and trade unions can also be created by other public associations.

The initiators of the creation of a public association convoke a constituent congress (conference) or general meeting, at which the charter (statute, or other founding act) is accepted, and guiding agencies are formed.

#### Article 9. Membership in Public Associations

The citizens of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and the USSR are members of public associations. The charter of a public association other than a political party can stipulate the membership in it of foreign citizens or persons without citizenship.

Citizens who have reached the age of 14 years can be members of youth organizations attached to political parties.

Collective members—labor collectives at enterprises, institutions, and organizations; and citizen associations—can take part in the activities of public associations other than political parties and trade unions, in the instances stipulated by their charters.

### Article 10. Charter of a Public Association

A public association adopts a charter that defines its goals, tasks, and methods of operation.

The charter must contain:

- 1) the name and abbreviated name of the public association; its address and the territory within the confines of which it carries out its activities;
- 2) the structure of the public association; the procedure for formation; the competency and terms of office of its guiding agencies;
- 3) the time limits for convoking of conferences and congress;
- 4) the conditions and procedure for acceptance and departure of members (when the public associations have a fixed membership);
- 5) the rights and duties of the members (participants);
- 6) the sources of formation of the funds and the procedure for using them;
- 7) the procedure for making amendments and additions to the charter;
- 8) the procedure for discontinuing the association's activities.

The charter can also stipulate other principles that pertain to the activities of the public association and that do not contradict the law.

### Article 11. Registration of the Charters of Public Associations

The charter of a public association is registered by the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

In order to register the charter of a public association or its organization (for a unionwide, interrepublic, and international association), within one month after the day that the charter is adopted, the public association files an application that has been signed by the members of the association, with an indication of the place of residence of each member. The applicants append to the application the charter, the minutes of the constituent congress (conference) or general meeting that adopted the charter, and other materials confirming the fulfillment of the requirements stated in Articles 6 and 8 of this Law.

The application for charter registration is considered within two months from the day that it is received.

Amendments and additions to the charters of public associations are subject to registration in the same procedure and within the same time limits as the registration of the charters.

The agencies carrying out the registration of the charters of public associations maintain a registry of those association. The public associations receive the status of a legal entity on the day that the charter is registered.

Registration fees in the procedure and amounts established by the legislation of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan are charged for registering the charter of a public association and any subsequent amendments and additions.

### Article 12. Refusal to Register the Charter of a Public Association

The registration of the charter of a public association can be refused if the charter of the public association contradicts Article 3, 4, or 10 of this Law, or if the charter of a public association with the same name has been previously registered.

In the event of refusal to register the charter, the applicants are so informed in written form, with an indication of the legislative statutes that the submitted charter contradicts.

In the event of refusal to register the charter of public association or the prolonging of the amount of registration time, the organizations can initiate a case at the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

### Article 13. Symbols of Public Associations

Public associations can have emblems and flags as symbols.

Emblems of public associations are approved by their guiding agencies in conformity with the charters and cannot serve to propagandize goals indicated in Part 2 of Article 3 of this Law.

The symbols are subject to state registration simultaneously with the charters of the public associations.

The name of the public association, the abbreviation of that name, and the association's symbols must differ from the names and symbols of other public associations registered in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

### Article 14. Discontinuation of the Activities of Public Associations

The activities of public associations can be discontinued by means of reorganization (merger, annexation, division), or liquidation.

Public associations are reorganized on the basis of decisions made by their congresses (conferences) or general meetings. The charters of the public associations newly formed after the reorganization are registered in the procedure established by Article 11 of this Law.

A public association is liquidated on the basis of a decision by a congress (conference) or general meeting, or on the basis of and in the procedure stipulated by Article 26 of this Law.

The property of a public association that has been liquidated on the basis of a decision made by its congress (conference) or general meeting is directed to the purposes stipulated by its charter.

### **Chapter III. Rights and Conditions of Activities of Public Associations**

#### **Article 15. Rights of Public Associations**

The rights of public associations are consolidated in their charters. To carry out the purposes and tasks defined in the charters, program documents, and other acts, public associations are free to disseminate information concerning their goals and activities.

Registered public associations have the right to participate in elections of agencies of state authority at the corresponding levels and to carry out legislative initiative in the person of their republic-level agencies.

Public associations have the right:

- through their people's deputies, to participate in the formation of agencies of state authority and administration;
- to represent and defend the interests of their members (participants) at state and public agencies;
- to propagandize freely their goals and idea;
- to establish the press and other mass media, and also to make use, in the established procedure, of the press and other state mass media;
- in the legally established procedure, to organize rallies, demonstrations, meetings, and other mass measures.

#### **Article 16. Political Parties, Mass Public Associations, Trade Unions**

Parties, in expressing the political will of their members, pose as their basic tasks the participation in the formation of agencies of state authority and administration, and also in carrying out the authority through their representatives who have been elected to soviets of people's deputies.

Parties have program documents that are published for public knowledge. Parties are equal before the law.

Parties have the right to nominate their candidates for election as people's deputies, including as a single list; to conduct pre-election agitation; and to form groups of their deputy adherents at the appropriate soviets of people's deputies.

Mass public movements pursue political or other goals and do not have a fixed membership.

Military personnel and persons occupying positions in law-enforcement agencies are guided in their official activities by the requirements of laws and are not bound by the decisions of political parties or mass public movement that pursue political goals.

Trade unions, in their interrelationships with state agencies, economic organizations, and cooperative and other public associations, represent and defend the interests of the trade union members with regard to matters in the production, socioeconomic, and cultural areas. All the trade unions are equal before the law.

Political parties and trade unions have only fixed individual membership.

### **Chapter IV. Property and Financial Activities of Public Associations**

#### **Article 17. Property of Public Associations**

Public associations and their organizations can own buildings, structures, a housing fund, equipment, stock, property intended for cultural-educational and therapeutic purposes, monetary funds, shares and other securities, and other property necessary to provide material support for their activities as stipulated by their charters. Public associations can also own publishing houses, other enterprises, and philanthropic institutions created at the expense of the funds of those associations in conformity with the goals indicated in their charters.

Legislative acts of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and the USSR can establish types of property which, for reasons of state and public security, or in conformity with international treaties, cannot be owned by public associations.

The monetary funds of public associations are formed from: entrance and membership dues, if their payment has been stipulated by the charters; voluntary dues and donations; proceeds from conducting, in accordance with their charters, lectures, exhibitions, sports and other events, and lotteries; income from production, economic, and publishing activities; and other receipts not banned by law.

Political parties and mass public movements pursuing political goals do not have the right to receive financial or other material assistance from foreign states, organizations, or citizens.

Political parties annually publish their budgets for public knowledge.

The property owned by public associations is protected by law.

The rights of unions and the associations that are part of them to own, use, and control the property belonging to those unions and the associations that are part of them are defined by the charters of the unions of public associations.

#### **Article 18. Production and Economic Activities of Public Associations**

Public associations, in the procedure defined by legislation, carry out production and economic activities and create, solely for purposes of fulfilling the tasks stated in

the charters, enterprises and cost-accountable organizations possessing the rights of a legal entity.

The income from the production and economic activities of public associations cannot be redistributed among the members (participants) of those associations and can be used only to fulfill the tasks stated in the charter; it is authorized for public associations to use their own funds for philanthropic purposes, even if that is not indicated in their charters.

The enterprises and organizations created by public associations make payments to the budget in the procedure and amounts established by law.

#### **Article 19. Mass Media and Publishing Activities of Public Associations**

Public associations have the right to establish mass media and to carry out publishing activities in conformity with the legislation of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan concerning the press and other mass media.

#### **Article 20. Taxes on the Income of Public Associations**

Public associations pay taxes in the legally-established volume and procedure on their income, with the exception of membership dues and donations. The procedure for withholding the taxes is monitored by state financial agencies.

### **Chapter V. Monitoring the Activities of Public Associations**

#### **Article 21. Monitoring and Overview of the Activities of Public Associations**

The financial agencies monitor the sources of the income of public associations, the amounts of funds received by them, and the payment of taxes in conformity with tax legislation.

Overview of the execution of the laws by public associations is carried out by agencies of the procuracy.

The state agency that has registered the charter of the public association monitors the observance of the principles stated in the charter relative to the goals of the activities of the public association. The registering agency has the right to require from the guiding agency of the public association the submission of the decisions that have been made, to send its representatives for participation in the measures being carried out by the public association, and to receive explanations from the members of the public association and from other citizens with regard to questions linked with the observance of the public association's charter.

#### **Article 22. Basis of Responsibility**

Violations of the legislation governing public associations entail criminal, administrative, material, and other responsibility in conformity with legislation of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

Responsibility for violating the legislation governing public associations is borne by the officials at state and public agencies who are guilty of such violation, and also by citizens.

Public associations, including those that have not registered their charter, in instances of violation of the legislation governing public associations, bear responsibility in conformity with the law.

In the event of commission by public associations of actions that go beyond the confines of the goals and tasks defined by their charters, or that violate the law, the guiding agency of that public association can be given a written warning by the agency that registered the chart of the public association, or by the procurator.

#### **Article 23. Suspension of the Activities of Public Associations**

In the event of commission by a public associations of actions that go beyond the confines of the goals and tasks defined by its charter, or that violate the law, its activities can be suspended by the agency that registered that public association.

In the event of suspension of the activities of a public association, the agency that registered it informs, in written form, the guiding agency of the public association concerning the violations of laws that have been committed and establishes a deadline for eliminating them.

After the violations have been eliminated, the guiding agency of the public association informs the organization that registered it; the registering agency, within one month after receipt of that report, gives the authorization of the public association to continue its activities.

The activities of a public association are suspended for a period of from one to six months.

#### **Article 24. Consequences of the Suspension of Activities**

In the event of suspension of the activities of a public association, it is forbidden for that association to use any mass media; to conduct propaganda or agitation; to organize rallies, demonstrations, or other mass measures; or to take part in elections; and there is also a suspension of their right to make use of bank deposits, with the exception of settlements on labor contracts, the compensation of losses incurred as a result of their activities, and the payment of penalties.

#### **Article 25. Procedure for Appealing the Suspension of Activities**

The suspension of the activities of a public association can be appealed to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

**Article 26. Liquidation of a Public Association in Instances of Its Violation of the Requirements Stated in the Charter or the Law**

A public association is liquidated on the basis of a court decision in the event that the public association has committed actions stipulated by Part 2 of Article 3 of this Law.

The court can liquidate a public association in the event that it has not eliminated by the established deadline the violations that served as the reason for suspension.

The property of a public association that has been liquidated on the basis of a court decision can become state property without compensation.

Organizations of unionwide and interrepublic public associations and republic-level public associations are liquidated on the basis of a decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, in accordance with representations made by the procurator of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, and also in accordance with representations made by other agencies and officials empowered to do so by the legislation of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. The decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan concerning the liquidation of a public association is not subject to appeal.

**Chapter VI. International Ties of Public Associations. International Public Associations. International Treaties**

**Article 27. International Ties of Public Associations**

Public associations, in conformity with their charters, can become part of international public (nongovernmental) associations, maintain direct international contacts and ties, and conclude the appropriate agreements.

**Article 28. International Public Associations**

A public association created in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan is recognized as international if its activities, in conformity with its charter, extend to the territory of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and one or more foreign states. The charter of the international public association is subject to registration in conformity with Articles 10 and 11 of this Law.

If the composition of an international public association created abroad includes as a collective member a public association on the territory of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the charter of the public association also is subject to registration.

A public association that has extended its activities to the territory of a foreign state submits to the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan its charter with the necessary amendments and additions for re-registration.

Public associations whose goals are the reinforcement of peace, the development of international cooperation, and certain types of humanitarian activities, can enjoy the benefits established by legislation.

The statutes stated in this Law extend to the activities of departments (branches and other structural subdivisions) of public associations of foreign states.

**Article 29. International Treaties**

If, by an international treaty of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, other rules than those contained in this Law have been established, the rules of the international treaty are applied.

A. Akayev, president of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

Frunze, 1 February 1991.

**Decree on Implementation of Law**

91US0486B Bishkek SLOVO KYRGYZSTANA in Russian 4 Apr 91 p 3

*[Decree: "Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan Concerning the Implementation of the Law of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan 'Public Associations'"]*

*[Text]* In connection with the adoption of the Law of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, entitled "Public Organizations," the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan decrees:

1. The implementation of the Law of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, entitled: "Public Organizations," effective 1 February 1991.
2. The establishment of the fact that the rule in Part 2 of Article 11 of the Law of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, entitled: "Public Associations," concerning the submission of the charter for registration within one month after its adoption does not extend to the charters of public associations that were created prior to the implementation of this Law. The charters of those public associations are to be registered prior to 1 January 1992.
3. The Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan:
  - is to adopt and publish in the press Rules Governing the Procedure for Registering Public Organizations and for Monitoring Their Activities, and to determine the procedure for assessment and the size of the fees for registering the charters of public associations;
  - prior to 1 March 1991, is to allocate an additional number of personnel billets for a special service to register the charters of public associations and to monitor their activities at Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and to resolve questions of the material-financial and other support of that service;
  - is to carry out the decisions of the government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan in conformity with the indicated Law.

M. Sherimkulov, chairman,  
Republic of Kyrgyzstan Supreme Soviet  
Frunze, 1 February 1991.

**Girenko on Masaliyev Resignation**

91US0498A Moscow GLASNOST in Russian No 16,  
18 Apr 91 p 2

[Unattributed interview with A.N. Girenko, CPSU Central Committee secretary; place and date not given: "Even in This Difficult Time, the Main Thing for the People Is the Fate of the Country"]

[Text] A.N. Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, participated in the Communist Party of Kirghizia Central Committee plenum.

[GLASNOST] Andrey Nikolayevich, four new secretaries of the Central Committee, including the first secretary, were elected at one time at this plenum. This is a rare event, if not to say unprecedented. What brought this about?

[Girenko] There were no extraordinary reasons for this. I would say this: This is one more example in favor of the fact that all questions, including personnel questions, should be resolved at the right time, and without piling them up.

What kind of situation has developed in Kirghizia? Former second secretary of the Central Committee N.M. Chepelev has been working a long time now on the staff of the CPSU Central Committee. M. Sherimkulov was elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic. M.I. Paryshkura headed the republic's committee on foreign economic relations. All of this, naturally, did not occur in one day. So that, in principle, questions about the secretaries of the Central Committee could have been resolved logically, without resorting to such a "salvo."

[GLASNOST] It is clear with the comrades mentioned. But what brought about A. Masaliyev's resignation?

[Girenko] His personal request. Absamat Masaliyevich has headed the republic's party organization for more than five years, and he did a lot so that it operated aggressively in what was a rather difficult period for us. Colossal burdens fell to his lot. But at some point, his health began to give out, and he requested that he be transferred to a sector of work which was more suitable for the way he feels. So there is no question of any kind of "removal," although, of course, A. Masaliyev, like all first department heads, were continuously the focus of criticism. But this is quite a normal occurrence.

[GLASNOST] A report appeared in the press about A. Masaliyev's transfer to work on the staff of the CPSU Central Committee. To what position?

[Girenko] The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat confirmed Absamat Masaliyevich as a consultant of the Ideological Department.

[GLASNOST] Was this decision supported in the republic?

[Girenko] Yes, the Central Committee plenum approved our decision. Many of the speakers, including President of Kirghizia A. Akayev, expressed satisfaction with this approach: They value the man's knowledge and experience, and they take advantage of it as much as possible. After all, this applies not only to department heads, but to all Communists, and especially to veterans.

[GLASNOST] How was the situation in the republic assessed at the plenum?

[Girenko] As tense. This is associated with the general crisis phenomena in the economy of the country. But at the same time, the situation in Kirghizia is more stable than in other regions of the Union. The relative stability is conditioned by the work of the republic's party organization and the constructive activity of the state leadership of the republic, most of all of President A. Akayev—a competent person who is able to unite people, who even have diverse political positions, around specific tasks.

[GLASNOST] Who proposed the candidacy of the new first secretary of the Central Committee?

[Girenko] It can be said, the Communists. On the eve of the plenum, a "large soviet" was held in all primary party organizations, and candidacies to the post of "first" were discussed. A majority of the party organization named Dzh. Amanbayev. He is 46 years old, works in the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and he headed one of the leading oblast party committee's—Issyk-Kul'skiy.

[GLASNOST] Andrey Nikolayevich, you visited enterprises of the republic, and you met with the workers. What created the biggest impression?

[Girenko] The meeting occurred immediately after the increase in prices, and it was natural to expect a sharp reaction. And that is what it was. But what was surprising: We arrived, for example, at a worsted cloth combine, a women's collective, and everything that concerns the family budget resounded extremely sharply here and emotionally. And, still, the main thing that disturbed people—we heard this from them—was the fate of the country, the Union, and the processes occurring in the center, and in the party's Central Committee. When this was talked about, the personal, and even what was very important and painful, assumed secondary importance. It is this mood of the people, who are sincerely worried about the fate of our state, that was the most striking impression. This also reminds us of our responsibility, and it gives us strength.

**Tajik Law on Social Organizations**

91US0472A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST  
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 28 Dec 90 p 3

[Law: "Tajik SSR Law on Public Associations in Tajik SSR"]

[Text]

### Chapter I. General Principles

**Article 1.** In accordance with the Tajik SSR Constitution, citizens of Tajik SSR have the right to unite into public organizations. The republic has a self-interest in the development of the creative initiative and social and participation of the citizens, and their participation in the administration of the state and society, and guarantees to citizens the right to create public associations.

#### Article 2. Concept of the Public Association

A public association is a voluntary formation that arose as a result of the free expression of the will of citizens who have united on the basis of a commonality of interests.

The following are recognized as public associations: political parties; mass movements; trade unions; women's and veterans' organizations; organizations of disabled individuals; youth and children's organizations; scientific, technical, cultural-educational, physical-cultural and sports, and other voluntary societies; creative unions; associations of people sharing a common ethnic or geographic background; foundations, associations, and other associations of citizens.

The action of this law does not extend to cooperative or other organizations that pursue commercial goals or that promote the extraction of profit (income) by other enterprises or organizations; to religious organizations; agencies of territorial public self-government (soviets and committees of microrayons; makhalla, building, street, and block [soviets and committees], etc.); public-action agencies (people's *druzhinas*, comrade courts, etc.); the procedure for the creation and activities of which are defined by other legislation.

#### Article 3. Legislation Concerning Public Organizations

The legislation concerning public associations consists of the Tajik Constitution; this law, that defines the legal status of public associations; and other laws and legislative acts of the Tajik SSR government.

#### Article 4. Purposes of Creating and Operating Public Associations

Public associations are created for purposes of implementing and defending civic, political, social, and cultural rights and freedoms; developing the citizens' participation rate and spontaneous action, and their participation in the administration of state and public affairs; satisfying occupational and amateur interests; developing scientific, technical, and artistic creativity; protecting the public's health, and their participation in charitable activities; conducting cultural-educational, physical-improvement, and sports work; protecting the environment and monuments of history and culture; conducting patriotic education and education in the humanities; expanding international ties and reinforcing

peace and friendship between peoples; and carrying out other activities that are not banned by law.

It is not permitted to create or to operate public associations that have as their goal or method of operations the overthrowing or the forcible change of the constitutional system or the forcible violation of the unity of the territory of the USSR and Tajik SSR; the propagandizing of war, violence, and cruelty; the inciting of social, including class, racial, national, and religious enmity; or the commission of other criminally punishable actions. It is forbidden to create public militarized associations or armed formations.

The creation and operation of public associations that encroach upon health and morality of the public, or upon the rights and legally protected interests of the citizens is prosecuted in accordance with the law.

#### Article 5. Principles of Creation and Operation of Public Associations

Public associations are created and operate on the basis of voluntary action, the equal rights of their members (participants), self-government, legality, and glasnost.

All the public associations, when fulfilling the functions stipulated by their charters or by other acts, operate within the framework of the Tajik SSR Constitution and other laws.

The participation or nonparticipation of a citizen in the activities of a public association cannot serve as the basis for limiting his rights and freedoms, including the serving as the condition for his occupying a position in a state organization, or as the basis for his nonexecution of the duties stipulated by law.

The requirement concerning the indication in official documents of the person's membership in a particular public association is not allowed.

The legislation governing labor, as well as the legislation governing social security and social insurance for the workers, extends to workers in the apparatus of public associations.

#### Article 6. The State and Public Associations

The state guarantees the observance of the rights and legal interests of public associations and, in conformity with the Constitution, guarantees the conditions for their fulfillment of their tasks as stated in their charters.

The state renders to youth and children's organizations material and financial support; guarantees the carrying out of a preferential tax policy with respect to them; and grants to children's organizations the right to use the facilities at school, nonschool institutions, club houses, palaces and houses of culture, and sports and other structures free of charge or on preferential terms.

The interference of state agencies and officials in the activities of public associations, or the interference of

public associations in the activities of state agencies and officials, is not allowed, other than instances when this is stipulated by law.

The measures sponsored by the organizations, political parties, and other public associations are carried out during the nonworking hours of their members (participants) and are paid for from those associations' funds.

It is not allowed to have the state finance the activities of political parties or mass public movements that pursue political goals, with the exception of instances of financing the election campaigns in conformity with the legislation governing the election of people's deputies.

Questions that touch upon the interests of public associations, in the instances that have been stipulated by legislation, are resolved by state agencies and economic organizations with the participation of, or the coordination of, the appropriate public associations.

#### **Article 7. Republic-Level and Other Public Associations**

The following are created and operate in Tajik SSR: republic-level links of unionwide public associations; interrepublic, republic-level, and local public associations; and international associations.

The republic-level links of unionwide and interrepublic public associations include those associations whose activities, in conformity with the tasks as stated in their charters, extend to the entire territory of the republic, and that have their organizations on the territory of Tajik SSR.

Republic-level public associations include those associations whose activities, in conformity with the tasks as stated in their charters, extend to the entire territory of the republic or to the majority of oblasts, rayons (cities) of republic subordination, and that have their organizations on those territories. At such time the republic-level political parties or trade union must have as their members no fewer than 500 citizens.

Local public associations include: oblast, rayon (city), settlement, and kishlak [associations].

Oblast public associations include those associations whose activities, in conformity with the tasks as stated in their charters, extend to the entire territory of the oblast or the majority of the rayons and cities in the oblast, and that have their organizations on those territories.

Rayon (city) public associations include those associations whose activities, in conformity with the tasks as stated in their charters, extend to the entire territory of the rayon (city), or, in the city of Dushanbe, also to the majority of its rayons.

Settlement and kishlak public associations include those associations whose activities, in conformity with the tasks as stated in their charters, extend to the territory of the settlement or kishlak.

In necessary instances, interrayon public associations can be created.

#### **Article 8. Unions of Public Associations**

Public associations have the right, on a voluntary basis, to unite into unions of public associations.

The procedure for formation and operation of unions of public associations and the procedure for discontinuing their activities are defined in conformity with this law.

### **Chapter II. Formation of Public Associations and Discontinuation of Their Activities**

#### **Article 9. Creation of Public Associations**

Public associations are created on the initiative of no fewer than ten citizens.

Public associations other than political parties and trade unions can also be created by other public associations.

The initiators of the creation of a public association convoke a constituent congress (conference) or general meeting, at which the charter (statute, or other founding act) is accepted, and guiding agencies are formed.

#### **Article 10. Membership in Public Associations**

The citizens of Tajik SSR are members (participants) of public associations. The charter of a public association other than political parties can stipulate the membership in it of foreign citizens or persons without citizenship, as well as citizens of other republics.

Citizens who have reached the age of 14 years can be members of youth organizations attached to political parties.

Collective members—labor collectives at enterprises, institutions, and organizations; and citizen associations—can take part in the activities of public associations other than political parties and trade unions, in the instances stipulated by their charters.

#### **Article 11. Charter of a Public Association**

The charter of a public association must stipulate:

- 1) the name, goals, and tasks of the public association;
- 2) the structure of the public association; the territory within the confines of which it carries out its activities;
- 3) the conditions and procedure for accepting a person as a member of the public association, and for his leaving it, in instances when the association has a fixed membership;
- 4) the rights and duties of the members (participants) of the public association;
- 5) the competency and procedure for formation of the guiding agencies of the public association and its organizations; the terms of office; and their location;



6) the sources of formation of the funds and other property of the public association and its organizations;

7) the procedure for making amendments and additions to the charter of the public association;

8) the procedure for discontinuing the activities of the public association.

The charter can also stipulate other principles that pertain to the activities of the public association.

The charter of the public association must not contradict the legislation.

#### **Article 12. Registration of the Charter of a Public Association**

The charter of a republic-level link in unionwide public associations, and the charter of international, interrepublic, and republic-level public associations, are registered at Tajik SSR Ministry of Justice.

The charter of a local public association in a rayon or city of oblast subordination is registered at the Justice Department of the executive committee of the oblast soviet of people's deputies.

The charter of a public association whose activities extend to the territory of the city of Dushanbe, its rayons, and rayons and cities of republic subordination is registered at Tajik SSR Ministry of Justice.

In order to register the charter of a public association, within one month after the day that the charter (statute, or other founding act) is adopted, the public association files an application that has been signed by the members of the guiding agency of the particular association, with an indication of the place of residence of each member. The applicants must attach to the application as appendices the charter and the minutes of the constituent congress (conference) or general meeting that accepted the charter, and other materials confirming the fulfillment of the requirements stated in Article 7 and 9 of this law.

The application for charter registration is considered within a month's time from the day that it is received.

Amendments and additions to the charters of public associations are subject to registration in the same procedure and within the same time limits as the registration of the charters.

The agencies carrying out the registration of the charters of public associations maintain a registry of those associations.

The public association or its organizations (agencies) do not carry out their activities until after the registration of their charter in the procedure established by this law.

Registration fees in the procedure and amounts defined by Tajik SSR Cabinet of Ministers are charged for registering the charter of the public association and any amendments or additions.

#### **Article 13. Refusal to Register the Charter of a Public Association**

The registration of the charter of a public association can be refused if the charter of the public association contradicts Articles 4, 5, or 11 of this law, or if the charter of a public association with the same name has been previously registered.

In the event of the refusal to register the charter, the applicants are so informed in written form, with an indication of the legislative statutes that the submitted charter contradicts.

Refusal to register the charter of a public association can be appealed at Tajik SSR Supreme Court and is considered in the procedure established by Chapter 271 of the Tajik SSR Civil Proceedings Code.

#### **Article 14. Symbols of Public Associations**

Public associations can have emblems, flags, and pennants as their symbols.

Emblems of public associations are approved by their guiding agencies in conformity with the charters. The emblems of public associations cannot serve to propagandize goals indicated in Part 2 of Article 4 of this law.

Flags and pennants are subject to state registration in the established procedure.

#### **Article 15. Discontinuation of the Activities of Public Associations**

The activities of public associations can be discontinued by means of reorganization (merger, annexation, division), or liquidation.

Public associations are reorganized on the basis of decisions made by their congresses (conferences) or general meetings. The charters of the public associations newly formed after the reorganization are registered in the procedure established by Article 12 of this law.

A public association is liquidated on the basis of a decision by a congress (conference) or general meeting, or on the basis and in the procedure stipulated by Article 23 of this law.

The property of a public association that has been liquidated on the basis of a decision made by its congress (conference) or general meeting is directed to the purposes stipulated by its charter.

### Chapter III. Rights and Conditions of Activities of Public Associations

#### Article 16. Rights of Public Associations

Public associations are equal before the law, and their rights are firmly established in their charters.

To carry out the purposes and tasks defined in the charters, program documents, and other acts, public associations freely disseminate information concerning their purposes and activities, and, in the instances and procedure stipulated by legislation, also enjoy the following rights:

- they participate in the formation of agencies of state authority and administration;
- they carry out legislative initiative;
- they participate in developing decisions of agencies of state authority and administration;
- they represent and defend the legal interests of their members (participants) at state and public agencies;
- they carry out other powers stipulated by this law and other legislative acts of Tajik SSR.

#### Article 17. Political Parties, Mass Movements, Trade Unions

Parties, in expressing the political will of their members, pose as their basic tasks the participation in the formation of agencies of state authority and administration, and also in carrying out the authority through their representatives who have been elected to soviets of people's deputies.

Parties have program documents that are published for public knowledge; parties are equal before the law.

Parties have the right to nominate their candidates for election as people's deputies; to conduct pre-election agitation; and to form groups of their deputy adherents at the appropriate soviets of people's deputies.

Mass public movements pursue political or other goals and do not have a fixed membership.

Military personnel and persons occupying positions in law-enforcement agencies are guided in their official activities by the requirements of laws and are not bound by the decisions of political parties or mass public movements that pursue political goals.

Trade unions, in their interrelationships with state agencies, economic organizations, and cooperative and other public associations, represent and defend the interests of the trade union members with regard to matters in the production, socioeconomic, and cultural areas. All the trade unions equal before the law.

Political parties and trade unions have only fixed individual membership.

#### Article 18. Production and Economic Activities of Public Associations

Public associations, in the procedure defined by legislation, carry out production and economic activities and create, solely for purposes of fulfilling the tasks stated in the charters, enterprises and cost-accountable organizations possessing the rights of a legal entity.

The income from the production and economic activities of public associations cannot be redistributed among the members (participants) of those associations and can be used only to fulfill the tasks stated in the charter; it is authorized for public associations to use their own funds for philanthropic purposes, even if that is not indicated in their charters.

The enterprises and organizations created by public associations make payments to the budget in the procedure and amounts established by law.

#### Article 19. Property of Public Associations

Public associations and their organizations can own buildings, structures, a housing fund, equipment, stock, property intended for cultural-educational and therapeutic purposes, monetary funds, shares and other securities, and other property necessary to provide material support for their activities as stipulated by their charters. Public associations can also own publishing houses, other enterprises, and philanthropic institutions created at the expense of the funds of those associations in conformity with the goals indicated in their charters.

Legislative acts of the USSR and Tajik SSR can establish types of property which, for reasons of state and public security, or in conformity with international treaties, cannot be owned by public associations.

The monetary funds of public associations are formed from: entrance and membership dues, if their payment has been stipulated by the charters; voluntary dues and donations; proceeds from conducting, in accordance with their charters, lectures, exhibitions, sports and other events, and lotteries; income from production, economic, and publishing activities; and other receipts not banned by law.

Political parties and mass public movements pursuing political goals do not have the right to receive financial or other material assistance from foreign states, organizations, or citizens.

Political parties annually publish their budgets for public knowledge.

The property owned by public associations is protected by law.

The rights of unions and the associations that are part of them to own, use, and control the property belonging to those unions and the associations that are part of them are defined by the charters of the unions of public associations.

**Article 20. Mass Media and Publishing Activities of Public Associations**

Public associations have the right to establish mass media and to carry out publishing activities in conformity with the legislation of USSR and Tajik SSR concerning the press and other mass media.

**Chapter IV. Monitoring the Activities of Public Associations. Responsibility for Violation of the Legislation**

**Article 21. Monitoring and Overview of the Activities of Public Associations**

The financial agencies monitor the sources of the income of public associations, the amounts of funds received by them, and the payment of taxes in conformity with tax legislation.

Overview of the execution of the laws by public associations is carried out by agencies of the procuracy.

The state agency that has registered the charter of the public association monitors the observance of the principles stated in the charter relative to the goals of the activities of the public association. The registering agency has the right to require from the guiding agency of the public association the submission of the decisions that have been made, to send its representatives for participation in the measures being carried out by the public association, and to receive explanations from the members of the public association and from other citizens with regard to questions linked with the observance of the public association's charter.

**Article 22. Basis of Responsibility**

Violations of the legislation governing public associations entail criminal, administrative, material, and other responsibility in conformity with legislation of the USSR and Tajik SSR.

Responsibility for violating the legislation governing public associations is borne by the officials at state and public agencies who are guilty of such violation, and also by citizens.

A public association, including one that has not registered its charter, in instances of violation of the legislation governing public associations, bears responsibility in conformity with the law.

In the event of commission by a public association of actions that go beyond the confines of the goals and tasks defined by its charter, or that violate the law, the guiding agency of that public association can be given a written warning by the agency that registered the charter of the public association or by the procurator.

**Article 23. Liquidation of a Public Association in Instances of Its Violation of the Requirements Stated in the Charter or the Law**

A public association is liquidated on the basis of a court decision in the event that the public association has committed actions stipulated by Part 2 of Article 4 of this law.

The court can liquidate a public association if, in the course of a year, there has been a repetition of the commission of actions stipulated by Part 4 of Article 22 of this law.

The property of a public association that has been liquidated on the basis of a court decision can become state property without compensation.

Public associations operating on the territory of Tajik SSR are liquidated on the basis of a decision of Tajik SSR Supreme Court, in accordance with presentations made by Tajik SSR procurator, or the agency that has registered the charter of the public association.

**Chapter V. International Ties of Public Associations. International Public Associations. International Treaties**

**Article 24. International Ties of Public Associations**

Public associations, in conformity with their charters, can become part of international public (nongovernmental) associations, maintain direct international contacts and ties, and conclude the appropriate agreements.

**Article 25. International Public Associations**

A public association created in Tajik SSR is recognized as international if its activities, in conformity with its charter, extend to the territory of Tajik SSR and one or more foreign states.

If the composition of an international public association created abroad includes as a collective member a public association created in Tajik SSR, the charter of the latter association is also subject to registration in conformity with this law.

A public association that has extended its activities to the territory of a foreign state submits to Tajik SSR Ministry of Justice its charter with the necessary amendments and additions.

Public associations whose goals are the reinforcement of peace, the development of international cooperation, and certain types of humanitarian activities, can enjoy the benefits established by legislation.

The statutes stated in this law extend to the activities of departments (branches and other structural subdivisions) of public associations of foreign states that have been created on the territory of Tajik SSR.

**Article 26. International Treaties**

If, by international treaty, Tajik SSR and USSR have established other rules than those contained in this law, the rules of the international treaty are applied.

K. Makhkamov, president,  
Tajik SSR.  
Dushanbe, 12 December 1990.

**Amendments to Tajik Constitution Published**

91US0474A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST  
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 9 Apr 91 p 1

[Law of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic: "On Changes and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Tajik SSR"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic decrees:

I. To make the following changes and additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Tajik SSR:

1. To present Part 2 of Article 82 in the following wording: "The Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR is elected directly by the voters. The Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet elects the chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet and forms the Presidium. The Soviet of People's Deputies of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast and the oblast soviets of people's deputies elect chairmen of the soviets and form presidiums. Rayon, city, rayon-in-city, settlement, and village soviets of people's deputies elect chairmen of soviets who are simultaneously chairmen of the executive committees of the corresponding soviets, with the exception of cases envisioned by the Law of the Tajik SSR."

2. To eliminate Article 83.

3. To present Part 3 of Article 87 in the following wording: "Individuals included in the Tajik SSR Cabinet of Ministers, leaders of departments, divisions, and administrations of executive committees of local soviets, judges, and state arbitrators may not be deputies of the soviet by which they are appointed or elected."

4. To eliminate Point 10 of Article 99.

5. To exclude from Part 1 of Article 104 the words "Tajik SSR people's control committee."

6. To exclude from Part 2 of Article 106 the words "chairmen of the Tajik SSR people's control committee."

7. To eliminate Parts 2 and 3 of Article 115.

8. In Part 2 of Article 117, to replace the words "administrative-executive" with the words "executive-administrative."

9. In Article 120:

In Point 4, replace the words "provides for interaction between higher power organs and Tajik SSR administration" with the words "heads up the system of organs of state administration and provides for their interaction with higher organs of state power of the Tajik SSR."

In Point 6, exclude the words "submits to the Supreme Soviet candidates for the post of chairman of the Tajik SSR people's control committee."

10. To present Article 130 in the following wording:

"Article 130. Sessions of local soviets of people's deputies are convened as necessary, but no less frequently than once a year.

"Local soviets of people's deputies are authorized at their sessions to consider and resolve any issues placed under their jurisdiction by legislation of the USSR and Tajik SSR. The list of issues considered and resolved exclusively at the sessions is established by the laws of the Tajik SSR."

11. To present Article 134 in the following wording:

"Article 134. The work of the soviet of people's deputies of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast and the oblast soviets of people's deputies is organized by their presidiums headed by the chairmen of the soviets; and the rayon, city, rayon-in-city, settlement, and village soviets of people's deputies—by their administrative organs headed by the chairmen of the soviets who are also the chairmen of the executive committees of the corresponding soviets."

12. To present Article 140 in the following wording:

"Article 140. Divisions and administrations of executive committees are formed by the soviet of people's deputies of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast and oblast, rayon, city, and rayon-in-city soviets of people's deputies, and in their activity they are subordinate to both the soviets and their executive committees."

13. The present law is to go into effect on the day of its publication.

K. Makhkamov, president,  
Tajik SSR.  
Dushanbe, 26 February 1991.

**PRAVDA Carries Variant Report on Tajikistan Earthquake**

PM1904203591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
20 Apr 91 Second Edition p 3

[TADZHIKTA-TASS report: "Tajikistan: Aid for the Victims"]

[Text] Dushanbe, 19 April—One person died and six were injured as a result of an earthquake in Tajikistan 18 April. The epicenter was near the villages of Chuponabad and Bugam in Kabodiyenskiy Rayon. The force of the underground elements, registering seven points [scale not specified], destroyed the two settlements in a matter of seconds. A two-year old child died under the wreckage of one apartment block.

According to preliminary information, roughly 1,000 apartment blocks and economic structures have been destroyed, along with several cultural and social facilities. Electricity lines and irrigation channels sustained damage. The underground tremor caused mudslides from the surrounding hills, bringing down almost 200,000 cubic meters of clay and stone onto orchards and truck gardens.

The republic government commission for emergencies is clarifying the extent of the damage. It flew out to the earthquake zone the same day.

**Uzbek Deputy Disputes MOSCOW NEWS View of Central Asian Unrest**

91US0487A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Apr 91  
Second Edition p 2

[Interview with Uzbek SSR People's Deputy Shakhobitdin Ziyamov by PRAVDA correspondent A. Kaipbergenov: "Who Is Claiming What?"; place and date not given]

[Text] Tashkent—This headline is taken from issue No 11 of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI [Moscow News], in which on the eve of the all-Union referendum a map was printed showing the present and suggested interethnic conflicts in the USSR. Purely visual, it reminded us of the situation in the country during the civil war. And just look at the area of Central Asia—it is all supposedly in the zones of conflict. Is this in fact so? Here is the viewpoint of Shakhobitdin Ziyamov, people's deputy of the Uzbek SSR and member of the republic parliamentary committee on questions of culture, language, and interethnic relations.

[Ziyamov] I cannot regard the map drawn MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in any way except as an attempt to present the desire for the reality. Certain home-grown "politicians," including some in our region, would definitely very much like a continuation of the tragic events in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. They simply do not want to see the real processes that are taking place in the region. Both as a scholar engaged in analysis of the processes in the sphere of interethnic relations, and as a practical worker I can say only one thing, namely, that the intentions of our peoples and the efforts of their government are aimed primarily at finding solutions to the very difficult socioeconomic crisis and creating dignified living conditions for the individual. I regard the question "Who Is Claiming What," the "most political map of the USSR," and a number of proposals from the review SREDNAYA AZIYA-KAZKHSTAN [Central Asia and Kazakhstan] as a logical chain in the social demand that at one time resulted in certain central newspapers being splattered with materials about the "Uzbek affair" and "Kazakh nationalism"...

[Kaipbergenov] In a brief commentary by the newspaper on the map of the USSR, which MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI described as "a most political map," it is stated that there is no republic in the region where there is a quiet border.

[Ziyamov] Here, in my opinion, we have a classic case of the mass media, first and foremost MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, which have been shaping negative public opinion about the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan over the last few years, becoming a prisoner of its own false ideas, and on that basis trying to make a long-term political prediction.

Look at the point of departure in the discussions by the authors of the geopolitical review; information is taken from "references in the press" or the programs of the sociopolitical movements. Looking in the review for even one proposition on the interrepublic relations and links that are typical of our region is a vain endeavor.

[Kaipbergenov] Let us try to fill that gap.

[Ziyamov] Very well. Let us turn first of all to the Alma-Ata meeting of leaders from the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan that took place in June 1990. "The peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan are not only geographical neighbors but also have common historical destinies and kinship in terms of culture, tradition, and custom. We affirm the unshakability of the historically shaped territories of the republics, which cannot be altered by anyone's will without their agreement." These lines are taken from the statement issued by the republic leaders. In light of this it is very strange to see on the pages of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI a long list of mutual territorial claims by the republics in the region, and even more strange to see a map that really does remind us of civil war times.

[Kaipbergenov] In my opinion the attempt to designate Karakalpak as a zone of ethnic conflicts, and to depict it as some kind of "bone of contention" is especially incorrect.

[Ziyamov] Karakalpak really does deserve attention, and not only from the country but also from the world community. Not only as a zone of the most serious ecological tragedy, as a zone that requires enormous resources and manpower to extricate it from ecological crisis. All the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan are paying more attention to the Aral and the Aral area. But the object of their concern and attention is not territorial claims but coordination of efforts and concentration of resources to mitigate the consequences of ecological catastrophe and the creation of living conditions for the peoples living in the Aral area.

[Kaipbergenov] It is strange that the political experts with MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI who are analyzing the materials of the mass media so attentively have failed to "notice" the agreement on economic, scientific and technical, and cultural cooperation between the five republics in the region signed in June 1990 and now being implemented.

[Ziyamov] I agree, the more so since the Alma-Ata meeting and the numerous subsequent contacts at various levels have been aimed not only at preserving but also at expanding all links between the republics...

[Kaipbergenov] On 14 March in Osh City, where last year bloody clashes occurred, the presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan signed a treaty on friendship and cooperation. Was consideration given in that document to interethnic relations and the rights of national minorities in the republics? Are there guarantees that the tragedy will not be repeated?

[Ziyamov] The text of treaty has been published in the mass media in both republics. Interesting problems are reflected in Articles 2, 3, and 4. They provide guarantees for citizens regardless of national affiliation, religious faith, and other differences, for their political, economic, social, and cultural rights and freedoms in accordance with generally recognized international standards on human rights. The republics assumed obligations to develop through the conclusion of special agreements a mechanism to insure citizens' rights and to take decisive, mutually agreed steps to prevent and eradicate extremism in interethnic relations and prevent interethnic conflicts...

One very important feature of Article 4 is that it underpins and guarantees "the right of and opportunities for all-around socioeconomic and cultural development of the Uzbeks and representatives of other nationalities living in the republic of Kyrgyzstan, and of Kyrgyz and representatives of other nationalities living in the Uzbek SSR."

Talking in general about the treaty signed by the two republics, I would like to emphasize that since it has been ratified and as a consequence underpinned by concrete actions, it should become a good stage toward qualitatively new mutual relations between the two sovereign republics.

[Kaipbergenov] Following last year's Alma-Ata meeting of leaders from the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan and the signing of the corresponding documents, some of the mass media were suspicious of the birth of

pan-Turkic ideas, while others suspected some desire to shut themselves off from the perestroika dramas going on in the country. How do you regard such commentaries?

[Ziyamov] What was it that was special about the Alma-Ata agreement? It covers economic, scientific and technical, and cultural aspects of regional links and defines basic principles and directions, and a mechanism for cooperation between our republics. Its content is fully in line with the interests of renewal and fundamental perestroika, emerging market relations, and the need to preserve and strengthen the unified economic expanse of the country. The agreement also takes into account the complex reality of socioeconomic, demographic, and ecological problems, which cannot be resolved by shutting ourselves off from the Union and the other Union republics. It contains a separate article that offers a complete account of all suspicions about any kind of mercenary intentions on the part of the region. It states as follows: "This agreement is open for any Union or autonomous republic to join."

[Kaipbergenov] How do you in Uzbekistan assess the results of the all-Union referendum?

[Ziyamov] The official results of the referendum have confirmed the will of the absolute majority of the peoples of Uzbekistan to preserve the Union for present and future generations. Not the earlier unitary Union but a Union of sovereign, equal states. This once again confirms that "the most political map of the USSR" shown in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI is idle talk, to say the least.

### Burlatskiy, Arbatov Memoirs Derided

91UN1338A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 7, 15 Feb 91 pp 10, 18

[Article by Mikhail Lobanov, under rubric "Who Makes Policy": "People From 'Olympus'"]

[Text] Mikhail Petrovich Lobanov was born in 1925 and was graduated from the School of Philology, MGU [Moscow State University]. He is the author of the following books: "Roman L. Leonov 'Russkiy les'" [L. Leonov's Novel "Russkiy Les" (Russian Forest)]; "Muzhestvo chelovechnosti [Bravery of Humaneness]; "Ostrovskiy" and "Sergey Timofeyevich Aksakov" (both in the ZhEL series); "Razmyshleniya o literature i zhizni" [Reflections on Literature and Life]; "Stranitsy pamyatnogo" [Pages of a Notebook]; and others.

ZNAMYA magazine (issues No. 9 and 10, 1990) published the memoirs of Georgiy Arbatov under the title "From the Recent Past." For the entire period of stagnation, for 20 whole years beginning in 1964, the author of those memoirs was one of the few people who, in his words, was close "to policy and to the people who formed it." Arbatov worked at the CPSU Central Committee as early as the Khrushchev days, in the department that was headed by Andropov; he was the head of a group of consultants at the Central Committee under Brezhnev; and, while director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the United States and Canada, gave advice to Andropov, who became General Secretary of CPSU Central Committee. It is that recent past, and his role in the policy of that time, that the author discusses.

It would seem that, for the first time, the reader is given the opportunity to see something about those "mysteries of power" that are linked with such "positions" as "assistant" and "consultant" for a ruler—"positions" that would seem to say nothing to the mass public. Even before Arbatov, several of his associates wrote about that time and their participation it, and, for a certain while, I must digress from Arbatov's memoirs and, for the purpose of understanding them better, say a few words about other writings of this ilk. For example, F. Burlatskiy's "Notes Concerning the Political Thaw," and "After Stalin" (NOVYY MIR, No 10, 1988).

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Burlatskiy began working as a Central Committee consultant before Arbatov did, and in the same Andropov department. As he stated, he "had the opportunity to be in direct contact with the political leaders," and several times in his notes he speaks of the "political Olympus" where he found himself, "unexpectedly for myself." Hearing Khrushchev's discussion about Beriya's arrest, Burlatskiy is astonished "at the ease with which [he] had become privy to the innermost secrets of the state." Although he does call himself, at that time, "a young person of an academic frame of mind," nevertheless he imparts to himself an artistic side of his nature, a kind of esthetic responsiveness to the blessings of life. And that

is laudable, if there had not been an obvious lack of conformity between the words spoken by the theoretician of "Soviet democracy" (which he considered himself to be from the very first steps of his "political maturation") and practice. While working at KOMMUNIST magazine, at the editorial office he makes a "recommendation to conduct concrete social research... concerning the privileges in supplying food products and public-health services. "We," Burlatskiy writes, "sent a large group of students to compare the dining rooms and snack bars at plants and in the ministries." But they should also have been sent to the appropriate places where those same workers at KOMMUNIST, the magazine of the CPSU Central Committee, were provided with services—places that were immeasurably more abundant than at any ministry. That would have been food for thought concerning the hypocritical attitude of the theoretician of "Soviet democracy."

But that is only a petty detail that is unworthy of the attention of the author of the memoirs. But he did say a lot about the luxurious receptions "at the summit," about the lavish feasts, apartments, and bed chambers!

"We went up," he recalls, "to the top floor and, after walking up a wide interior staircase, found ourselves in a tremendous hall, filled with a large number of tables laden with drinks and all kinds of appetizers" [M. Lobanov: This was in the Kremlin]; "I began having my suits made as a kind of uniform in a special tailor's shop: dark blue, gray, and even a diplomatic suit—black"; "We took with us a box of that drink, that was intended for receptions in Albania, but those receptions had not occurred, so all the cognac remained intact... I finally became so drunk... that I literally fell into the arms of my surprised relatives after we landed in Moscow"; "...I, as was the rule, together with Yu. V. [M. L.: Andropov] accompanied him [M. L.: Khrushchev] six times abroad to the European socialist countries. These were chiefly official trips that were replete with things done for show, with solemnity, pomposity..."; "A cortege of black cars—there were no fewer than 25 or 30 of them—made its way through the crowd... everything was done with an extraordinary amount of solemnity, and was very beautiful. I think I was riding in the fourth car with one of the assistants of the First..."; "During the dinner that had been organized by the Bulgarian leaders in honor of the delegation, the consultants and assistants were seated at the very same table as our leaders..."; "Situated in the hall were tables that literally broke down under the abundance of the drinks and viands. In the center of each table was a gigantic sturgeon about two or three meters long, and garnished with shrimp, vegetables, and who knows what else"; "During our stay in Varna, we were housed in the Yevstegenograd palace of Tsar Boris. I had never enjoyed such luxury: a swimming pool in the middle of a tremendous room"; "Yu. V. was part of the delegation..., and I was 'attached to,' but at a rather close distance. So close that I usually stayed in the same accommodations that they did, and ate my meals together with them. Incidentally, they could be called 'accommodations' only as a

*joke. They were a king's palaces, which, according to tradition, had been occupied by Joseph Broz Tito"; "The entire delegation and we sinners—the persons accompanying them—went for a swim in the sea every day, and then, sitting on the shore with the Yugoslavian leaders, would drink Coca-Cola and Schweppes, which were already being shipped to Yugoslavia from the Western countries..."; "Lying at night in a luxuriant bed on the mezzanine of a small building (I think, a hunter's cottage where the 'accompanying persons' were housed), I tossed and turned for a long time..."; "The Yugoslavian leaders invited us to a night club. There was music at the night club, and the youngest people among us danced with a pretty young girl, the wife of an elderly Yugoslavian ambassador to the Soviet Union... In the next section, a strip tease was offered... I stayed behind and, for the first time in my life, saw a strip tease... For the first time that was, of course, a very savory treat." Etcetera, etcetera.*

Such "regal" honors, of course, do not come completely free. They involve a lot of obligations. But when accepting them, and even when recalling them seemingly with a shudder, the author at the same time, at a distance, wants to make himself independent of them, independent of that "stagnation" in which he bathed and prospered. He is in general ready nowadays to see within himself, within the person of that time, not some kind of "intellectual servant," but, rather, the opener-up of new progressive paths who at one time was underestimated, and even persecuted.

"I entered the area of policy after 1953," the author of the memoirs reports. "I firmly believed that I was in the center of the most progressive currents in our country. Perhaps running ahead somewhat, but wasn't someone supposed to assume that mission, which was one that was dangerous and precipitate from the point of view of one's personal interests?"

Do you really think that a "consultant" or "assistant" could flourish if he got into a conflict with the "political leadership" or the "party line"? Because the line taken by the party and the party leadership is well known, and any difference of opinion with respect to it during the time of the same Andropov was immediately cut down and cruelly punished. An example of this is V. Osipov, editor of the "samizdat" VECHE magazine, who at that time was sentenced to eight years in camps. And even for possession of VECHE, S. Semanov, the former editor in chief of CHELOVEK I ZAKON magazine was fired and given a strict party reprimand. That was very easy to do after biased interrogations at the KGB. But the theoreticians of "Soviet democracy" calmly progressed in their careers. Because they had with Yu. V. (as they called Andropov) "special relations." There was "mutual trust over a period of 20 years," to use Arbatov's words. "I was paid by the mutual relations," as Burlatskiy admitted. With this kind of "mutual trust" it is possible to go boldly into "the center of the most progressive currents in our country."

Incidentally, at times our "Soviet democrat" acquired within himself the bravery to get into a dispute with the powerful of this world. That dispute was... in his sleep! "Often I dreamed that I was arguing with Stalin... I accused him of crimes... By the way, I subsequently had many dreams in which I had discussions with Khrushchev, with Andropov, or with other figures." That was in his dreams, but when he was awake what he needed, and what he provided was like his participation in "this exciting process—a joint collective writing, editing, and rewriting of the documents and speeches of the country's leaders." There are curious details here. "The first songs that I heard my mother singing to me in my childhood were 'Hostile Whirlwinds Are Blowing Above Us' and 'Fly Ahead, Our Locomotive!...' I included lines from the latter song in N. S. Khrushchev's report at the 22nd CPSU Congress. And he liked them very much." We learn about the operating method of the group of authors engaged in preparing a "memorandum for the higher leadership," we learn how the work was performed by the "group engaged in preparing the draft of the party Program" (with entertaining pauses and a game of taking quotations from [Ilf and Petrov's] "Golden Calf" and "Twelve Chairs"), with and "orientation toward prolonged peaceful economic competition, in the course of which all the advantages of socialism would be revealed."

Unfortunately, the author does not mention that socialism is the kind of socialism—"developed," "matured"—from whence, from which group, he left. What is piquant is that our "speechwriter" humbly writes texts with necessary quotations also for those who are reviled, people like Suslov. In general, concerning his "clients" other than Andropov, he has an extremely low opinion: those who were sitting in state on the "political Olympus" had a "lack of education and culture." After reproving the bad taste that those "not very educated peasants" had with regard to archaic matters, Burlatskiy equates them with the "modern style" in architecture: "Apparently one of the first breakthroughs was the Palace of Congresses within the Kremlin."

A rather typical self-portrait—a product of stagnation—is made up of these notes, despite all their "perestroika" actualization, which, of course, should not be taken seriously. Just as one should not take a sympathetic attitude toward the complaint made by the author of the memoirs concerning his own unaccomplished fate. Recalling the words of a friend who had reproached him for excessive zeal with regard to being in the vanguard ("Your bustling around and straining won't have any effect!"), Burlatskiy complains: "a thirst for changes had a detrimental effect on my biography."

Yes, that is Burlatskiy complaining! Burlatskiy, the favorite of the system and the people at the top! One can see in the preface to his notes how wounded his biography had been: "From 1953 I worked at KOMMUNIST, the magazine of the CPSU Central Committee. Then, for five years I worked at the central party apparatus, two years at PRAVDA, and 15 years in the



party school..." At this moment he is a doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, people's deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, chairman of the Subcommittee for Humanitarian, Scientific, and Cultural Cooperation, editor in chief of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, and an indispensable participant in all kinds of foreign symposia, conferences, and the like. Don't enrage God, Fedor Mikhaylovich! True, he is not an academician, like his associate Arbatov. But, truthfully speaking: how is the latter more worthy than he?

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Now, after becoming acquainted with Burlatskiy, we can see more clearly the environment in which Arbatov operated. That author does not go so far as to engage in awkward "belletristic" liberties, as Burlatskiy sometimes does. In gray officialese and phraseological stereotypes, the academician sets forth what is currently fashionable among the "radical democrats": accusations of stagnation and all mortal sins, leveled against the "conservatives" and "Stalinism" (a term, incidentally, that was introduced by Trotsky), and general words about "perestroika," "democracy," "pluralism," but in a more concrete manner—about Russian "imperial claims and arrogance," about "great-power cynicism."

Arbatov especially hates in our country the forces "with militaristic ways." He brands what he calls the violation of the Helsinki agreements, what causes "serious concern in the West"—the "omnipotence of the military-industrial complex," the "unprecedented propagandizing of militarism," including propaganda in the form of patriotic books about the Patriotic War, the "pernicious effect of militarism," etc. He is not embarrassed by the fact that even Andropov, a nonmilitary person, was indignant at his "advisor's" pro-disarmament demagoguery. Incidentally, according to Arbatov, that discussion, like other discussions (with Gromyko, et al.), was conducted "eyeball to eyeball," so that it is impossible to find out whether it really happened that way, or whether he ascribes to himself a boldness that did not exist. But now he has become bolder, now he has thrown aside all restraint, and it is extremely worthy of regret that our military men, in particular Marshal Akhromeyev, are lowering themselves to polemics with this television fire-eater. Because for this "Americanist" the exemplar is the "peace-loving nature" of the United States, even after Grenada, Panama, and Iraq.

But let's not digress from the main point—what primarily makes these memoirs remarkable. The main point is the influence exerted upon the "higher leadership" by the "assistants" and "consultants" attached to them, who apparently are not visible at the summit of power, who write memos to one another, who run from office to office, who search for the necessary quotation, but not one of whom, apparently, knows what is being done "on top of Olympus." But they really do know, and they know a lot. On this score, we learn much from this particular author. Well, first of all, we learn what the

Americans call the knowledge of "dirty little secrets." So, like an outstanding expert in this field, Arbatov is "in the know" about the political intrigues at the top, the interrelationships between the leaders and their "levers of force and power," and the nicknames within the apparatus (such as "iron Shurik," one of the members of the Politburo, a nickname that you can compare with the wittiness of our current "radical democrats" with respect to their rivals—"a grand piano in the bushes," "the Red Hundred," etc.). But he himself, in the world of intrigue, feels like a fish in water as he knocks together the necessary detachment around the Gensek [General Secretary], fearing most of all that, under the new Gensek, a new group of advisors that have an ideological orientation that differs from that of Arbatov and Company might form and gain strength.

Obviously, our hero's opponents are the "Stalinists" and "conservatives," while he—Arbatov and his friends—are "anti-Stalinists" and "progressive forces." This time the warrior against Soviet militarism goes into a militant rage himself, representing, by the way, his opponents as the aggressor: the Stalinists "rushed into the offensive"; the "fifth column" of Stalinists in the Brezhnev encirclement itself; "the 'assault detachment' of conservative ideologues from the CPSU Central Committee apparatus changed over to open attack"; etc. All these forces were launched "for the psychological working over of Brezhnev himself." "However that may be, by the common, albeit uncoordinated, efforts of a considerable number of people, it proved possible to weaken seriously the influence exerted upon the new General Secretary [M. L.: Brezhnev] by the most militant Stalinists, including not only individual members of the Politburo, but also home-grown theoreticians from the suite. This became possible in a stubborn struggle."

The "main thing" was achieved: the "monopoly on 'Brezhnev's ear,'" to use Arbatov's expression. Apparently this was the only thing that the "consultants" and even the Politburo members who were stubbornly fighting them could not withstand, and soon, incidentally, they were indeed removed.

There were not any particular theoretical battles, when the "progressive forces" could have graphically and convincingly shown their superiority. The author writes about "one of the sharpest skirmishes" with his participation—in preparing the text of a speech for Brezhnev that he was supposed to give during his trip to Georgia. The version of the speech as prepared by the conservatives, obviously, was "Stalinist." The text as written with the guiding participation of Arbatov was accepted: "I shall not say that it proved to be profound in meaning or rich with new ideas. But Stalin's name was mentioned in it (I simply could do no more than this) only once..."

What bravery! But what about everything else that was prepared by Arbatov and his comrades for the speeches and reports given by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and for the drafts of the Central

Committee resolutions, and the preparation of documents for the 25th CPSU Congress—everything that remains, one must think, in Brezhnev's "collected works"?

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (30 January 1991) gloats: "In a defective, parody-like voice, Brezhnev spoke about the decaying of imperialism, about the sufferings of the working man under capitalism, and about the almost complete disintegration of culture there. At a difficult moment in life when it is becoming completely intolerable, it would be good to pick up a little volume of the collected works of Leonid Ilich and pamper oneself with the reading of cheerful literature."

Who are you laughing at, gentlemen? Is it not your editor in chief and his Arbatov associates who wrong for the Genseks this "cheerful literature," but who now are pretending that they were not responsible for anything and were practically persecuted at that time?

Incidentally, that milieu, of course, had its own merits. "The people," Arbatov writes, "who were brought in to fulfill Brezhnev's assignments or to review the materials coming in to him from other assistants, included... A. Ye. Bovin, the author of these reminiscences [M. L.: that is, Arbatov], and G. Kh. Shakhnazarov..." What is curious is the "circle of interests" (that became more defined with the passage of time) of these people. We learn that, under Andropov, who had become the General Secretary, Bovin engaged in the "national question." The aspect of the "national question" that was of interest to the advisor of that time can be judged from his subsequent statements, for example, on the basis of his articles that furiously defend Zionism (IZVESTIYA, No 239, 1989, and No 26, 1990). Currently G. Shakhnazarov, assistant of the General Secretary of CPSU Central Committee, propagandizes the "Einstein-Russell Manifesto," with its "new way of thinking," its idea of world government and the suppression of national interests, and extols the works of M. Kovalevskiy, the head of prerevolutionary Masonry in Russia. And now I will speak finally about Arbatov himself.

One is astonished at how irresistible the "psychological working over" of Brezhnev by the Arbatov crowd had been. The author tells how IMEMO (Institute of World Economics and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences) and its director, who was "close to policy," and its "creative, progressive scientists" had been subjected to attacks. A party commission to inspect the institute's work, which commission was headed by a Politburo member, with the participation of a CPSU Central Committee secretary and others, established the "contamination of the cadres by Zionist elements," and the fact that "the institute disoriented the country's leadership relative to the processes occurring in the world." And so, with the passage of events, when "the institute's political authority had been substantially undermined," when there arose the threat of a "new working over for the leadership and the collective," Arbatov and Bovin appeal to Brezhnev. "...We told Brezhnev," the author of the memoirs remarks,

"about the adversities that came crashing down on Inozemtsev (M. L.: the late director of IMEMO), and that had apparently hastened his death, and about the fact that a party meeting had been planned for the day after tomorrow, a meeting where the attempt would be made to besmirch the very memory of him. We also told him that it was being planned to carry out a pogrom at the institute."

Here our advisors act as superlative psychologists, renowned experts with regard to Brezhnev's soul, which was inclined in some instances, as one can see, to demonstrative magnanimity. It is not important that the former institute director had not objected to the facts revealed by the commission ("he remained rather passive"), but it is important to evoke the Gensek's "noble feelings, to evoke, as it were, sympathy for a person's memory that one wants to besmirch. This is, so to speak, "laying the ground work," and then one can begin the main thing—the prevention of the "pogrom at the institute" at the party meeting on the day after tomorrow.

"Brezhnev," the academician continues, "for whom, judging by his reaction, that was news, asked, 'Who should I call?' Advising him, we said... Gesturing to us to remain silent, Brezhnev pressed the appropriate button... Brezhnev said that it had come to his attention (he did not mention his source) that some kind of case had been organized around IMEMO and Inozemtsev, and an investigative commission had even been created... And now there were intentions to give Inozemtsev a mortal working over, and to carry out an investigation with the party organization and the collective. 'So what's going on there?'"

After that telephone call the institute was blanched and no longer participated in any commissions. But we see in this discussion the wonderful "dialectics of the soul" of the story-teller, who had masterfully insinuated his way into the Gensek's trust! It is even somewhat strange that the author did not even veil the whole truth about his ideological operation on top of "Olympus." In general, Arbatov does not act cautiously. Apparently, now is the time when there is nothing to conceal. And so his tongue becomes quite untied when he begins to discuss his interrelationships with Andropov. With the latter's election as Gensek, Arbatov, the director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the United States, who for a long time had already been more than just an advisor, rushes in passing to the Olympic "ear"; "I said that, without major personnel changes, he would not be able to do anything." The "major personnel changes" were the mass expulsion of all those same "stupid, gray" (to use the author's words) conservatives and the bringing in of Arbatov men to fill the responsible positions, including positions in the Politburo.

One can only guess who empowered that advisor to deal in this manner with the personnel on Olympus. Dissatisfied with the Gensek's caution with regard to personnel changes, Arbatov writes him a letter. "What did I write to Andropov about? First, about the fact that the creative

intellectuals were becoming disappointed about the appointments that had already been made during his administration to positions at the Cultural Department in the CPSU Central Committee apparatus, and also in a number of publishing houses and editorial offices." Then the author of the letter accused the officials who were allegedly stifling the Theater of Satire and the Theater on the Taganka; he denounced a responsible Central Committee worker who was giving lectures "aimed against the instructions concerning the drawing closer together of economic science and practice... IMEMO and Oleg Bogomolov have transcripts of those statements—your assistants can request them."

The Gensek's reaction was unexpected: "Andropov accused me in a 'surprisingly unceremonious and unobjective' tone of having 'claims on sermonizing' and a lack of objectivity, concluding that this was 'not the tone in which you [formal form of pronoun] and I ought to converse' (I was surprised and put on guard by the fact that this was probably the first time since 1964 that he had addressed me with the formal pronoun)." Andropov rejected the accusations in all regards and in conclusion wrote, "I am writing all thing so that you will understand that your memoranda such as this do not render me any assistance. They are unfactual and irritable, but, most important, they do not enable me to make the correct practical conclusions."

Arbatov explains this "great argument" by nothing else but... Andropov's illness. Just as he explains something else: "Somewhat later Andropov, believing the denunciation that I had said something improper to the Americans about the leadership, even instructed his successor at the KGB to have a talk with me. This too I cannot explain by anything other than his illness."

After consulting (for some reason "in the light of a street lamp") with Bovin (from whom the Gensek has also "distanced himself"), Arbatov apparently decides "to go off to the side." But that did not happen. Soon, once again there were "confidential, comradely contacts and ties" with the Gensek. Once again he writes memoranda and letters, makes accusations, and gives exhortations. He lavishes praise on the leftist intellectuals and reviles those who "strive to compensate for their professional, and sometimes also intellectual, weakness by using demagoguery concerning their closeness to the people (especially in the countryside)." (It was then, on Andropov's initiative, that the CPSU Central Committee's devastating resolution concerning VOLGA magazine appeared...) The advisor also takes on the role of the evaluator of the cultural workers: "...There are several definitely great figures in culture, such as Ch. Aytmatov, S. Rikhter, G. Tovstonov, and Ye. Mravinskiy. We should take care of them and take special steps to pamper them, and to prevent them from being offended. Even I. V. had such a circle and he overlooked all their sins, and especially the denunciations."

Why, all of a sudden, this reference by the vehement "anti-Stalinist" to I. V. [Iosif Vissarionovich] Stalin?

*Burlatskiy in his memoirs repeats several times that Andropov called him and his ilk "spiritual aristocrats." Other Central Committee workers who were "simple mortals" got a good drubbing from the stern and demanding Yuriy Vladimirovich, but he gave his blessing to those consultants. And Burlatskiy explains that by the fact that the Genseks lacked culture: Khrushchev and Brezhnev were "not very well-educated peasants," and although Andropov differed from them by his greater intellectualism, he did need cultivated assistants. We shall not discuss the degree of intellectualism on the part of the "gods on Olympus," if only that same Andropov (who marked the beginning of his administration by catching loafers in the bath houses). But we can judge our "spiritual aristocrats" if only on the basis of their memoirs. Those memoirs do not contain a single brilliant thought, not a single profound observation, not a single objective token of the time. They at one time wrote their editorials to order for PRAVDA and for KOMMUNIST magazine, and they remained on that level. The only thing that was added was the experience in carrying out intrigues and in extolling themselves rather comically.*

Now they feel that they are on top of another "Olympus"—not the stagnant one, but a radical one. Arbatov calls for decisive revolutionary actions. Burlatskiy, in his dialogue (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 30 January 1991), calls for the creation of a "movement toward social democracy" ("social democracy first of all, and then social protection") and exclaims, "The time has come for actions!", "Fly ahead, our locomotive!", as in the words of Burlatskiy's favorite song.

The consultants remember their past, and they say that there is no place for that past in the new marketplace, and for them it was "like water off a duck's back." It's just that there has been an increase in the "scientific" positions—Arbatov has already had more than ten of them. Even in the narrow circle of their "American friends," whom our "spiritual aristocrats" love so much to quote, there is no attempt to conceal the disdain for our home-grown Soviet dilettantes. Brezinski was even surprised when asked if he had met with Academician Arbatov in Moscow. The Polish American stated proudly that he had not met such "academicians." And one can scarcely consider it to be a sign of respect that, with respect to our academician, Bronfman, the president of the World Jewish Congress, permitted himself to divulge the following "dirty little secret" (to use Arbatov's favorite American expression): "A couple of years ago Georgiy Arbatov, the director the Institute of the United States and Canada, assured me that he is a Jew, since his father is a Jew."

What need was there to "assure" him? Why not just state the facts...

These "lumpen-academicians" (as Shatalin aptly called them in the press) are a dime a dozen in our high places. There appeared a communique in the press that Arbatov had been appointed to the "Higher Consultative and Coordination Council under the Chairman of the

RSFSR VS [Supreme Soviet]!" The same unsinkable Arbatov! And alongside of him in that council are Academician Zaslavskaya (who, during the stagnation period, razed "unpromising villages"); the fictionalized economist Shmelev (impressively promised the unemployed 40 million [rubles]); Academician Bogomolov (whom, you might recall, Arbatov quoted in his denunciation); Bunich and Popov, yesterday's singers of "mature socialism" and the "planned socialist economy," but who now are terrorists from the wild market; etc.

But where is the guarantee that, following Arbatov's lead, there will not be a repetition of the joint confession of the council under Yeltsin to the very same Bronfman?

But should one be surprised at the metamorphosis in this people from the stagnation period, if the entire system operates to nurture them.

Previously it was necessary to have a "monopoly on Brezhnev's ear," but currently there is no need of this: all these advisors are Yeltsin's friends in the "interregional group," in "democratic Russia." Really, as Blok said about Russia, "Give the plundered beauty to whatever magician you want." And then, "let him lure and delude people, because you won't perish." Yes, after the election, Russia proved to be in the hands of special magicians who had spoken on its behalf. And here too it is not a matter of placidly to state that "you won't perish."

Not a single nation, even in our country, would permit the triumph of that "misery," to use the word employed by that friend of the radicals, Comrade Trotskiy. All this has nothing to do with us. It is for this reason that there is currently occurring in our history that which was mentioned by another Russian poet: "They have raised the dust with their hooves all around," but will they soon perish "to the accompaniment of the devil's whistle"...

### USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution on Status of Chernobyl Cleanup

91WN0409A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
15 Apr 91 Union Edition p 2

["Resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the Course of Fulfillment of the 25 April 1990 USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution: 'On a Unified Program for the Cleanup Following the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station and the Situation Associated With That Accident'"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet notes that the 1990 resolution: "On a Unified Program for the Cleanup Following the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station and the Situation Associated With That Accident" has primarily been fulfilled. The resettlement of people from the territory subjected to high levels of radioactive contamination, clarification of the radiation situation, and the house-to-house studies and certification of populated points continue. A state register of persons subjected to radiation effects as a result of the accident has been established. Steps have been taken to improve the health of the population, children in particular. Implementation of measures to reduce the ingress of radioactive material into agricultural produce has insured a lowering of the dose among the population.

A state Union-republic program has been approved by the USSR Government to protect the health of children against the effects of the catastrophe at Chernobyl, covering the period 1991-1995 (the "Children of Chernobyl" program).

An international program with participation by independent experts to assess the effect of the consequences of the accident on the environment and the state of health of the population is coming to its conclusion. Stricken areas are being given help by foreign countries, organizations, and individuals.

At the same time the USSR Supreme Soviet considers that the steps taken to deal with the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe are still not in line with the complex situation that has taken shape in the stricken areas.

In contaminated areas the level of medical care for the population remains inadequate, and the treatment centers are not fully staffed with medical personnel, equipment, and drugs. An increased incidence of disease has been seen in particular rayons. Improvements are needed in the supplies of foodstuffs and durable goods. The employment problem has worsened for the population in territories from which resettlement of the inhabitants has been carried out, because of the cessation of economic activity there; in the resettlement areas the employment problem has become worse because of the slow development of the production infrastructure. Decontamination work at populated points and on particular territories being carried out by organizations of the Union republics is proceeding unsatisfactorily.

Together with other ministries and departments, the USSR Academy of Sciences has allowed tardiness in the formation of scientifically sound criteria for the population to live on contaminated territories.

The submission to the USSR Supreme Soviet of prepared drafts for a law on the Chernobyl catastrophe and a law on the utilization of atomic energy and nuclear safety has been delayed, thus allowing no opportunity to pass them even now.

The newly created USSR Committee for the Cleanup of the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station, established as part of the USSR Council [as published] of Ministers Commission for Emergency Situations, and also the corresponding state committees of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR have not developed the necessary organizational work or practical actions.

There is lack of agreement in the approaches of the Union republics when defining measures for accident cleanup and on the level of compensation for persons who have suffered as a result of the accident.

It has not been possible to achieve significant improvement in the sociopsychological situation in areas affected by the catastrophe. The information provided to the public about the radiation situation and the course of implementation of cleanup programs following the accident remains at a low level.

Proper attention is not being paid to solving the problems of organizing, building, and operating radioactive waste disposal sites.

The USSR Supreme Soviet resolves as follows:

1. To take under advisement information from the USSR Government, RSFSR Council of Ministers, Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, and Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers on the course of fulfillment of the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution: "On a Unified Program for the Cleanup Following the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station and the Situation Associated With That Accident."

2. The USSR Government, together with the RSFSR Council of Ministers, Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, and Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers will do the following:

—during 1991 insure unconditional completion of the tasks set forth in the state Union-republic program for urgent measures during the period 1990-1992, and in republic cleanup programs following the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station. During the first half of 1991 complete the recruitment of contract construction organizations and other organizations adequate for the volumes and directions of work for this year and subsequent years, and also insure priority allocation of the necessary material-technical resources;

- take the steps necessary to provide the population in contaminated areas more fully with clean food products in accordance with rational standards, paying special attention to deliveries of foodstuffs enriched with vitamins and with pectins and other bioactive substances to those areas, primarily for children, pregnant women, and nursing mothers;
  - during the first half of 1991 take steps aimed at improving the structure of the public health organs in control zones, recruit and establish medical personnel, including on a contract basis, and provide medical centers with up-to-date equipment and drugs. Insure priority for measures to prevent possible long-term aftereffects caused by the accident;
  - accelerate comprehensive studies of the populations living in control zones, and on this basis compile a medical and biological data bank on the population's state of health. Jointly with the USSR General Confederation of Trade Unions insure that the health of the population improves during 1991, primarily that of children and teenagers from stricken areas;
  - during 1991 complete the creation of a system of departmental and state radiation monitoring of agricultural and food products, water, and the soil, to cover every populated point in the control zone. Insure production of the necessary quantity of personal dosimeters and other instruments for radiation monitoring. Significantly improve sanitation information and information work among the public on matters relating to the effects of radiation;
  - continue the comprehensive study of the territory of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR subjected to radioactive contamination, and insure within the times stipulated the compilation of summary landscape-and-geochemical and radiological-ecological maps of contaminated areas;
  - during the first half of 1991 draw up comprehensive proposals for programs for international cooperation in taking steps to mitigate and deal with the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station.
3. The RSFSR Council of Ministers, Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, and Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers will do the following:
- during the first half of 1991 complete the organization of special services to decontaminate territories and populated points and bury and rebury radioactive waste. It is recommended that associations for business cooperation be recruited extensively to solve problems relating to improving the radiological-ecological situation in stricken areas;
  - review questions pertaining to the socioeconomic status of areas subjected to radioactive contamination, and also the advisability of setting up in restricted and resettled zones on the territory of the RSFSR, the

Ukrainian SSR, and the Belorussian SSR a regime of special control and economic activity regardless of administrative-territorial divisions, and adopt agreed decisions on this problem.

4. The USSR Government jointly with the RSFSR Council of Ministers, Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, and Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers will insure the formation, on the basis of a concept adopted for the population to live in areas affected by the accident, of a unified long-term state Union-republic program to protect the population of the USSR against aftereffects from the Chernobyl catastrophe. When this is done they should consider the new conditions resulting from the country's transition to market relations and the adoptions by republics of declarations of sovereignty. When drawing up the program they should make provision for measures to stabilize the sociopsychological situation in areas subjected to radioactive contamination, and in areas of resettlement. They should submit the long-term program to the autumn 1991 session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Refinements should be made to the state Union-republic program for urgent measures for the period 1990-1992 for the cleanup following the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station, giving due consideration to the concept for living adopted and proposals put forward by USSR people's deputies. If necessary, appropriate proposals should be submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

5. The government of the USSR jointly with the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers will take the steps necessary to implement the work program set forth in the decision of the USSR Council of Ministers to close down operation of the power units at the Chernobyl nuclear power station.

6. To recommend that the mass media show maximum objectivity in covering the problems associated with the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station.

7. During the second half of 1991, the commission investigating the causes of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and evaluating the actions of officials during the period following the accident will submit to the USSR Supreme Soviet information on work done.

The USSR Government will draw up and submit to the autumn 1991 session of the USSR Supreme Soviet a draft law on the utilization of atomic energy and radiation safety.

8. Monitoring compliance with this resolution is assigned to the USSR Supreme Soviet Ecology Committee and USSR Supreme Soviet Health Committee.

A. Lukyanov, chairman,  
USSR Supreme Soviet  
Moscow, the Kremlin, 9 April 1991

### Scientist Outlines Current Dnepr Basin Radiation Dangers

91WN0409B Kiev *RABOCHAYA GAZETA* in Russian  
13 Apr 91 p 3

[Interview with Doctor of Geological and Mineralogical Sciences Professor Valeriy Aleksandrovich Kopeykin by Yu. Dronzhkevich, at Chernobyl; date not given: "It Will Not Get Worse"]

[Text] The people of Kiev probably still remember how alarmed they were in January this year when rumors circulated that a large quantity of radionuclides had been released into the Pripyat River, and then into the Dnepr. Various officials and respected people explained at that time to the inhabitants of the Ukrainian capital that their alarm was unfounded and that there was no danger.

But are the concerns of the people of Kiev and of all who live in the Dnepr basin really unfounded? Doctor of Geological and Mineralogical Sciences Professor V.A. Kopeykin, who in 1987 undertook a study of the geological and geochemical aftereffects of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station], believes that there is still cause for concern.

[Dronzhkevich] Valeriy Aleksandrovich, on what is your conviction based?

[Kopeykin] Analysis of the air and space pictures of the zone of radioactive contamination shows that the main locus of the radioactive dust containing plutonium fell within an area that is periodically flooded by the Pripyat and Uzh rivers. And this kind of flooding is possible in the years immediately ahead. The maximum boundary for flooding passes through the old bed of the Pripyat, which has been well traced on color pictures taken from space along the line running Yuryevich-Novoselki-Babchin-Khatupa-Braginka River-Asarevich. There was evidently flooding in 1108 to judge from the Radzivilovskiy chronicles.

The maximum boundary for the flooding, of which there is a one-percent probability, that is, once every 100 years, passes south of that line, and the area of the flood plain inundated is less in that case. However, in any scenario a major flood can play the role of a "drag" causing a large volume of the plutonium that fell with the radioactive dust onto the flood plain of the Pripyat River to be deposited in the Kiev reservoir. The railroad levee running from the Chernobyl AES to Slavutich may play a double role here, particularly in the area of the railroad bridge across the Pripyat. The annual flooding since the accident at the Chernobyl AES has carried away from the Kiev reservoir and the flood plain of the Pripyat a large quantity of radioactive silt into the middle and lower reaches of the Dnepr. Already today the concentration of strontium-90 in the waters of the Dnepr is above the maximum level permitted for this radionuclide for irrigated farming.

[Dronzhkevich] Can anything be done to avoid this danger?

[Kopeykin] One possible scenario for eliminating the threat of a wash-out of radioactive dust from the flood plain of the Pripyat by flooding is to dredge the alluvium into a sand mass behind the levee, limiting the area of the locus. Another is to dig several canals parallel to the bed of the Pripyat. And a third is to construct a levee with a runoff channel behind it, without backfilling the locus.

These scenarios have been reviewed at the Pripyat Scientific Production Association and in the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources. At this moment a working version of the project has been selected and work on it has been started. But most of the work will not have been completed before the 1991 flood. This gives cause for alarm. From my standpoint the most acceptable thing is to divert the Pripyat River round the locus of the radioactive deposits (mainly plutonium) into its old (prehistoric) bed in a westerly direction. This will immediately lower the level of the ground waters and slow the rate at which the radionuclides are being dissolved.

[Dronzhkevich] There is talk that all is not well with the Chernobyl AES in the sense of seismicity. Is this so?

[Kopeykin] The seismicity map of the European part of the USSR in print classifies the Chernobyl AES at six on the seismicity scale for category two ground (it was five on the scale in an earlier map). Today, however, we have facts showing a rise in the level of the ground waters in the area of the Chernobyl AES building itself because of the construction of the wall in the ground, and that puts the ground in the area of the station into category three. This requires an increase in the scale reading for maximum calculated earthquake (MRZ is a possible earthquake once every 1,000 years). Indeed, in general a rise is being observed in the level of ground waters because of technological measures.

Moreover, the Pripyat River passes through a young tectonic fault and has a different erosion basis along different sections of its own bed. This requires an increase in the MRZ scale reading by a minimum of 0.5. When the seismicity maps for the European part of the USSR were being made, the earthquakes mentioned in the chronicles for the years 1230 and 1510, which registered eight on the scale, were not taken into account (we may doubt the chronicles but they should not, in my opinion, simply be ignored in the calculations), it is necessary to increase the MRZ scale reading another 0.5. Thus, these facts require that the MRZ reading in the area of the Chernobyl AES be set at eight, not lower. Meanwhile, when the Chernobyl AES was under construction the calculations were set at six on the scale, and the reactors at seven.

[Dronzhkevich] Valeriy Aleksandrovich, you were talking about the danger of a wash-out of the plutonium locus into the flood plain of the Pripyat. But surely there

is still plutonium in the various temporary burial sites, first and foremost in the "Rusty Forest?"

[Kopeykin] Studies of the ground waters from the point of the temporarily localized radioactive waste in the "Rusty Forest" in the area of Yanov station show that the pine trees that died as the result of radioactive contamination were buried in 1987 in sandy trenches without any kind of clay protective cover. One trench was opened up and it was possible to see that water is standing at 1.5 meters from the surface. That is, the dead pine trees have now been lying in water for three years, and the radioactive dust settled in them is also in this natural solution. Analysis of the water, first filtered through ordinary filters, has shown that readings above the maximum permissible concentration for the population are observed in virtually all the radionuclides measured.

Moreover, plutonium several dozen percent above permissible concentrations for potable water has been found in water from the "Rusty Forest" disposal sites in colloidal and true suspensions. We first detected plutonium in suspension in the "Rusty Forest" disposal site in the summer of 1989. The suspension also contains americium and curium. It is known that the danger of alpha radiation, which these three elements are, is 20 times greater than the danger from other radionuclides. The main route by which they enter the body is through the respiratory organs—the lungs.

Plant pollen and plant material from peat bogs, which are borne very easily by the wind, may be contaminated with water containing dissolved alpha-emitters. Aqueous dust may even be lifted directly by the wind from the surface of open water.

The standards for permissible concentrations of plutonium-239 in air are 100 million times greater than the standards for water. And the half-life of this isotope is 24,065 years, not 30 years as it is for strontium-137. It is precisely the plutonium in the fallout from the accident that proves that what happened at Chernobyl was not simply an accident but a catastrophe whose ecological consequences it is still difficult to imagine.

It is my opinion that it is now essential to make a study along the track of the excursion from the Chernobyl AES of the nature of the behavior of alpha-emitters in aqueous solution, and determine possible sites of other "Rusty Forests." I think that this is a priority task at this time. Hopes of burying the radioactive dust in the ground still remain just that—hopes—because there is no precedent for this.

At the same time there is no need to panic about the "Rusty Forest" disposal site near Yanov station. The reason for the appearance of the plutonium, americium and curium in solution is not only the pine trees with the radioactive dust that have been buried in water, but to a large extent the corresponding geochemical situation. I think that we shall find quite a number of "rusty forests" along the Chernobyl track, and also in places where no

pine trees have been buried. So the question arises of the possible consequences of dissolved alpha-emitters in the fauna and flora in the zone affected by the Chernobyl AES.

It was splendid that virtually all the predictions of a possible process of the dissolution of radioactive dust in an increased rate of radionuclide migration were negative. It was reckoned that the dust would not dissolve in the immediate future. We know today that this is not so. So special, goal-oriented work is needed to conduct geochemical studies of the processes involved in the migration of radionuclides, not only in the 30-kilometer zone around the Chernobyl AES but also beyond. This applies in particular to the alpha-emitters—plutonium, americium, curium, and neptunium.

[Dronzhkevich] In your opinion, what steps should be taken?

[Kopeykin] Today it is essential to publish large-scale radiation maps for all nuclides separately and for alpha- and beta-emitters. Unfortunately, many of the loci containing the dissolved radionuclides will be outside the 30-kilometer zone. The dominant radionuclide in dissolved form is now strontium-90. It has few geochemical fixers in nature. Certain clays or colloids may act as such fixers. Accordingly, strontium-90 will migrate actively and distantly. In a normal situation, however, because of the strong dilution of the waters of the Dnepr it is hardly likely that maximum permissible concentrations will be exceeded for potable water.

Cesium, on which a great deal of work has been done because of its very easy determination using the method of spectroscopy, is a very poor aqueous migrant because it is fixed by potassium-containing clays such as illites. Radioactive cesium is dangerous in dust, and the main method for dealing with it is fighting wind erosion of soils.

The plutonium is the most dangerous component of the excursion from the No. 4 power unit at the Chernobyl AES because of its high degree of alpha activity and its great half-life. Possessing a large set of valence states, it will behave in different ways in different geochemical situations. It is most mobile in oxidizing conditions, in the zone of free oxygen. Peat bogs will be a barrier against plutonium.

The problem of burying radioactive waste remains acute. If we talk from the standpoint of geochemistry, then in the 30-kilometer zone of the Chernobyl AES there is no site for it. However, you could not carry away such large quantities. So, willy-nilly, the waste must be buried in the zone. To this end it is essential to hasten work on a project for a plant known as the "Vektor" program. Site selection for it is limited and it could realistically be in the area of Burakovka. Of course, the final word rests with the local authorities and population.

Touching on a general prediction of the radiation situation, I would like to say that it is essential to distinguish



areas of contamination from the areas bordering on them. In order to reduce the effect of the radiation, on irrigated land it is necessary to use natural mineral sorbents as an additive in the plowed layer since they retard certain nuclides quite well, and to cultivate periodically, going deeper each time. I consider propaganda about the 35-REM concept immoral, particularly for people living in "clean" conditions. The more so since those people know that the international standard is 5 REM.

Having had personal experience of work in the cleanup zone after the 1987 Chernobyl accident, I believe that given a continuation of the decontamination work, no marked deterioration will occur in the future with respect to the radiation situation. However, transport of radioactivity both in suspension and in solution will occur.

#### **Progress, Changes in Chernobyl Clean-Up Program Assessed**

91UN1334A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY  
VESTNIK in Russian No 8, Feb 91 p 9

[Interview with V. Gubanov, chairman of the Committee for Eliminating Aftereffects of the Chernobyl AES Accident, by G. Lomanov; place and date not given: "Getting Rid of the 'Chernobyl Syndrome'"]

[Text] Already almost five years have passed since the tragedy at the Chernobyl AES [Nuclear Power Station], and it has been almost one year since the USSR Supreme Soviet ratified the State Union and Republic Program of Urgent Measures for 1990-1992 on Eliminating the Aftereffects of the Chernobyl AES Accident. This program has become the basis for new large-scale measures. Suffice it to say that over 10 billion rubles [R] have been appropriated this year from the Union budget alone to implement these measures. What is the situation today in the affected regions? How is implementation of the program progressing? V. Gubanov, chairman of the Committee for Eliminating the Aftereffects of the Chernobyl AES Accident, talks about this at the request of PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK.

[Lomanov] Viktor Afanasyevich, the tragedy at Chernobyl has in one way or another affected the interests of over four million people and its consequences will be felt for many years to come. For this reason I would like to begin our conversation with the concept that has caused such a sensation and been severely criticized, the "35-rem [roentgen equivalent man]" concept. After all, a great deal depends on what criteria will be used to determine the safety of people living in the regions adversely affected—health of the population, scope of resettlement, and volume of investments.

[Gubanov] A new concept has now been developed. It differs from the previous one which proceeded from the premise that an individual should not receive a dosage exceeding 35 rems over his lifetime (averaging 70 years). But people want to know if they can live here today

without damaging their health. And if so, for how many years? The new concept will enable us to answer such questions. In assessing the situation, it takes into account the cumulative dosage received by an individual over a year and establishes the lower annual limit of radiation from the Chernobyl fallout—0.1 rem.

[Lomanov] And the upper limit? Is it again "35?"

[Gubanov] It has not been established.

[Lomanov] Why?

[Gubanov] Simply because accomplishment of the envisaged program of urgent measures will not allow people residing in affected regions to receive more than 20 rems during their lifetime, taking into account earlier accumulated dosages and with the removal of all restrictions. And even this figure includes some degree of insurance—the real level of cumulative dosage does not exceed 17 rems. And one more important aspect—the concept includes the principle of voluntary resettlement of people from territories where the contamination level is less than 40 curies per square kilometer. I believe this is fair—after all, for many people, especially the elderly, the act of moving and adapting to another locality entail experiences which at times have a much greater effect on people's health than the influence of radiation.

It will not be an easy matter to implement the new concept. But all the obligations that have been confirmed by the government in various programs and resolutions are in effect and will remain in effect over the time intervals envisaged by these decisions. Everything the state has guaranteed with respect to resettlement and social compensation will be accomplished.

The republics victimized by the accident participated in developing this concept. They agree with its main principles, which will become the basis of a law on the Chernobyl catastrophe to provide social protection for citizens who are victims of the accident, and of a long-term Union and republic program for 1993-1995 and prior to the year 2000. The draft law has already been submitted to the parliament and might possibly be included in the agenda of the spring session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Lomanov] It was proposed to resettle people from regions with a great amount of radioactive soil contamination (more than 40 curies per square kilometer) over a two-year period—about 73,000 people in all. How many have already moved out?

[Gubanov] Last year it was planned to resettle 29,000 individuals. Preliminary data show that 26,900 residents have left. I recall that the program envisaged the opportunity to move out of less contaminated regions—if people desired to do so, of course. This provision relates to families with children, pregnant women, people who cannot live here by virtue of their health condition. Taking this into account, we must resettle at least

140,000 people prior to 1992. Almost 45,000 inhabitants have left. The most intensive resettlement is taking place in Belorussia.

Overall efforts within the framework of the Chernobyl program are expanding with every passing year. In 1989, R1.1 billion was spent, last year, R2.2 billion, and this year R10.3 billion have already been allocated from Union budget funds alone. This presents the real possibility that a significant portion of the effort envisioned by the program for 1990-1992 may be accomplished this very year.

[Lomanov] Many urgent measures have envisaged the establishment of a system of trained medical aid. The press has sharply criticized medical personnel not desiring or incapable of determining whether the illnesses of former "eliminators" were connected to their work at the Chernobyl site. There remains a bitter after-taste—just yesterday you were a hero, and now you are feeble, ill, not needed by anyone.

[Gubanov] The criticism is justified. Presently the situation is being corrected. A State Register of Persons Subjected to Effects of Radiation From the Chernobyl AES Accident has been established. At the Union level it contains information on 539,000 individuals, including 192,000 of the so-called "eliminators" who worked on eliminating the consequences of the catastrophe. An entire network has been created based on the country's leading clinics—20 regional interdepartmental councils of experts entrusted the responsibility of establishing a causal relationship between illnesses and disabilities, and efforts to clear away the accident.

In order to spare the inhabitants of monitored regions from having to undergo X-ray examinations unless absolutely necessary, facilities for ultrasound diagnostics and endoscopy are nearing completion in Bryansk, Kiev, Zhitomir, Gomel, and Mogilev Oblasts. In Mogilev, a diagnostics center has been outfitted to accommodate 500 visits per shift; in Minsk, a specialized republic center for treating thyroid tumors; and in Gomel and Mogilev, branches of the Scientific Research Institute of Radiation Medicine of the Belorussian SSR Health Ministry have opened up. Two statistics in conclusion—last year more than 500,000 inhabitants of the affected regions received treatment and recuperated in special health centers; over 13,000 children were sent abroad for treatment and health restoration.

[Lomanov] How are tasks being executed with respect to the compilation of a detailed atlas showing radioactive contamination?

[Gubanov] An aerial survey of 20 oblasts was accomplished and the materials are being processed taking into account ground-based investigative data. Half of the farmsteads were examined and appropriate survey specifications should be finalized this year. The scope of this effort is graphically illustrated by the figures—radiation specifications were compiled for somewhat over 120,000 farmsteads in 1,212 population centers. And more than a

thousand towns and villages beyond the boundaries of the monitored zone were examined—at the request of residents and local authorities.

[Lomanov] Could you tell us something about the "clean" products—apparently, regions suffering from the accident have not been spared the general shortages we are all experiencing?

[Gubanov] Without a doubt, it is a difficult situation we see here. Nonetheless, consumption quotas for 11 types of basic food products in Belorussia, for example, were allocated in their entirety to regions with a contamination density greater than five curies per square kilometer. And quotas for other products, certain manufactured goods primarily, have been allocated to the affected regions. I should note in general that priority financial and material support has been stipulated for the Chernobyl program. Expenditures for it in the plans of republics and departments are apportioned by separate paragraph.

[Lomanov] Are the local food products edible? From time to time we hear reports that here or there, "dirty" meat or milk has been found...

[Gubanov] If we are talking about meat, it must be admitted that there are such incidents, but they are rare and the amount of product contamination is insignificant. This happens when farms or their proprietors fail for one reason or another to switch their livestock over to noncontaminated fodder three months prior to slaughter. Each such situation is promptly analyzed and the production is used to fatten up cattle or undergoes technical processing. Last year the production of contaminated meat did not exceed hundredths of a percent—is this cause for a flare-up of emotions?

Radionuclide content in plant production has basically decreased to levels not in excess of international norms. Such production may be freely sold, transported, processed, and used without restriction by all population groups of countries that are members of the European Community, including children.

In the majority of contaminated oblasts, the percentage of milk not in conformance with TAS's—temporary allowable standards—has decreased to 0.1-0.8 percent. The situation is worse in Bryansk and Zhitomir Oblasts, where this percentage is reaching 8-11 percent. We intend to conduct a conference there in the spring and delve into why we are not seeing any reductions in the amount of contaminated milk.

[Lomanov] So much contradictory material has been written about the danger of radiation that people do not believe anything or anyone—not authoritative scientists nor official organs. Are we going to be able to rid ourselves of the "Chernobyl syndrome?"

[Gubanov] It will be difficult, but we must. For sociopsychological tension is resulting in the departure, primarily of young and industrious people, from the affected

regions. A great deal of explanatory effort is necessary. Objective information must be provided on the dangers, real and imaginary. Here we are counting on sound, well-considered treatment by the press, although we ourselves are devoting more attention to providing objective information as well. Material on the new concept has been prepared for popular distribution. Regional public information centers are being established in Kiev, Minsk, Bryansk, Zhitomir, Gomel, and Mogilev. There will be increased publication of scientific literature for popular consumption, brochures, and reference pamphlets. Our committee has begun to issue an information bulletin, published in only a thousand copies at present. We expect to increase this to 10-15,000, and at that time will be able to send the bulletin to all population centers in the affected regions.

[Lomanov] Finally, many countries have responded to our misfortune. How do you assess the international assistance that has been provided?

[Gubanov] We are very grateful for it, although in our view it should be institutionalized. I believe the first step in this direction was taken through the special resolution of the 45th session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted in December of last year. It was resolved to create the Chernobyl Fund and organize its functional structure within the UN framework. Recently a coordinator was appointed for this problem—Margaret Anstee, deputy secretary general of the United Nations and head of the UN Center for Humanitarian Questions and Social Development. She recently traveled to the USSR and met with representatives of the republics. A preliminary understanding was reached regarding establishment of a program reflecting our requirements which could be fulfilled with the participation of international organizations or with their assistance.

#### **Ukrainian Officials Comment on Chernobyl Plant Status**

91WN0408A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
27 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by PRAVDA UKRAINY special correspondent Viktor Nikipelov: "How Are You Doing, Chernobyl?"]

[Text] Chernobyl-Slavutich-Kiev—As our newspaper has already reported, V.P. Fokin, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, visited the Chernobyl AES [nuclear power station] and the city of Slavutich on 6 February. A frank and involved discussion of the current situation at the Chernobyl AES and its future, prospects for the nuclear power industry, and the fate of the city of Slavutich took place during meetings with the station's management and work force.

Taking into account the requests from many readers who have taken a continuous interest in the issues of Chernobyl, we decided to report on the details of the meetings and discussions held, and to outline the positions and views of operating personnel and scientists.

Some excerpts from a report by M.P. Umanets, general director of the Chernobyl AES Production Association, follow.

#### **Safety**

At present, the operating personnel of the Chernobyl AES work with a reactor which, in essence, has little in common with the RBMK [high capacity channel reactor] which existed in April 1986 (this is true of physical characteristics in particular). At present, the station is not in any way inferior to other domestic AES as far as safety features are concerned.

In addition to the regular control and protection system previously in existence, a rapid emergency system has now been commissioned. Its "response" time amounts to 2.1 seconds, which is six times better than that of the regular system currently in existence, and 12 times better than that of the system existing prior to April 1986.

Now operators of the station are able to receive computations of the disposable reactivity margin [operativnyy zapas reaktivnosti] in five minutes, whereas previously such information could only be obtained in two hours.

#### **Decommissioning the Units**

As is known, a resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the republic provides for decommissioning all units at the Chernobyl AES before 1995.

Now a variant of closing the station down has been selected which calls for shutting down successively the first, second, and third units in 1993-1994 and 1995 respectively, unloading fuel to be stored in a special storage facility, washing and decontaminating technical equipment and systems after the fuel has been unloaded, holding the systems for a long period of time, and subsequently dismantling them together with structures (this, however, will take place in the remote future).

According to preliminary calculations, the cost of this program will come to about 2.5 billion rubles [R]. In the course of this, the station will gradually turn into a consumer of heat and electricity for many years to come, beginning in 1993. In addition, we will not be able to reduce the size of the work force considerably, as indicated by the experience of the already shut down Armenian and Beloyarskiy AES.

Subsequently, the Chernobyl AES director stressed that, given a considerable improvement in the station's safety standard, its specialists believe that decommissioning the units at this time is not feasible. Also, we cannot ignore the fact that the shutdown of the Chernobyl AES will reduce the generation of power in the republic by almost one-tenth (given the already existing shortage of energy carriers), and there is simply no way to make up the losses in the immediate future.

I believe, said the director, that we should approach the republic parliament once again to have our proposals

considered carefully and comprehensively, with the use of skilled independent experts.

We should also refine some provisions of a five-year moratorium on AES construction in our republic. Also, how logical is the decision not to commission or load the virtually completed second unit of the Khmelnitskiy AES, while the first unit is in operation?

### The Sarcophagus

First of all, let us recall that it is not completely sealed. The total unsealed area of the sarcophagus comes to more than 1,400 square meters.

The issue of nuclear safety was the most alarming until mid-1988. Scientists and researchers were interested in the possibility of a self-sustaining chain reaction which would subsequently be accompanied by an explosion and large amounts of discharge—something of a replica of what happened on 26 April 1986. Now they have drilled through the reactor in all directions, and specialists continuously monitor the condition of metal and building structures, as well as nuclear fuel, using optical video technology and all kinds of sensors... In certain locations, the study of the building structures has been incomplete due to high levels of radiation coming to between 800 and 1,000 roentgens. Nonetheless, after conducting a number of physical experiments, research leaders came to the conclusion that a self-sustaining chain reaction is impossible, due to which the sarcophagus is considered to be nuclear-safe.

What is the future of the sarcophagus? There are several opinions in this regard. The first variant calls for building a sealed cover structure over the sarcophagus (perhaps, made of titanium)—shelter No. 2. Subsequently, the unit would be left in this condition. For their part, specialists of the station believe that Unit 4 cannot be left in this condition. A green meadow will not actually exist where it is located, but it is quite possible to dismantle the unit to the 12-meter mark, extract and bury radioactive wastes, and safely encase the rest in concrete.

A variant has also been proposed which calls for dismantling Unit 4 without building shelter No. 2 at all. It provides for the complete removal of fuel and all parts of the unit.

### 'Yelena'

A great many idle fantasies and rumors concerning "Yelena" circulate at present. "Yelena" is the top 2,000-ton segment of the reactor, the so-called "lid," severed by the explosion from its pillars and hanging at an angle over the reactor well. Many people believe that if it falls into the well a mechanical discharge of radioactive dust which has formed inside the reactor under the influence of destructively high doses of radiation will occur. This version has spawned a multitude of panic rumors.

However, specialists have now developed and installed an effective dust suppression system which would be used to reduce to a minimum all possible unfavorable consequences of such a fall. It provides for the prompt delivery to the reactor of a sticky liquid which would "tie up" its dust content.

However, as scientists from a comprehensive scientific team believe, the very possibility of such a fall is very much in doubt. The laser surveys conducted and mathematical computations indicate that "Yelena" may only slip down slowly, at the speed of several millimeters per day. If we take into account the fact that the height of the well is about eight meters we can understand that a certain time margin remains for necessary maneuvers to be performed.

Incidentally, last year's earthquake, with a magnitude of about five points, was actual confirmation of the stability of "the lid" which has three fulcrums at present. Moreover, calculations have already been made for pouring concrete on some of the space under "Yelena" with an eye to restoring a reliable fourth fulcrum.

What if such a discharge occurs after all, despite the measures taken? (At present, life suggests that we should evaluate all possible scenarios). So, in the opinion of specialists present at a meeting with M.P. Umanets, it could pose a certain danger only to the personnel of the station, and its consequences would not affect areas beyond the 30-kilometer zone. However, the current radiation situation in the compound of the station itself, which they have succeeded in attaining at the cost of a lot of effort and considerable outlays in recent years, would deteriorate. Understandably, in this case the shutdown of the units, the emergency evacuation of personnel of the station and of the organizations servicing it, and the shutdown of forced ventilation are envisaged as primary safety measures.

### Samoylenko's Opinion

The desire of the government to know what might happen after "Yelena" falls is easy to understand, observed General Director of the Spetsatom Production Association Yu.N. Samoylenko. I think that at present nobody can say with complete confidence and clearly what kind of discharge would occur in the process, and what the size of the area affected would be, despite many specialists who have been on site assuring us that "Yelena" will not fall.

However, no matter what kind of discharge occurs (a small or even a large one, even if its radiation risk factor is reduced to a minimum), we should be mindful of the sociopolitical ramifications which may cause a powerful explosion of public opinion in our republic. This would wipe out all attempts to restore the shattered reputation of our nuclear power industry made in recent years, and therefore, would worsen development prospects for the power industry as a whole.

As Samoylenko sees it, the main point at present is to focus all efforts on the sarcophagus, which meets neither national nor international requirements. It is necessary to select an acceptable variant soon, and to fund all work well, keeping in mind all the time precisely the sociopolitical consequences in question.

At present, we need a real victory on a specific avenue so as to be able to say, for example, that the sarcophagus has been fully neutralized. Such an accomplishment would create realistic prerequisites for changing public opinion with regard to nuclear power generation.

#### Slavutich

A promise to build a 21st-century city was quite attractive. However, as the director of the station said, this has been literally ruined since 1989 by the USSR Minenergo [Ministry of Power and Electrification] in its capacity as general contractor. At present, there are 2,819 families on our waiting list for housing, of which 1,618 families are at the Chernobyl AES alone. Instead of the 1,010 housewarmings planned for 1990, we celebrated only 118. The situation is equally bad with regard to schools, where several hundred children study on the second shift, and pre-school facilities...

No matter how hard we try to convince the people of the opposite, observed M.P. Umanets, most of them associate the discontinuation of construction in the city with the decision to close the station. No arguments of ours convince anyone given the condition of construction in Slavutich. You can imagine the pressure all this puts on our employees; you can imagine how bankrupt we appear to them. We need urgent and effective help.

#### Revelations To Be Considered

Allow me a small lyrical digression now, the Chernobyl AES Production Association director appealed to the public. You know, it pains and saddens me to read interviews with energy specialists who offer wind generators to us. Indeed, at present the nuclear power industry is being pilloried, and there is nothing we can do about it. Nonetheless, I would like to stress that a serious discussion of the future of the Ukraine is pointless in the absence of an adequate energy potential. Let us approach this problem in a balanced manner, without undue emotions and passions.

After all, the latter are inflamed both by individual presentations, and newspaper articles and TV and radio broadcasts. This is how public opinion is shaped little by little. In public transit, there are signs to the effect that it is forbidden to talk to the driver when the vehicle is in motion, whereas it is possible to grab the sleeves of, say, senior engineers of reactor control going to their shift, and it is possible to post pickets and threaten their families, as incidentally has been the case at the already mentioned Khmelnytskyi AES. It is alarming that this attitude is becoming a regular phenomenon here in the Ukraine.

It appears that some people do not have a clear idea of what they are playing with. After all, you cannot continuously keep the personnel of nuclear power stations under such unfavorable psychological pressure. This is the greatest favor we ask of the government, which is seconded by the directors of all AES in the republic. Please note that they are not asking for funds, transformers, or equipment; they are asking first of all for the protection of their personnel who currently perform their professional duties conscientiously, no worse than others.

#### Fokin's Interview

After the meeting in Slavutich ended, I approached the prime minister of the republic, asking what new things he had learned during this trip.

Vitold Pavlovich stressed: "One of the goals of our visit was to meet with the management of the nuclear power station, its employees, and scientists monitoring the condition of Unit 4, and to familiarize ourselves with their views on an entire set of issues. I must say that exchanging views was very useful. I listened to all the arguments made by the professionals who are convinced that, after all measures have been taken, there is no need to close the station down and decommission its units, that it is illogical to restrict the capacity of units already in operation once the level of their safety has been increased so efficiently.

"Second, as you know, rumors have recently spread with lightning speed concerning various troubles with the sarcophagus, primarily concerning the possible fall of "Yelena," causing panic among the populace. Having heard quite well-reasoned reports from the director and other speakers, we became convinced that apparently there is indeed no reason to be apprehensive about the condition of Unit 4. Finally, the third goal of our visit was to familiarize ourselves with the state of affairs in Slavutich.

"It is necessary to carefully examine everything we have heard; after all, the final position of the government on all of these issues should be very balanced. A difficult task is in store for us: To select the only correct solution with regard to both the future of the Chernobyl AES and the prospects for the city."

[Nikipelov] However, in the process many people forget that the development of our republic will not advance a single step without improving energy availability...

[Fokin] This is absolutely correct. We also have people who reject technical progress and are prepared to call for living virtually in caves and using candles; I believe that their arguments cannot be taken seriously.

[Nikipelov] However, it appears that they intend to send someone else to these caves rather than go themselves...

[Fokin] Indeed, while they discuss it, a majority nonetheless prefer to live in well-lit and heated apartments,

and to make extensive use of household appliances, audio equipment, and TV sets.

[Nikipelov] In response to a question concerning prospects for the development of the nuclear power industry in the Ukraine, V.P. Fokin said that at present it is premature to discuss this because there are no locations in the republic where we can easily site an AES and begin construction. The Ukraine does not have a crystalline shield which could provide a good foundation for the implementation of a design of safe nuclear plants.

However, there are alternatives available to us, stressed the prime minister. We are now studying closely the potential for using steam gas plants which have great advantages compared to nuclear reactors (the efficiency of nuclear power generation does not exceed 30 to 32 percent, whereas that of steam gas plants comes to between 50 and 55 percent). They are comparatively pure from the point of view of ecology. One of the elements of such units is being developed in Kharkov; meanwhile, we are reviewing the issue of acquiring such units abroad.

In response to my question on whether the prime minister believes that the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine may revisit the issue of the feasibility of closing down the Chernobyl AES after precisely such meetings and consultations, Vitold Pavlovich said:

"After our meeting, hardly. However, if there is a continuation of this meeting, if both specialists and members of our parliament work seriously on this issue, I do not rule out that we will be forced to address these problems in the future, perhaps in the immediate future, one way or another.

"I have already noted that the issue of decommissioning the units entails major technical problems and requires considerable time. This is to say nothing about outlays. Suffice it to say that the program for decommissioning the units developed by a government commission will cost upwards of R2 to R2.5 billion, according to the most conservative calculations. Of course, this is quite a lot given our current poverty."

### **Nuclear Waste Contamination at Chelyabinsk-65 Facility**

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Union Edition p 3

[Article by Ye. Manucharova: "Boomerang: A Chronicle of One Unnoticed Catastrophe"]

[Text] Our car is heading toward Karachay, the infamous Ural lake. That is, it is famous now. Only recently, it was a strictly secret lake: radiation.

I still cannot see Karachay yet, but the dosimeter says the lake is getting closer: The numbers on the panel are growing, ever more rapidly replacing each other, and the

alarm signal is sounding ever sharper. Finally, the instrument breaks out in a squeal, going completely off the scale, and then the car stops.

There it is, the lake itself, which I would very much like to load entirely onto a missile and send far away, to the sun of another galaxy. This is a joke, of course. It is impossible... And what if, for instance, the missile suddenly blows up during the launch?

Not far from us, work crews are despondently piling boulders in the water. Their task is to partition the lake into sectors, so that a tornado (which do happen here) will be unable to pick up the radioactive wastes with which Karachay is filled. The concentration of radionuclides is extreme: 120 million curies. (Remember? The Chernobyl explosion released less: 50 million).

Karachay belongs to the Mayak combine. It dumped the wastes here when it made our first atomic bomb. It dumped not only in Karachay, but also in other water reservoirs, in the Asanovskiye marshes, and in the river Techa. Later, they began to hide the wastes in various sorts of burial grounds, corking them up in volume and storing them in bunkers and trenches.

Mayak is proud that one and a half decades ago it created a modern "storehouse, costing about 100 million rubles, equipped with protective technology, manipulators, and remote control using television." Indeed, such a thing exists. I saw it. But! On the admission of this same Mayak, "the accumulation of hard wastes continues in trench-type storehouses." In these, "monitoring equipment is lacking" (Document No. 05-123, 4 December 1990). In other words, today, just like 40 years ago, nobody can be sure that complete storage safety has been achieved or that effective monitoring of the status of the wastes has been organized. Experts have determined that the danger index at the burial grounds is 5 on a scale of 10. At open water reservoirs (like Karachay), the index is higher: 6-7.

How do they calculate such a precise danger level? It is hard for a journalist to understand this. However, here is a fact indicating that Mayak might blaze "brighter than a thousand suns." Four years ago, one of the waste storage areas, after heating itself, exploded underground. Twenty million curies were released into the air.

"Mayak" understands the danger of Karachay and is trying to keep the liquid wastes within its banks, to not let them overflow... However, in the drought of 1967 the lake became shallow and the wastes became aerosols. The wind scattered them throughout the okrug.

One inevitably breathes plutonium near the terrible Karachay. Thus, the workers' faces are covered by Petryanov filters. They refer to them as "hoods" or "petals."

One of my companions unexpectedly starts smoking... Is he not afraid of intense breathing? What is this? Bravado? Yes, to a certain extent... For the most part, it is the habitual calm, "everyday" attitude of the Mayak

workers toward a material that they have worked with for a long time. Incidentally, the radiation background in their homes and on their streets is less than in Moscow.

It should be noted that this nuclear town behind barbed wire (code named Chelyabinsk-65) makes a favorable impression on visitors. It is clean, well-tended and intelligently planned. There are 83,000 residents in the town. However, workdays are measured such that there is no bustle anywhere. The people carry themselves with dignity. Apparently, they live like a close-knit family: Dynasties are commonplace at Mayak.

In front of the Mayak administration building, I saw a festive pair of newlyweds place bouquets at the base of the memorial to Kurchatov. A family is beginning with an expression of gratitude toward the creator of the bomb. The parents work here in the town, and the young people stay here too..

To a stranger, the desire to live where a tremendous concentration of dangerous wastes has accumulated seems strange. Maybe the people simply do not know that acute radiation sickness will kill? In nine fatal days... No, they know this and have seen it, and not just in the film "Nine Days of a Year." After all, the first atom bomb began to kill those not even yet born.

They made it here at Mayak in haste, carelessly believing that the goal was worth any means.

People worked here neither for money, nor for glory. Who remembers the heroism of Mayak's first nuclear workers? Their names were classified. Alas, now they are forgotten... As well as their successes. And their mistakes... They do not have great wealth. The pensions are quite small. Special additions to the pension were established here only for people whom the combine has listed in the "Red Book" (over-irradiated!). A total of 160 rubles is paid, almost at the poverty line. After catching a dose, they were treated (medicine at Mayak is first-class), and then they fearlessly returned.

One radiochemical production employee simply cannot understand why I am surprised by his return to Mayak after over-irradiation. After all, he, Viktor Sergeyevich Sladkov, likes his job. He also dislikes existing on the beggarly pension. He is a man, and he is a worker. Mainly, it seems, the radiation is not really all that scary!

The optimism of this place is mind-boggling...

Although one can understand this: If one did not recognize the tragedy, it would not appear to exist. For a long time at Mayak they have diligently suppressed in themselves the idea of the danger and criminality of spreading radiation. At first, this happened out of fear of Beriya, and later simply because superfluous thoughts obstructed the work.

However, it often happens that the heroism of some is outstripped by the bungling and criminal foolishness of

others. Can this be said of Mayak? The nuclear workers have existed here like a state inside a state, and this power had its own order.

For instance, today there is an official dosimetry service at Mayak. Andrey Fedorovich Lyzlov, head of the labor protection department, strictly monitors the maximum standards of safety. However, was it always this way? Here is what Mayak's own documents say:

"For most enterprise veterans it is impossible to determine the true dosimetric data. The basic production personnel at the Mayak Production Association received a collective dose of radiation, having no analog in the history of development of the nuclear industry"... "The workers considered the fulfillment of all production assignments, regardless of the radiation dose, their civic duty"... As a result, "more than 10,000 people were over-irradiated." There is more: "There is a real increase in mortality among personnel exposed to over-irradiation."

To put it simply, the people voluntarily turned off their dosimeters and climbed in where the radiation threatened them...

Totalitarianism generated both cruelty and sacrifice at the same time.

When the accident occurred in 1957, people cast themselves into the furnace itself, toward the cistern that was exploding underground. Two people, Yuriy Orlov and Vladimir Turusin, made their way to it in a tank. I did not see the former. The latter, answering my questions, always tried to prove that there were no alternatives to his deed: It was necessary to be sure of the size of the catastrophe, to know that the neighboring storehouses had not overheated and would not explode into the air.

Specialists from Chelyabinsk-65 went to Chernobyl quickly and voluntarily. It turns out, it was no worse there than at Mayak. Besides which (a paradox!), as a result only of this brief trip, the Chelyabinsk workers gained the right to the privileges of the irradiated.

People at Mayak realized how much they had been cheated of only after the USSR Council of Ministers and AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] resolution was issued on aid to the people who had worked on the Chernobyl plant (No 325). Let me quote again:

"The establishment of the privileges indicated in resolution No 325 evoked indignation and dissatisfaction among the veterans and employees of the enterprise... The resolution led to a social injustice for people who have given their health in the name of strengthening the country's defense capability."

After all, Mayak had never laid claim to anything before. Such was the social order of the state at the time: mercilessness toward oneself, contempt toward others.



Now this is returning to the nuclear workers as a boomerang of disrespect and mistrust toward them themselves.

Here is what the people of Mayak write:

"In the newspapers and on television, outright insults are aimed at us, the population of Chelyabinsk. The need to create a nuclear shield has been questioned, and appeals are being made to shut down the Mayak Production Association, right up to eliminating it." There is both despair and surprise here. However, after all, in the same document one reads: "The site of the Mayak Production Association is a potential source of radiation danger for the region and the population."

Sam Shepard, an American playwright, once said: "There will be nothing but tragedy, if you get mixed up with destructive ideas."

Mayak destroyed. Essentially, for 40 years it sawed away at the bough on which it sits and it laid waste to the whole region where it exists. In this time, arable land was taken out of use. Waters have been contaminated. Settlements (23) have been moved further away. The residents were evacuated from their native homes into temporary panel shelters (10,700 people!). They have been irradiated and get sick (935 cases of radiation sickness).

Now, in the course of history, the population is faced with the need to issue sentence on Mayak. Only the population has the right to give a vote of trust.

This will be done in the AES [nuclear power plant] referendum. This is to be held in March. It is interesting that nobody is surprised by the tardiness of the referendum. It will be held eight years after approval of the AES project, six years after the start of work. Already, 200 million rubles have been invested in the problematic construction site. The permissiveness and lack of control on the part of the nuclear workers are as though sanctified by tradition. Profitability is not even being discussed: How many billions will the AES cost the state? How many years will construction drag on? How dangerous is it to build an AES next to the waste store-houses?

However, the people (yet another paradox) are not up to it. They need to survive now. If more money can be received from the construction, if this offers regional social benefits, the population will consent.

Nonetheless, today's Mayak is forced to answer for the faults and blunders of its predecessors, the people whose portraits hang in its Museum of Labor Glory. However, nobody was counting the money when the blunders were committed. Today, conversion is occurring and the combine is getting poorer. In order to help the population, it must either become a beggar or start new work.

Viktor Ilich Fetisov, the young and intelligent director of Mayak, did not panic upon receiving the combine a year ago. He realized that time had refuted the idea of a

closed city, which was prestigious because it created something in great secrecy. Now Fetisov is fighting for the interests of the surrounding region, as his own.

The previous generation of nuclear workers heroically submitted to the course of history thrust on them. Now a fundamentally different trend in social mentality must be considered: the thirst of each to create his own fate. There are new people both at Mayak and outside its bounds.

"Lately, an outflow of skilled workers from among the young, promising and competent cadres has been observed... and the process continues to grow," says the director.

Having recognized these new realities, Fetisov directly related the well-being of the combine to that of the region and designed the agitation for the AES on an open-door policy. Any group of people which wants to investigate the matter can see for themselves how terrible Karachay is. Or, if one wishes, one may enter Mayak's holy of holies, where the miracle of neutralizing the radioactive wastes occurs.

Enormous automated industries have an alluring magic for modern man. One cannot help but admire it, when Yevgeniy Grigoryevich Dzekun, chief engineer of the radiochemical plant, shows how the enormous pincers of the manipulators handle the fuel assemblies. The power is fascinating...

It does not just fascinate me, but also the "Greens" and even the especially cautious residents of settlements closest to Mayak. Having visited the combine, group after group realizes that they have judged it superficially, that the danger of Karachay is great, and that is why it is time to build an AES (in Mayak's opinion, there is no other alternative for salvation). They realize that everything lies on the shoulders of the Mayak collective...

So they talk, on leaving the combine. However, later people inevitably return to their temporary shelters. Then they think over and over again that there has been a great deal of talk, yet still no assistance whatsoever. Then opposition springs up again: It is "them" (Mayak), and "us" (the population). There is still a dividing barbed wire. Yet the main thing is the lies.

There were many years of lies, sanctified by the lofty titles of the liars. Before the Chernobyl tragedy, nobody ever told the people what kind of evil deed had been committed against them. They were evacuated their homes by imperative, suddenly, humiliatingly, silently, not even given time to collect themselves. Or they were not evacuated, such as from Muslyumovo, even though it was also contaminated.

The doctors were also departmental (for others the region was closed). They were not in the least interested in the plurality of tragic diagnoses, or even in the frequency of examinations. Only when the Chernobyl tragedy happened did people realize that they were living



in Hiroshima too. In the minds of the leaders of the nuclear sector, this process was reflected somewhat distortedly. Here is an excerpt from a letter by B.V. Nikipelov, USSR first deputy minister of nuclear power engineering and industry, to the deputy chairman of USSR Gosplan: "After the release of the corresponding resolutions on the accident at the Chernobyl AES, stipulating a broad range of privileges and compensations for the afflicted population, the social tension among the population in the Urals region greatly intensified. The population began demanding the application of these privileges in the rayons subjected to radioactive contamination as a result of emergency situations that occurred at the Mayak chemical combine."

The most important word here was unsaid: "justly!" Justly demanding... After all, the leaders of the afflicted oblasts used precisely this formulation in their own reports.

I am driving to Muslyumovo. This settlement has not been evacuated yet and still stands along the bank of the dangerous Techa. Here they now know what the river brings to people. Three months ago, the Muslyumovites became annoyed, seeing the fence built along their banks. They continued to live with the habitual naturalness of riverside residents. I see the results of this when a man arrives at the home where I am conversing with Kamalov, chairman of the settlement soviet. This man was evacuated and resettled twice due to radiation. For the same reason, he looks like a decrepit old man and there is not one healthy child in his family... Like all Muslyumovites, he receives the lowest pension, not for work-related illness, but simply for illness. Even though his sickness is radiation!

Kamalov shows me the long list of his wards who have especially serious diseases.

Gennadiy Abdrakhmanovich Gabitov, chairman of the Kunashakskiy Rayon Soviet, also speaks of the burdens placed on the population. He is a leader, not just formally, not just in the duty of service.

Gabitov is an intelligent professional. An agricultural education is behind him, as well as the Academy of Social Sciences. He knows the strength of his own authority, understands the tragic needs of the people who elected him their leader, and knows how to build a hierarchy of goals. The main goal now is to feed the rayon and improve its health. Medicine is the first channel through which the funds allocated by the government for Chelyabinsk Oblast will arrive.

His position: High professionalism is necessary in every job. Hence his interest in the conclusions of expert commissions. With a great delay (dozens of years!), scientists have now carefully studied the region. Their opinions will be submitted for the discussion of a USSR Gosplan state expert commission. Science and only science (independent!) should decide how to improve the region's health. It should be a set of decisions, such that

(on this point, of course, nobody will dislodge him) the population will get the benefits, and not lose them.

No, he is not satisfied with the decision signed by the country's prime minister on privileges for the residents of the 30-kilometer zone around the AES. There will not be one serious social project in this narrow strip: Everything will be built further away, where the real residents and their lands are.

The barbed wall between Mayak and the population collapses here. For the current leadership of the combine, the narrow 30-kilometer privileged strip also does not exist. There is a large afflicted region (already well familiar to Mayak) which must be cared for and considered. Such as the city of Chelyabinsk-65. Such as the combine.

However, both sides, realizing that the most serious deficit right now is the budget, are calculating that, by justice, a share of the country's resources will be allocated to them, and that the share of the funds, earned by the people who created the "nuclear shield of the state" and the people who suffered from it, will be determined. Determined by the same law, as in the Chernobyl calamity.

I would like very much to believe this. Nonetheless, is it possible to completely place all problems on the center? On the old system of financing? Is there no possibility for structuring relations between the closed city and the afflicted region on the new "expenses and profits" system? It is worth thinking about this.

The objectively sad experience of subjectively self-sacrificing Mayak ought to teach us something.

**Ozernyy Nuclear Facility Impact on Public Health**  
*91WN0333B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA*  
*in Russian 27 Feb 91 p 4*

[Article by V. Sanatin: "Uran-gate"]

[Text] We will never, perhaps, discover what price we have paid for the first atomic bomb, the first nuclear submarine, the first nuclear reactors...

Apparently, the personnel of the first domestic industries for concentrating thorium, uranium and other radioactive materials were frightened by the super-urgent orders, defenseless, unconcerned and doomed. Evidence of this is the obscure village of Ozernyy in Rezhevskiy Rayon, Sverdlovsk Oblast. There is a disaster in every third home here. Approaching a Russian stove with a dosimeter, it reads 1000 microroentgen per hour. In the kitchen garden, it reads 3000 microroentgen: Does it not bother the living to lie in the grave already!

We brought along Ravil Khuzin, chief doctor of the Rezhevskiy Rayon SES [Health and Epidemiological Service], and Igor Ivanov, labor hygiene specialist, as fellow travelers. We armed ourselves with the reliable SRP 68-01 radiation instrument, and off we went!

Ozernyy is picturesque, like any settlement lost in the spurs of the Ural ridges among pines, larches and birches. The homes here are basically fine, with carved shutters, window casings and verandas. The owners are talented and skillful. The homes face a planed board with blue and light green paint: "For the Joy of Life!" The people of Ozernyy do not deserve the wrath of God. Nor does there seem to be reason at all for the state to be angry with them. Look, everything is perfectly normal: a "Lastochka" nursery school, an agricultural club with the slogans "Glory to the CPSU!" and "Peace to the World!"

However... Right now the people of Ozernyy, despite all cravings for peace, are under semimartial law. Before martial law, there are not enough chemical defense suits, gas masks, civil defense vehicles or helicopters with decontamination equipment. If such a "spot" were discovered near Kiev or Minsk, which have learned from bitter experience, one would not manage without red shoulder-boards. But here there are peaceful muzhiks and grandmothers in sweaters. It is quiet.

According to local residents, the "industrial zone left" Ozernyy in 1964. Before 1978, all data on the zone, including health and epidemiological data, was filed under the "Secret" seal. Ozernyy was founded in 1949, with the discovery and initial development of a thorium deposit. If we believe the health service, the ore was not just mined here. The concentrators worked here too. Otherwise, imported ores would not have appeared in Ozernyy...

The people of Ozernyy were deceived for more than 40 years. Is this why, of 1370 residents, only 250 decided to abandon the settlement? It no longer matters to the others where they live out their days. The shock of the unexpected discovery crushed the will and spirit of the people. Faces everywhere are confused and long, realizing the whole absurdity of life spent and continuing.

We visited the Galimzyanov home. Radif, the husband, feels sorry for Murka, who bears dead kittens from year to year. The cat perched itself near the stove and gazed with curiosity at the clicking dosimeter.

The daughter, Tanya, is at the children's home, an invalid from birth. I guessed the diagnosis immediately: organic lesion of the central nervous system. Our hosts, with some sort of secret thought, asked: Have doctors unexpectedly appeared? With lightning speed I had to deny it: "No, no!" Let the nuclear physicists and the boys from "Sredmash" and the Ministry of Defense dissemble to the residents of Ozernyy. If one has enough conscience, let the psychoneurologists, constantly pretending to be geneticists, play the hypocrites. Radif, like all the fathers in Ozernyy, deserves sympathy. Yet one need not lie.

I myself grew up in the zone of the Kyshtym nuclear trail. I well recall how they evacuated us. Evacuate, if you please! In 1957-1958... I have a daughter, also an invalid

since birth. Among those from the Urals, born in Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk oblasts, there are so many hostages of our nuclear sabbath, that in our sorrow we will soon be colliding face to face with each other. If only we knew who, after the hell of Hiroshima, pointed his finger at a state map, incessantly falling on the Urals range, on the border of Europe and Asia, on the watershed, on the banks of the beautiful streams and lakes that give their water to the Tobol, the Irtysh, the Ob...

Who he was is a secret. Who were we? Ashes! The "roses" of the sabbath and of dictatorship blossom only on human ashes. "Roses," protected by terrible thorns...

Now we are patient. A branch of the Sverdlovsk Radio Factory operates in Ozernyy. At its entrance, the instruments show radiation of 200 microroentgen per hour. At the workplaces of the factory employees, they read 360 microroentgen. The walls of the plastics shop register 550, and the factory fence—2500! The owner of letterbox No 5, on abandoning the Ozernyy deposit, transferred its shops to the civil factory without leaving a single printed word on the subject of radionuclides. Although director V. Demin suspects that his direct leadership in the oblast knew where it was inviting the workers, there are no official and criminal traces of this unsurpassably base transaction.

The people of Ozernyy have not done too badly in the zone. They have cars, televisions, refrigerators and smoked sausages. Comparing today's life to yesterday's, the people even feel obligated to the nuclear monster. Heaven help you if you mention legal suits: No one will understand.

Viktor Gorokhov, chief engineer at the factory, shows us a map of the radioactive contaminations. The map shows more than 70 open, radiating wounds. The most dangerous are the three "burial grounds." I asked what they, the people of Ozernyy, meant by the concept of "burial grounds?" They answered: "Well, the places where industrial wastes were unloaded..." "Then these are radioactive dumps, not burial grounds," I elaborated. "Possibly, in the forest clearings and ravines, where there is a tremendous background, they burned the packaging from around the products," thinks Igor Ivanov. However, I do not understand him, an SES employee. What packaging? Thorium and uranium products are not transported in wooden boxes. Or were they? Usually such loads are delivered in special lead containers...

How were the "burial grounds" formed in the settlement, from what kinds of materials? Who conveyed this invisible, deadly poison here? Do any witnesses to this terrible "work" remain alive? Has the prosecutor's office started a civil investigation? This is what interested me most of all in Ozernyy. The people I talked to were submissively and sadly silent.

There was no investigation at all. Last December, an oblispolkom decision was made, regulating the procedure for work to decontaminate the settlement. Eight

million rubles were allocated for decontamination and construction beyond the limits of the danger zone. However, this is Soviet money, the people's money. I myself suffered, I myself pay. The authorities of Ozernyy, Rezh and Sverdlovsk have decided not to institute a legal suit against the nuclear industry.

Yet there is cause! Igor Ivanov has already issued the necessary certificates for the first patient suffering from radiation sickness. He turned out to be from Sverdlovsk, an assistant excavator machinist who did unsealing work at an Ozernyy quarry. I am sure that people, familiar with the Ozernyy "letter-box," but who did not know what was ending their "fine life," will respond.

I know why the authorities have no cause for particular alarm. Civil medicine in the Urals, regardless of constant and bitter experience with radioactive contamination, is incapable of answering the sufferers' main questions. The first is: "Will I be able to have children?" The second is: "What diseases will trouble me in my remaining years: endocrine, cardiovascular, or oncologic?" After Chernobyl, specialists from the Ukraine would probably be able to help answer these questions for the people of Ozernyy. So, let "Sredmash" invite medical luminaries to Ozernyy at its own expense! It should pay for the per diem allowances, diagnostics and medicines. Let the people at "Sredmash" remember: The children of Ozernyy climb all over terrible "burial grounds" right and left. In the summer, they swallow poisoned dust and scatter it throughout the entire settlement. In the winter... I saw for myself: Against a background of 3,000 microroentgen, everything was trampled by children's skis. It is fun to ski down the hillocks!

The question of moving out was decided in Ozernyy with the same servile mentality, accustomed to any woe. The local authorities surveyed the population in order to find out how many families would be leaving and how many apartments must be built for refugees at neighboring sovkhoses and at the rayon center. The rest are "voluntarily staying." New housing is being built for them here, in the settlement.

Oh, this is an obstinate state approach! They are, at their utmost, finishing the construction in Ozernyy, 50 meters from a "burial ground," of a new shop and warehouse buildings and, behind this, housing for the branch's workers...

What is there to rejoice at in Ozernyy? The sacred Ural kindness and reliability with regard to their fellow countrymen. The chairman of the settlement soviet, Grigori Govorukhin, got a dosimeter somewhere and now can recall the figures for the radiation background in every home by heart. He knows, without big committees, who should be examined, who to treat, who to help by evacuating. Oh, how it grieves the chairman when he looks at the home of Neafid Klevakin, with its painted cocks and a weathervane on a skate in the form of Gogol's mother Russia, rushing heaven knows where. So pretty! The years will calm Neafid... But how can he help

young Sergey Zamyatin, who built his very first home right by the entrance to a "burial ground?"

The provincial submissiveness to fate in Ozernyy is no cause for rejoicing. A clot of this submissiveness lies in the extinguished hopes of old men for a better life for their sons, or in the doleful eyes of Viktor Gorokhin's mother. For a long time, the chief engineer of the branch had decided not to invite us to her door. Yet we dropped in on Mariya Ivanovna: one dosimeter argued with the other. One read 241 microroentgen, the other read 1,100! We sighed.

We sighed again, when we visited the Ozernyy boarding school for sick children, 28 of whom are completely orphaned. Who put 130 boys and girls here, already cheated by nature, and for what sins before the state?

We must leave! We leave, and once again we drift past the eyes of the "Lastochka" nursery school and the agricultural club with the slogans "Glory to the CPSU!" and "Peace to the World!" The doomed do not remember evil.

#### **Baku To Host Interregional Caspian Sea Conference**

*91WN0335A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY  
in Russian 6 Mar 91 p 3*

[Azerinform article: "Save the Caspian!"]

[Text] The First Interregional Congress on Problems of the Caspian Sea is being held in Baku this June. The Republic of Azerbaijan State Committee on the Preservation of Nature [Goskompriroda] held a briefing in connection with this. Leaders of the republic Goskompriroda and leading scientists of the Academy of Sciences and VUZs [higher educational institutions] of Azerbaijan answered the questions of representatives of the press, science, various ministries and departments, and industrial enterprises and organizations.

Those attending were informed that representatives of all the Caspian regions in the country—Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenia, and even Iran and Turkey—will participate in the congress. The basic goal of the congress is to unite efforts to solve the ecological problems of the Caspian and to draw the attention of Union and world society to them.

Participants in the briefing noted with alarm that the ecological situation in the Caspian is worsening with every day and that the steps being taken are insufficient even to stabilize it. The basic causes of the situation that has formed are an unthinking, rapacious attitude toward the Caspian, the low technical standard of marine oil extraction, the lack of modern cleansing installations, ill-considered hydro-construction and town planning along the Caspian shore, and pollution of the Volga and Kura, which empty into the sea. Serious damage has been done to spawning plantations, the biomass has

decreased, certain species of Caspian flora have vanished, and the sea's entire gene pool is on the verge of extinction. All this is aggravated by the nearly complete powerlessness of nature-preservation agencies and the inadequate financing of ecological measures.

The problem has gone so far that the regions of the Caspian cannot improve separately. The common efforts of all countries along the Caspian shore are required. If radical steps are not taken today, noted the briefing participants, a global ecological catastrophe is inevitable.

The First Interregional Congress is faced with drafting a program of joint actions to protect the Caspian.

### **Republic Goskompriroda Head on Azerbaijani Ecology Issues**

*91WN0335B Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY  
in Russian 27 Feb 91 p 2*

[Interview by Kh. Imanov with Arif Enverovich Mansurov, chairman, Republic of Azerbaijan Goskompriroda: "If We Want To Survive..."]

[Text] Ecological tension in the republic continues to grow. What are the ways out of today's difficult situation? What is the main state department called on to guard nature doing under these circumstances? What awaits us in the near and more distant future?

Our correspondent, Kh. Imanov, discusses this with A.E. Mansurov, chairman of the Republic of Azerbaijan State Committee on the Preservation of Nature [Goskompriroda]:

[Imanov] Arif Enverovich, for a long time matters of the ecology were under the reliable "lock" of closed censorship. Now, on the waves of glasnost, incredible figures and facts, drawing a terrible picture of devastated nature, are suddenly raining down on us. Is this "devil" really so terrible? Are our fears over-exaggerated?

[Mansurov] The situation is really serious. Many scientists believe that if mankind does not take effective steps in the next 40 years, we will not survive the catastrophe. An extremely difficult situation has also formed in our republic, where such violence was committed on the natural environment of Azerbaijan in the last 70 years, behind bravura speeches and triumphant reports, that it is now impossible to correct the situation through the efforts of Goskompriroda alone. It is not at all surprising that only ruins have been left for us: a land polluted with petroleum and fuel oil, a graveyard of oil derricks, the dead Bay of Baku, the lifeless waters of Sumgait, the numerous dumps...

[Imanov] Indeed, it is a dismal picture. What is the status of our water resources?

[Mansurov] Lamentable though it may be, the situation here is even more troubled. The Apsheron coast is threatened with becoming a dead zone. More than 11 billion cubic meters of polluted sewage, including the

waters of the Volga (10.2) and the Kura (0.7), are released into the Caspian annually. Sixty percent of these flows come from enterprises in the petrochemical industry.

The petroleum products that enter the sea during industrial work related to marine prospecting and the extraction of oil and gas have a toxic effect on spawn, larvae, and young fish, the spawning-grounds are disappearing, and the food base is being destroyed. From 1983-1989 alone, the number of sturgeon decreased by 7 million in the North Caspian alone, and slightly more along our coast. In this regard, accumulations of chloro-organic pesticides, including DDT, have been found in the muscle tissues of sturgeon. Here is the outcome: whereas in 1913 more than 80 tons of the most valuable species of fish were harvested in the Caspian, in the 1980s the catch was smaller by a factor of several tens.

The polluted rivers which flow here from beyond the republic's borders are creating yet another complex problem for us. The Kura is basically polluted in Tbilisi and Rustavi, while the Kura tributaries, the Araks and its tributaries are polluted within the territory of Armenia, and many times above the permissible norms. The center and the Union ministries, as everyone knows, are taking a neutral stance on this issue.

[Imanov] But meanwhile the pollution continues...

[Mansurov] And with increasing intensity. This is especially graphically obvious with regard to the Okhchuchay River. For 15-20 years already, neither the Union government, the USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, the USSR Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy, nor the USSR Goskompriroda have wanted to take any steps whatsoever here. The government of Armenia puts all the blame on the Kafan and Kadzharan copper-molybdenum combines, which are subordinate to the Union Mintsvetmet...

[Imanov] How do things stand in this case?

[Mansurov] Using existing methods, we are currently calculating the damage done to the interrepublic rivers, in the first place the Okhchuchay, with future recourse to Gosarbitrazh. We are also thinking of similar steps with regard to Union enterprises within the territory of our republic.

[Imanov] Everyone knows that the center has also taken an unobjective stance, to put it mildly, with regard to our large industrial cities. Baku and Sumgait were not included on the so-called "black list" of cities with the worst ecological indicators. What do you have to say about this?

[Mansurov] We voiced a decisive protest to the Union bodies, having substantiated the worthlessness of the instructions existing on this account. Judge for yourself. Whereas 286,000 tons of harmful substances all in all were released in 1988 into the aquatic environment of

Alma-Ata, Dushanbe, Yerevan, Bishkek (Frunze), Tashkent and Tbilisi, which are included on this list, in Baku alone in 1989-1990 such wastes comprised 667,000 tons, i.e., more by a factor of 2.5. And these substances are far more toxic. Are further arguments necessary? I just signed a protest letter on this subject to Yu.A. Izrael, chairman of the USSR Gosgidromet.

[Imanov] Arif Enverovich, even a fleeting glance at the ecological situation does not inspire optimism. Do you see any way out of this situation?

[Mansurov] In general, I believe that there are no hopeless situations. The main thing is to choose the right course and adhere to it strictly. The first task is to draft a new law on the preservation of nature, a norm for the use of nature. We must raise the level of ecological expert analysis. In this regard, the committee should be granted extraordinary authorities, which should be reflected in the law. The usual bans and administrative punishments, as well as the passing of innumerable resolutions and instructions or the preparation of programs and expectation of their fulfillment, should all be left in the past. Today the answer lies in converting to payments, collections and taxes for the use of nature. Enterprises which use natural resources would have to invest funds in nature-preservation measures in order to remain profitable.

As of this year in the republic, simultaneously with the primary solution of ecological problems via economic methods, we also foresee the inclusion of payments for natural resources (land, minerals, water, forests, etc.). Note, for instance, that the fine for polluting above the norm will be deducted from an enterprise's profits.

[Imanov] In other words, the payment will not be somewhat mythical, as it was in the past. The fines will hit the pockets of all members of the collective?

[Mansurov] Yes, and this is the essence of the new penalties. The new mechanism being created for applying economic methods will be fully reflected in the law. On the initiative of the President of the republic, it is already being drafted. I think that once it enters into effect we will finally shift the solution of problems of preserving the surrounding environment from a standstill.

[Imanov] You spoke of introducing new payments this year for the use of nature. Does the State Committee have the material and technical capabilities to accurately determine the extents of damage?

[Mansurov] You have touched on our weak spot. Our capabilities, even after the 1988-1989 reforms of the entire Goskompriroda system, leave much to be desired. Figuratively speaking, our activity is strongly reminiscent of sending an unarmed soldier to the front. Before our very eyes, enterprises are releasing a tremendous quantity of harmful substances into the surrounding environment, but because of the lack of instruments and lab equipment we cannot do anything. The poachers,

having free scope, are using weapons, while we are trying to stop them afoot and unarmed. The matter has reached to the point that the poachers, having fired on our helicopter, have seriously damaged it, and now we are making up for the damage. Yet the damage inflicted on nature remains irretrievable.

[Imanov] However, in order to struggle effectively for the purity of nature, you probably need not only material resources, but also fairly extensive knowledge?

[Mansurov] One of the prominent foreign scientists in the field of ecology, N.F. Reymer, once remarked that ecology is an ordinary field of the natural sciences, but in order to work in it as a professional one must understand at least 300 (!) branches of various sciences. Unfortunately, today we almost always encounter ecological illiteracy. Incompetent statements in the mass information media, often even by people with scientific degrees, harm the general task. For instance, according to inventory data the overall area of land removed from circulation in Apsheron comprises 10,000 hectares, and the entire area occupied by the "Azneft" administrations amounts to 15,300 hectares. Yet, suddenly you read in the newspaper that 100,000 hectares have been put out of service. And a scientist is writing this. Or the quantity of waste from the Azerbaijan Pipe-Rolling Plant unexpectedly turns out to be a whole order of magnitude higher. I could cite many such examples. For raising ecological literacy and eliminating the shortage of ecological information, the State Committee is currently creating its own information system based on computer technology. A data bank has already been created, and ecology panels are being constructed in Baku and Sumgait. In a while, anyone who wishes will be able to obtain information, using them, about the ecological situation in the cities and rayons of the republic, about violations of the law committed by nature-users, and other data. Glasnost will help not only to raise the literacy of the population, but also more effectively to struggle against violators.

Let me also note that the State Committee is not the only one working on ecological problems. Public organizations such as the Republic Society for the Preservation of Nature and the Ecological Union are also involved in nature preservation, and the "Greens" Movement is also developing. This can only be welcomed. Today we should, as they say, all stand up together to defend the nature of our native land, its soils, minerals, waters, air, and animal and plant life.

[Imanov] One last question: What can you say about the specially preserved natural territories of the republic?

[Mansurov] Above all, I would like to note that the designation of such territories, besides maintaining ecological balance, preserving the genetic diversity of plant and animal life, obtaining scientific data about the course of natural processes in nature, and other things, is also useful for ecological education and upbringing.

In Azerbaijan there are 14 preserves, yet there is not one national park. In past decades, for various reasons more than 100,000 hectares were removed for the needs of industry and agriculture from the 219,500 hectare overall area of the preserves. And this is at a time when the whole world is trying not only to preserve its natural wealth, but also to augment it. Georgia, for example, pays great attention to the Lagodekhi Preserve, created back in 1912, and they are trying to increase its area. Yet we have reduced the area of such a pearl, as the Kyzyl-Agachskiy Preserve, from its creation in 1929 to our day, from 180,000 hectares to 88.3 (!), and today we are participants in its collapse and destruction. All this is

only because it is subordinate to the center and, essentially, is neglected. With the cooperation of the republic, we have now sharply raised the question of Azerbaijan's national ownership of the Kyzyl-Agachskiy Preserve. Today, the question of creating national parks is also being worked out, above all the Shakhdagskiy Park in the Kuba-Ismaillinskiy zone, the Talyshskiy in the Lenkoran-Astarinskiy zone, and the Geygelskiy on the base of an existing park in the Khanlar-Dashkesanskiy zone.

If we want to remain alive, there is one path to survival: the preservation and augmentation of that which God gave us...

### Supreme Soviet Committee on State Program To Combat AIDS

91US0483A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 25 Apr 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by S. Karkhanin: "The Puzzle about the Virus—Deputy-Medical Men Consider State Program to Combat AIDS"]

[Text] According to the data of sociologists, schoolboys are now informed in detail about AIDS, students not as well, and people engaged in production generally prefer to know less about the "plague of the 20th Century." But can this be viewed with complacency, even though in the USSR only 619 men, women, and children are infected with this sinister virus and the number of patients is less than six dozen? Deputies on the committee of the country's Supreme Soviet for the protection of the health of the people are convinced it cannot be. The shortage of medical instruments and disinfecting materials and an intensive tourist exchange can lead to the fact that in the near term the insidious illness could sharply expand the attack front. Up to one and a half million infected in the Soviet Union by the year 2000—this is the prognosis of specialists.

The USSR Cabinet of Ministers will soon adopt a state program to fight this dreadful disease, and a governmental commission is already operating. But as was noted at a meeting of a deputy committee, grave reasons for alarm remain.

A typical figure: If the onslaught of the virus is not stopped, expenditures on assistance to those who become ill will make it necessary to double the health service budget, and, what is more, in the very near future. And these are not conjectures, but precise calculations that affirm that misers pay twice. It is not surprising that the other day, when the progress of the fight against AIDS was being discussed in the USSR Ministry of Health, the ministries of all the republics, except Georgia, gathered for the discussion: In the face of a mortal threat, there must be no thought of discord and mutual resentments. But, on the other hand, the program must be financed from the Union budget, and the resources coming to it from the republics are niggardly. And the deputies emphasized correctly: The initiators of attempts to "economize" on medicinal needs will bear the moral responsibility for a possible epidemic surge.

V. Bykov, former head of the former Ministry of the Medical Industry pointed out another aspect of the problem. It was decided to eliminate his ministry; however, no one, it seems, gave thought to the fate of the industry. The question of a rightful successor—a pharmaceutical industry corporation—was in the air, but at the same time local authorities are hurrying to "privatize" plants that remain without a boss. The Mosmedaparat association, which produces a unique product, in the words of Valeriy Alekseyevich, was almost completely bought up by former cooperators. As a result, instead of elaborate and inexpensive medicines and

instruments that are needed in hospitals and polyclinics, simple but expensive ones are being produced.

"Under conditions of the impending market, state property is being taken away bit by bit by private sources," the former minister noted. "We are arguing here about the amount of disposable syringes, and we are silent about the fact that there will be nothing to pour into them. Analgin has disappeared in tablets, and now its production in ampules has been curtailed... Our best specialists are being pushed out into businesses."

However, they have another path—abroad. Academician Ye. Sverdlov, director of the Institute of Molecular Genetics, talked painfully to deputies about young talented scientists who are now working abroad. Basic science has long been on the periphery of state interests, and as a result hundreds of promising researchers have left the Motherland, including those engaged in AIDS problems. But strange things also happen with the results of the work of those who remained. Not everyone knows that the azidotthymidine with which the illness is treated was created by Soviet biologist A. Krayevskiy, and, what is more, the preparation is being produced abroad. The very same scientist has developed improved versions of the medicine—there is no one to arrange output...

Until recently, it was usual to think that people who avoided the "risk group" were almost not threatened by the danger of getting sick. However, 21 infants were among those who have died from AIDS in the USSR. And other facts indicate: Drug addicts, homosexuals, and prostitutes are not the only victims of the insidious virus. That is why a system has been set up in the USSR for early preventive treatment that is more effective than the American system, where essentially the sick are treated. Thirty-three million analyses have been made, and the blood specimens of 90 million persons have been studied. One hundred and ten centers have been opened that are oriented toward the fight against AIDS—in general, a strong counterattack against the virus is being started. A new electrolysis method, which was developed by Soviet specialists, may become a part of it, and that will make it possible to sterilize medical instruments reliably.

All of this is important, aside from everything else, because, in the words of the deputy-doctors, now there is even a shortage of bleaching powder, and spectrophotometers for analysis, manufactured in Yoshkar-Ola, are no good at all.

"It is proposed to use sodium carbonate instead of bleaching powder," said L. Zhigunova, a doctor from Nalchik. "But there is not enough of it even for workers in the food industry. We have five times less syringes than we need. Incidentally, why did no one think about how to deal with the use of disposable syringes? Is it possible that they are suitable as raw material for new ones?"

O. Shishkin, USSR minister of general machine building, emphasized: It makes sense to think about this. And the general racket that was raised in the press about

disposable syringes is hardly justified. Practical workers are convinced: It is entirely possible to use disposable syringes, after carefully disinfecting them, of course.

When there is a shortage of instruments and medicines, the patient at times has to hope for a miracle... And self-styled "healers" could not wait: They are undertaking the treatment of any sickness, including AIDS. Can one believe such methods? The specialists should have given the answer. And they gave it: The methods of all eight of the psychics who were checked out in the USSR Ministry of Health were acknowledged to be, to put it mildly, unsound. One Kuzin, who is well-known in medical circles, who recommended a "medicinal compote" to diabetic patients, in the words of Minister of Health I. Denisov, admitted to charlatanism and to becoming a medical quack for the sake of profit.

Briefly, the fashion in herbal drink bars that are now open at all intersections also is not harmless, because nobody knows how the decoctions and potions are prepared. The degree of ignorance is directly proportional to the degree of risk—that is why the propaganda on the preventive treatment of AIDS also must be strictly scientific. In this connection V. Pokrovskiy, an academician and a deputy, mentioned the need for international contacts that are necessary to specialists. But how are such contacts maintained when the Moscow Soviet pushed up prices for hotel rooms for foreigners up to 1,000 rubles per day? Such expenses cannot be afforded either by foreign doctors or by participating Soviet organizations. It appears that in the near future the exchange of ideas will be possible only through the press and the mail... It is a vexing and sad prospect, because, as the academician said, profound scientific studies on AIDS are appearing that should be developed.

The virus, which is fatally dangerous to people, has presented scientists with numerous puzzles. One of them is a unique variability, or in other words, mutability. And, in the opinion of leading specialists, it cannot be excluded that diagnostic methods that have been found will be powerless after a certain time: The treacherous virus will again change its symptoms. This is the first time that such a complex problem has come before medical men. To underestimate it, means to put the health of millions of people on the edge of a catastrophe.

### Anti-AIDS Program Expected Soon

LD2504130591 Moscow TASS in English 1029 GMT  
25 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow, April 25 (TASS)—An anti-AIDS state programme is expected to be adopted soon by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, the "SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA" daily reports today.

There are 619 HIV-positive and less than 60 full-blown AIDS patients in the Soviet Union today, but their number is expected to grow because of lack of medical

equipment and preparations and due to "extensive tourism." Experts say the Soviet Union will have 1.5 million HIV-positive people by the year 2000.

Allocations for the anti-AIDS fight will have to be doubled in the near future if the spread of the virus is not stopped. All republican health ministers, except the Georgian one, took part in the discussion of the anti-aids programme in the Soviet health ministry. The programme is to be financed from the union budget, which is not getting much from the republics.

Until recently it has "been generally thought in the Soviet Union that there is no AIDS threat for people outside the "risk group", the daily writes. But there are 21 children among those killed by the disease in the USSR, and there are other facts proving that not only drug addicts, homosexuals and prostitutes face the threat.

Today the Soviet Union has a system of early preventive measures. 33 million analyses have been carried out, 90 million people underwent AIDS blood tests. With the opening of 110 anti-AIDS centres a massive attack on the virus begins. A new method of electrodiagnosis, designed by Soviet specialists, will provide quick and safe sterilisation of medical equipment, the daily stresses.

### Mental Patients' Plight Due to Soviet Psychiatry 'Liberalization'

91US0483B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 25 Apr 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by N. Lukyanova: "Victims of Demagoguery—What 'Liberalization' in the Country's Psychiatry Has Produced"]

[Text] A drama unfolded in the communal apartment: A recent patient of a psychiatric hospital tried to poison a neighbor's little girl, and the child was miraculously saved. Another case: In a schizophrenic fit, a son strangled his mother. Before this, relatives repeatedly submitted requests to doctors to hospitalize him. They were refused because the sick person himself did not want treatment. Both cases were reviewed almost simultaneously in one of Moscow's rayon courts.

"Yes, such cases are not rare now," it was confirmed in the USSR Procuracy. "Mentally ill people who are left without medical care also commit crimes. Of course, afterwards they are sent for compulsory treatment, but what has been done cannot be undone."

Why did a situation develop that is absurd from the standpoint of common sense, when sick people are frequently incapable of critically evaluating their own behavior and can ignore the requirements of psychiatrists?



"We are today undergoing a very specific period in the development of our country's psychiatry," says A. Karpov, the chief psychiatrist of the USSR Ministry of Health. "As you know, some time ago in our country, aggressively roused by our press and the foreign press, a stormy campaign was started under the slogan: 'Down with repressive psychiatry!' It was asserted: So, that is the way psychiatrists, at the KGB's bidding, make short work of dissent. Well, very likely there were such cases. But they entailed a very small circle of patients."

The new statute on the conditions and procedure for providing psychiatric help in the USSR, which was adopted in January 1988, undoubtedly helped restore justice. However, this statute, as often happens in our country, began to be interpreted so literally in many clinics and dispensaries that many people who were really suffering with mental illnesses ended up without the necessary psychiatric observation. Judging from official statistics, there are almost four million individuals like this in our country. They began to be removed from dispensary registers and discharged from psychiatric hospitals on a massive scale. As a result, more than one million patients (!) were left without regular medical assistance in a short period.

"Of course," continues A. Karpov, "much in our work needed to be reorganized. However, the changes needed to be well-thought out and well-prepared, taking into account the rights both of patients and psychiatrists, and of society as a whole. But it turned out differently... It was particularly annoying that patients began to dispute us, the doctors, who for many years had excellent relations, helping them with medicines, housing, job placement... Now they have been 'enlightened': It seems that villainous psychiatrists hurt and offended them in every possible way. Add to this the increased susceptibility and vulnerability of the mentality of our patients... And like from a horn of plenty there poured forth subpoenas on complaints of 'illegal' hospitalization. We are being accused of everything! But, after all, trust in the doctor is also a curative factor..."

"Indeed, it is extremely difficult to work now," asserts G. Smirnov, deputy to the chief doctor of the psychiatric hospital imeni Kashchenko. "Patients have become much more aggressive, they do not listen to medical personnel, and they refuse treatment. It is absurd: A patient is committed to a psychiatric hospital on the basis of medical symptoms, but he is free to decide for himself whether to be treated or not. It is now authorized to use compulsion only in the most extreme cases, when, for example, a patient attacks a doctor with a knife or attempts to commit suicide. But, then, many of our patients do not realize what they are doing, and that is where their social danger lies. They frequently come to us now already in a stage when the illness has gone too far—until recently they were treated as outpatients—and they ask to be treated in a hospital. To a person who does not adequately evaluate his condition it always seems that he does not need a hospital. In the new situation, a roundabout formulation is found, according

to which insane persons may be but are not obliged to be treated. As a result, there are situations of increased risk in a family, on the street, in public transportation. And there is a tragic end, by no means a rarity. Briefly, this statute in fact deprived society of the right to self-defense."

"Of course, it also should be kept in mind," says V. Kotov, director of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute department of general and forensic psychology imeni Serbskiy, who joins the conversation, "that it is not always easy to draw a line between a mental patient and a person who is in a condition of temporary nervousness. Psychiatry is one of the most subtle spheres of medicine. It contains a person's mass of shades of conditions and moods. After all, how was it often before? A person came into a psychiatric dispensary with the usual nervous overwork, requiring one-time treatment or simply conversation, and consultation, and right there he was put on the register, and they began to monitor his behavior and visit him at home. I will not argue that such care is necessary for some. But for some it simply does not facilitate leading a normal life. The conclusion: Medical psychiatrists should work only with serious mental illnesses, but minor disorders are the concern of special socio-psychological services."

Nonetheless, and V. Kotov also agrees, it does not make sense when both the aggressive paranoiac and the quiet kleptomaniac have similar opportunities to decide their own fate. It is hardly likely that their lives will become happier and fuller because of this. "Humanism" in psychiatry, when carried to an absurdity, also contributes to the fact that there are more poor and unattended people—among those who beg for charity in transportation, and very often there are former patients of psychiatric hospitals in underground street crossings. Having received the formal rights to a full-fledged life, they, in fact, are unable to use them: Thus, it is difficult for people to find work, they frequently get into a conflict with those around them, and, left without care, they let themselves go to seed more and more. Yielding to demagogic appeals to fight the "repression" of psychiatry, and opening wide the doors of mental hospitals, the zealots of this struggle wittingly or unwittingly prompt patients to go along a crooked path. Under the guise of defending the civil rights of such people, they simply took away the right to health.

Is there a reason to repeat foreign mistakes? There was also a wave of fights for the rights of mental patients in the United States 30 years ago. About 300,000 homeless, unemployed, and those suffering from mental illness showed up... On the other hand, a principally new attitude toward such sick people was taking shape—calmer and more sympathetic. To this day in our country, a person who is seen at a psychiatrist's office is looked upon as a social outcast. It is no accident that hospitals for the mentally ill in our country, with rare exceptions, are very bad: crowded conditions and unsanitary. In Irkutsk Oblast, for example, up to the present time, a psychiatric hospital is housed in the former

Aleksandrovsk central political prison; that is, in a former jail. Would it not have been more humane to begin the struggle for the rights of the mentally ill with an elementary improvement of their life and daily activity in those psychiatric hospitals? In hospitals, but not in "psikhushka's," as it has become customary to call these institutions with contempt.

Now, when preparations are going on for a new normative act on psychiatric service in the USSR, it is already clear that the 1988 document, which was in fact hastily put together, suffers from numerous errors. If it is taken into account that out of each 100 of our fellow-countrymen approximately 30 are today on the border between health and mental illness, and the "stress press," which provokes such illnesses, continues to build up, then the scales of the problem will be understandable. The problem is knocking at the door with an ever increasing number of tragedies and misfortunes, and if deafness to them is humaneness, then what is cruelty?

### Maternity Death Rate on Rise in Armenian Republic

91US0473A Yerevan EPOKHA in Russian No 3, 17 Jan 91 p 10

[Interview with G.A. Beglaryan, chief obstetric gynecologist of the Armenian Ministry of Health, by A. Margaryan under the rubric: "Health of the Nation: Maternity Death Rate Is on the Rise"]

#### [Text] Maternity death rate index:

Year	per 1,000 births
1985	0.22
1986	0.26
1987	0.24
1988	0.24
1989	0.38

#### These are the statistics.

We went for explanations to G.A. Beglaryan, chief obstetric gynecologist of the Armenian Ministry of Health.

[Beglaryan] All told, we have 3,222 obstetric beds in the republic, including 689 beds for abnormal pregnancies. The lowest numbers of beds are in Masisskiy, Aniyskiy, and Artikskiy Rayons. The total number of obstetric gynecologists in the republic is 754. Vardenisskiy, Sisianskiy, and Razdanskiy Rayons and the medical unit of the city of Charentsavana have fewer specialists.

In 1989, 36 pregnant women died in the republic's obstetric facilities. Of this number 28 women had pregnancies of 28 weeks or more, which converts to 0.38 deaths per thousand births.

Of the 28 deaths, 13 took place in the obstetric facilities of the city of Yerevan, which transforms to a maternity death rate of 68.5.

The preliminary analysis indicates serious drawbacks in the record keeping for maternity deaths as well as violations of the order: "On Further Improvement of Medical Birth and Death Records" issued by the Armenian Ministry of Health.

[Margaryan] What are the main causes of death in pregnant women?

[Beglaryan] The top cause of death in these women is hemorrhage and the second place belongs to late toxemia. According to our analysis, in most cases excessive hemorrhaging develops against a background of prolonged toxemia. The appearance of late toxemia at an early stage did not alert the doctors. Such women were not put into the abnormal pregnancy "high risk" group in prenatal care clinics; they were not hospitalized when it was necessary; they were not given comprehensive out-patient treatment, adequate to the severity of their condition.

The second place is taken by deaths caused by late toxemia (in Martuni, Artik, Nairi, Ararat MSG [expansion unknown], Masis).

Prenatal care clinics do not pay proper attention to the prevention and early detection of the abnormalities mentioned above. Of the 28 deceased pregnant women seven were registered too late, one was not registered at all, and three women visited the clinic only one to three times. Prolonged, inefficient treatment was provided at in-patient clinics; the examination of the women was inadequate, the fetus was not delivered at the proper time or in a sensible manner.

A special concern is caused by the low qualifications of doctors who supervise deliveries or advise pregnant women in maternity and prenatal care clinics.

[Margaryan] What is the effect of abortions on maternity death rates?

[Beglaryan] Reduction of the number of abortions and prevention of unplanned pregnancies are problems that remain crucial in the republic. Abortions often cause sterility, premature labor, and other complications in pregnancy and delivery; they result in high maternity death rates.

But if a woman under 19 or over 35-40 years of age uses contraception and also observes an interval between births of not less than two to 2.5 years, then the maternity death rate may decrease three times.

The death rate among pregnant women is also affected by their unsatisfactory working conditions; sanitary recommendations for the rational employment of pregnant women are still insufficiently observed. The blame for all this belongs both with enterprise administrators and with idle and passive medical staff and trade unions.

We have a rather high number of obstetric gynecologists (754) but in spite of that there is a big gap in the number of highly qualified personnel practicing in our cities and villages. For instance, there are eight to 10 obstetric gynecologists working in the republic rayons who have modern medical equipment.

Another thing affecting the maternity death rate is the fact that graduates of our medical institutes are not ready for independent work.

[Margaryan] These are distressing facts, of course. But everything you have talked about should be added to the sharp drop in the quality of life. Shortages of food render an adverse effect on the well-being of the pregnant woman and of the fetus...

[Beglaryan] Yes, this is a crucial problem. I consider it necessary to open special stores for pregnant women and breast-feeding mothers. We do have special stores for the disabled and for the war veterans, but who is going to think about the future mother? If we open such stores, we will be able to provide everything needed by pregnant women and we will also help to remove the stress situations that are so familiar to us and so detrimental to the health of the mother and of the child to come.

#### Abortion Problems in Latvia Viewed

91UN1307A Riga LATVIJAS JAUNATNE in Latvian  
11 Mar 91 p 2

[Interview with an unnamed gynecologist by Inese Kalviete: "Viewpoint"]

[Text] "I can't stand my husband! I don't want him ever again, never..." a young woman sobbed in despair following her first abortion. At home, her husband and seven-month old baby were waiting for her, but at that moment they were for her the most indifferent people in the world.

"Yes, the first abortion is a great moral trauma," confirms a gynecologist at a country hospital.

[Gynecologist] I remember the first years of my marriage, too. We did not know how to live and avoid pregnancy. So, we had an abortion. First one, then another. In those days they didn't even have anesthetics yet.

Now, of course, we have learned to do abortions in the early stages. I believe that soon we will adopt the Lithuanian method, which terminates pregnancy already in the first three or four days.

[Kalviete] But isn't it true that our women approach abortion sort of like brushing your teeth in the morning and evening?

[Gynecologist] That may be too strong a comparison, though I do know women who do not consider abortion to be a great misfortune. If a woman is well acquainted with her cycle, it is easier to avoid conception.

[Kalviete] I presume that for a lot of women, that is not as obvious as it is for you. More precisely, please.

[Gynecologist] Today there are a lot of hormonal preparations, included imported ones, which when used regularly can prevent both pregnancy and abortion.

[Kalviete] I have heard the viewpoint that hormonal tablets have a bad effect on a woman's body...

[Gynecologist] Just take a look at what foreign women are like. Almost all of them use tablets, yet they are by no means any fatter than ours. You have to know the physiological cycle...

[Kalviete] I take it we women are illiterate in this matter.

[Gynecologist] I hold the position that a woman in possession of her faculties should know her cycle. It's not that complicated—just read J. Zalitis' "In the Name of Love." Of course, being sensible about sex is more characteristic of older women. It is most easy to "mess up" during one's youth.

[Kalviete] In other words, abortion again? How many abortions can a woman endure?

[Gynecologist] During my 20 years of practice, I have come to hold a certain view: If abortion takes place under sterile conditions, and the appropriate therapy is applied following it, there should be no complications. There are some women who have had many abortions. There is a pretty woman of around 50 who visits my practice, and she has already had 54 abortions.

[Kalviete] Let's say a woman of 28 or 29 who has had several abortions is unmarried and lives an irregular lifestyle—how should she protect herself?

[Gynecologist] With an irregular sexual lifestyle, the chances of "messaging up" are greater. Up to now, a quite effective device was an IUD manufactured in Finland. Nevertheless, in the springtime, every second abortion patient had one of these "Finnish loops." People should marry—then it won't be so easy to "mess up."

[Kalviete] Are you condemning unmarried woman who have abortions?

[Gynecologist] What can I condemn? We have all grown up in an obtuse society with communistic views. We knew everything in advance—so and so many will be born, so and so many will die, so and so many abortions...

Every abortion is different, depending on the psychology of the woman. Family women are different—more stoic and calm. Recently, girls have been coming in who are pregnant for the first time. "Why are you doing this?" I ask. The usual answer: "I don't like the man. I don't want his child." Whatever the reason may be, I have to help each woman...

[Kalviete] There is the view that abortions should be made illegal.

[Gynecologist] What will that achieve in our society?—nothing. Until there is a realistic alternative, we cannot demean women even more by making them look for “back-alley doctors.” Even now we don’t know how to treat women humanely. Yes, they come for abortions, and there are reasons behind this. Why create even more stress by yelling at them, “*Kak ty lezhish, korova* [How you lay there, you cow]!” We must have sympathy. I have noticed that it is women doctors who are least tactful and who most actively defend making abortion illegal.

[Kalviete] In order to spare themselves unnecessary stress, women look for a doctor themselves that they can trust. They are willing to pay more just to protect themselves if only a little bit.

[Gynecologist] I can understand such women very well. There are many who can’t trust their district gynecologist. Moreover, in our system, a very long time goes by from when you realize you are pregnant, to when you have the abortion. First there are the tests and the warrant—three or four weeks down the drain. Yet the best time for an abortion is at five to six weeks.

[Kalviete] Let’s say the woman has been examined and the tests are normal. Then what?

[Gynecologist] The abortion—a mechanical separation of the pregnancy from the woman’s body. When the woman is already on the chair, she receives anesthetizing and tranquilizing agents. Then the cervix is dilated. We dilate it mechanically. Then we select the curette of appropriate size. Everything takes place tactilely, by touch; we can’t see anything. We locate it by palpating with the curette, then we separate it. We get it out through the cervix. Then the uterus contracts and assumes its normal position. Since disinfection takes place already before the abortion, we can’t introduce any infection. An experienced gynecologist is protected from such accidents.

[Kalviete] What is the charge for an abortion?

[Gynecologist] In theory it is free, although, of course, payments are also made. And that’s perfectly all right, for unfortunately, we think least about health. You are willing to pay 25 or 50 rubles for a bra or panties, but what about for an abortion?

### Post-Chernobyl Rise in Infant Health Problems in Latvia Noted

91UN1307B Riga LATVIJAS JAUNATNE in Latvian  
11 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by E. Kulis: “Affiliate of the Land of Imbeciles?”]

[Text] Since 1926, a home for infants where the state looks after orphans, foundlings, and the children of single mothers, has been operating in Liepaja. Beginning in 1982, out of sheer necessity, this institution was

transformed into the Liepaja Home for Infants with Psychoneurological Disorders. At present, 170 children live here, although this figure usually hovers at around 200. The fact that most of these unfortunate children are boys is also cause for reflection.

These little citizens of Latvia are divided into sixteen groups—one quarantine group, five groups of walking children, and the rest—bedridden and sedentary “residential” groups.

Accompanied by Head Nurse Astra Jansone and Nurse Gunta Krutaine, I toured the wards, children’s rooms, sleeping rooms, and spaces where the aforementioned are combined. A toddler took hold of the hem of my pants; instead of legs, he had only “angel wings”—the disfigured buds of extremities. Needless to say, he got around only with the use of his arms. Right next to us, a child with a bucket-like head was staring—hydrocephalus. In his blue eyes—the seat of his soul. A pair of Down’s syndrome patients with flat faces and narrow eyes stooped in the corner, rocking monotonously like practitioners of a weird, mystical ritual. A tiny sadist with cynical grin (at three years of age!) stealthily hobbles (to the extent possible, what with his lack of motor coordination) up to a fellow who shares his fate, in order to hit or at least bite him. A drug-dependent child with a permanent grimace of suffering twitches and cries—his body craves the “medicine” used by the young mommy who so loves to get high.

In another ward, beings without consciousness and without normal limbs sleep(?), doze(?) [as published] in various repose, sunk in lethargic slumber. With soft bones, sores, and ulcers, they lie silent since birth—little “skeletons” destined to starve to death, for their bodies will not take up any kind of nourishment.

“Several of the children’s mothers live right in the neighborhood,” says Head Nurse Astra Jansone. “Across the street is the correctional drug rehabilitation center.”

It would be very instructive for these “ladies” if a little tour of all the wards were arranged for them, after which they could be asked how they intend to repent before all this suffering.

There are “mommies” who are so drunk when they are brought to the birthing home that they must be held firmly lest they fall on the floor at the very moment that a new life comes into the world. There are those who flee from the ward, “forgetting” their child. There are those who drink various substances to abort their pregnancies even in the seventh or eighth month. But these are just a few of the aspects of “socialist realism” pertaining to the guarantee of “a happy childhood.”

“Following the accident at the Chernobyl atomic power station, the number of cases of Down’s Syndrome at our facility doubled in two years,” explains Astra Jansone, “and what is tragic is that these are children from normal families, children who are wanted.”

"We are starting to get infants from the Liepaja rayon who suffer from hydrocephaly, and infants with deformed extremities," adds Nurse Gunta Krutaine. Their parents have not refused them, they still have some hope...

In the wards lay and crawl babies whose mothers have worked with ammonia, lead, and toxic pigments. Children whose parents work or serve in garrisons under conditions harmful to health cry due to various congenital ailments. The offspring of single mothers—a third of the children here—fidget aimlessly. The diagnoses—a whole bunch: Microcephalus, physical and mental retardation, skeletal anomalies, lability of the central nervous system.

One ward after another, one tragedy after another. The daylight flooding through the half-opened windows seems as though coming from another world. The roar of the heavy vehicles of the army garrison flows through the half-opened windows—just beyond the outer wall of the infant psychoneurological home is the military reservation of a motor transport company of the Soviet Armed Forces.

What is in store for the children who dwell here? The so-called ones with a future—they make up about a third—will go to boarding schools in Liguti or Purmsati. The rest will end up in boarding houses in Baldone, Ilgi, Viki, or elsewhere, including psychiatric hospitals. For life.

What will the orphans do after their appointed graduation from the boarding schools? They will stay and work on nearby farms. Around Purmsati, a peculiar community is already forming whose members are way ahead of other families, when it comes to producing offspring. And what will happen with these offspring? What, for example, can we say to the parents, all of whose 11 children dwell in various special institutions? What can we say to the head of the family, all of whose four children, including the twins, were in various hospitals, but have now been sent to the Limbazi Home for Children so that they could at least be together? Does our society have the right to ask of drug addicts, prostitutes, the mentally weak, or drunks, that they not produce offspring?

And what can we ask of those who work with substances harmful to their health, in proximity to electromagnetic fields, or under conditions of radioactivity?

There are one and a half million Latvians in Latvia. The network of special health institutions in Latvia is growing in leaps and bounds.

Will Latvia become an affiliate of the land of imbeciles?

### **Turkmen Police Officials on Treatment of Alcoholics**

*Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian  
4 Apr 91 p 3*

[Article by D. Polatov, lieutenant colonel of the domestic service, administration chief of the Turkmen SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and V. Sidorenko, major of the domestic service, chief of the department of drug treatment institutions of the Turkmen SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs administration, under the rubric: "Viewpoint: Are Work-Treatment Facilities Necessary?"]

[Text] Until recently few rank-and-file readers knew the details of the activity of corrective-labor institutions. This subject—like, incidentally, statistical information—was off limits.

Now newspapers, radio, and television are trying to reveal the details of the activity of these structural subdivisions and to cover any extraordinary event—whether it be escape or the seizure of hostages. But are these reports always objective? Do they not distort reality to the advantage of this popular subject? Specialists discuss this today.

Many residents of Turkmenistan know that there are two work-treatment facilities on the territory of the republic, but far from everyone knows who is kept in them, and they have no idea of the danger these patients present to our society.

The majority of these people are moral reprobates, and most often they have lost their ties to society. They live for drugs and alcohol. All of them have already been treated for alcoholism and drug addiction in public health institutions but this treatment did not save them.

Drugs and alcohol are fairly expensive. And a person who has become dependent on them looks for ways to obtain money. Most frequently this drives them to legal infractions and crime. Such people have been sentenced to compulsory treatment in addition to their criminal punishment.

Completely able-bodied people end up in institutions of the closed type. The question arises: Is this fair or not? Is it correct or not?

Alcoholism and drug addiction are not viral diseases. One can be cured of them if one has a conscious desire and will power. But if a person has neither of these, there is only one solution: strict isolation and active treatment with medication. This is what is done in the LTP [work-treatment facility].

Some people now think that the LTP's should be transferred to the system of the Ministry of Public Health. This is substantiated with legislative acts. And in October of last year the USSR Committee for Constitutional Oversight reached a conclusion: "On legislation on the question of compulsory treatment and labor re-education of individuals suffering from alcoholism and drug addiction," after which the central newspapers

printed articles about the illegality of keeping alcoholics and drug addicts in LTP's and the inhumanity of forced treatment. The conclusion was that the LTP's should be eliminated.

In our view, certain of the conclusions of the USSR Committee for Constitutional Oversight were interpreted arbitrarily and a subjective evaluation was submitted to the court of public opinion. The fact is that the conclusion is only a recommendation and is regarded by legislative organs of the Union republics as a document which indicates only the mistakes that have been made. For example, in court proceedings that consider the materials related to sending people to LTP's, there is no provision for the participation of a legal defender. In our view, this is an encroachment on a person's constitutional right to a qualified defense.

But the document also contains these lines: "Citizens sent for compulsory treatment on grounds not related to disturbing the peace or violating the rights of others are subject to release under the policy envisioned by the law." This is something which can be disputed.

An analysis of the materials from cases of individuals held in LTP's shows that there is a large number of them in treatment facilities. And who has ever seen an alcoholic who would not disturb the life of his neighbors and would not cause trouble in the life of the family with whom he is living? It is no accident that relatives frequently appeal to the administrations of LTP's and beg them not to send the patient home after he has been released, fearing that they will again have to go through the terror of living under the same roof with him. But the administration does not have any rights in this matter, although there is no confidence that our patient has been completely cured of his disease either. For there are people who end up in LTP's two or three or even five times.

Here is a sad example of this. Until recently citizen K. was undergoing compulsory treatment in an LTP in Ashkhabad. He surprised his acquaintances with his extraordinary memory, which is fairly rare for an alcoholic, and gave the impression that he was quite an intelligent person. His job was to assign work to others, which he did in the presence of the administration and other patients, and there were no complaints against him. He went through the entire course of treatment and voluntarily agreed to an implantation of the preparation "esperal," which is effective for several years. During the time he spent in the LTP he earned a large amount of money. Everyone agreed that this person had changed his life.

But it turned out that all this was merely for show. Several days before his release, K. removed the "esperal" implant himself and immediately made sure that he had not lost his taste for vodka. Within a couple of days after he had left the facility, he came to the administration in terrible condition: beaten and barefoot and without clothing or money. The workers had to buy him new

personal effects. And this was after he had been through treatment four times! We might even meet up with him a fifth time.

Some people think it is the administration and the medical workers who are to blame. Perhaps, but we have already said that successful treatment requires a desire to get better, and many people do not have this desire. They escape from the LTP and we look all over the republic for them and bring them back. And this happens several times for each of them. You ask: Are there really no controls on alcoholics and drug addicts? Unfortunately, there are almost none left. True, Article 211 of the Turkmen SSR Criminal Code is still in effect. It envisions liability for escape, but it is escape from the territory of a protected facility, this means only from the LTP.

And the presidium of the USSR Supreme Court, by its decree of 30 November 1989, recognizes that when a patient leaves an unprotected facility it is not considered escape. In a word, the decree has nullified the efforts of LTP workers to impose the proper order both on preventive treatment facilities and on the treatment process itself.

Those who are interned in LTP's are well aware of this, they escape from work facilities, and they do not return from leaves or short vacations which are granted to them in keeping with principles of humane treatment. And the officers of the treatment facilities travel through the cities, towns, and villages of Turkmenia, spending state money on travel and accommodations, and bringing the escapees back. And the latter, after they have completed their punishment in the isolation ward, escape again.

This is why the workers at the LTP in Seyda at a general meeting adopted an appeal to the republic Supreme Soviet which contains the words: "...In order to eradicate these extremely serious social phenomena, we need a stricter law regarding unwavering discipline and treatment processes. The violator must be completely responsible for his actions to the full extent of the law. Permissiveness gives rise to more violations and crime."

In a word, we need a new law. Even if it is not so strict, it must be fair.

And we should not be in a hurry to transfer the LTP's to the system of the Ministry of Public Health or to eliminate them. This is suggested by the experience of other Union republics as well.

By an ukase of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of 21 June 1990, Estonia completely eliminated LTP's. It did not take long to see the result—there was a sharp increase in "drunk" crimes. It was necessary to nullify the law as quickly as possible.

The Uzbekistan Ministry of Public Health categorically refused to take the LTP's under its wing because it anticipated the consequences: an army of socially dangerous elements in the hospital beds. As an emergency

measure, the Council of Ministers nullified the decree on the transfer of LTP's to the Ministry of Public Health.

In Georgia, alcoholics and drug addicts were transferred to therapeutic institutions of the Ministry of Public Health, but they had to immediately introduce into the criminal code an article stipulating responsibility for evading therapy since the crime rate shot upward just as it did in Estonia.

Latvia is displaying a great deal of caution in resolving this issue. They are preparing new legislation which envisions centers for social rehabilitation of alcoholics and drug addicts instead of LTP's. The development of the draft law was entrusted to a group of venerable scholars of various profiles.

Russia, armed with all the best that has been achieved in other Union republics, has prepared the draft law of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, "On Social and Medical Rehabilitation of Chronic Alcoholics and Drug Addicts," which envisions sending this category of individuals to LTP's not only when they avoid therapy but also when they violate the law when drunk.

Probably one of the "oldest" of the Union republic legislative acts for compulsory treatment of alcoholics and drug addicts is the ukase of the Presidium of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet published as early as 1965, which has been augmented and amended twice (1985 and 1987). One can say with confidence that this ukase is obsolete. The Turkmen Ministry of Internal Affairs submitted as a legislative initiative basically new proposals to the Committee for Questions of Legislation, Legality, Law and Order, and Rights and Appeals of Citizens to the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet. And one wishes to believe that the republic parliament will take them into account.

### Internal Migration of Ethnic Germans in USSR Detailed

91UN1326A Kishinev MOLODEZH MOLDOVY  
in Russian No 25-26, 30 Mar 91 p 11

[Unattributed article under rubric "Voices": "If the Mountain Doesn't Come to Mohammed...": 'Deutsche Welle' Concerning Internal Refugees in the Soviet Union"]

[Text] The paradoxical nature of the situation with refugees in the USSR consists in the fact that these people are not refugees FROM a country, but WITHIN it. The word "refugees" acquired that new meaning after the bloody reprisals perpetrated by the Azerbaijanis against the Armenians in Sumgait in May 1988. At that time the Armenians, fearing for their lives, began to leave Azerbaijan. Subsequently they were augmented by refugees from Armenia; Russians, Ukrainians, and Jews from Baku; Meskhetian Turks from Uzbekistan; representatives of the North Caucasus peoples who were living in Kazakhstan; and others.

The chief cause of this phenomenon itself—the existence of internal refugees in the USSR—lies in the sphere of the national relations in the Soviet Union. People belonging to a particular ethnic group become refugees because they are forced to do so by the xenophobia, and sometimes also the direct nationalistic aggression on the part of the indigenous, or, to put it more precisely, the so-called titular nation, that is, the one that gives its name to the particular union republic.

Obviously, the nationalism of the titular nations in the Soviet Union currently plays a tremendous positive role in the process by which the republics win their independence from the Soviet imperial center. However, this process is accompanied by an increase in chauvinism, hostility to other nations, and, in the final analysis, a striving to push them out of their republics.

The broad scope of these chauvinistic moods in the USSR during the past two or three years is an indisputable factor. Also, a remarkable result of it is the fact that, among the persons chased out of the republics, there is a greater and greater number of Slavic nations, primarily Russians and Ukrainians, as well as those who, in the USSR, are included among the "Russian-speaking" segment of the population—Germans and Jews.

In October LITERATURNAYA GAZETA and the PRAVDA VOSTOKA Uzbek newspaper reported that, during the previous year, 180,000 persons, of whom 80,000 were Russians, had left Uzbekistan. During the first half of last year alone, practically three times as many Russians left Kirghizia as a result of the hostility on the part of the indigenous population than had left during the entire previous year, and they constituted the majority of all those who had left. From the autonomous republic of Tuva, where, since May 1990, the Russian-speaking population has been subjected not only to constant threats, but also to direct physical reprisals, tens of thousands of Russian families have left. According to reports in the Soviet press, Germans are leaving Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics and going to the Russian Federation sometimes in entire kolchozes, preferring the difficulties of setting up a new life in new locations to the hostility demonstrated by the Central Asian and Kazakh population. These regions are also being currently deserted by peoples who are still living there—Meskhetian Turks, Kurds, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and Assyrians.

In other words, the forced emigration of nations within the confines of the Soviet Union has currently become a differentiating feature of its demographic state.

What, then, is the total number of internal refugees that had built up by the end of 1990 in the USSR? Both officials and journalists agree that the number of such refugees who have been dispersed throughout the Soviet Union is no less than one million persons. How many people can become internal refugees in the next few years?

The fact that the streams of refugees keep forming as a result of an increase in the number of people of Slavic nationalities inevitably dictates the gloomiest forecasts. The fact of the matter is that, out of 145 million Russians, 25 million live outside the confines of their union republic—the RSFSR. In addition, nationalism is making itself increasingly known in the republics on the territory of the RSFSR that have proclaimed themselves to be sovereign autonomous republics. Ought one not to expect, as a result, the forced departure of some segment of the Russians from Tatarstan and Bashkirstan, where they are currently represented by three million persons? And, finally, there are all justifications for assuming that the streams of refugees will intersect in the most varied directions the borders of the Central Asian republics. A doleful pledge of this first of all is the Uzbek-Tajik national and territorial conflict that currently flares up only sometimes, but that threatens to turn into a real conflagration.

It is also necessary to take into consideration the fact that today, in the Soviet Union as a whole, 60 million people are living outside their national-state and national-administrative territories.

However this may be, inasmuch as the conflagration of nationalism in the USSR is currently only flaring up and it probably cannot be extinguished by orders or regulations from above, on the basis of the most modest computations one should count on an increase in the number of internal refugees in the Union to several million persons in the next few years.

This is a tremendous problem for the Soviet Union is a problem, that can become one of the sources of its internal instability. Simultaneously it is the expansion of the scope of the tragedy that is already existing today.

The streams of internal refugees in the Soviet Union are by no means the traditional migration of the population. In the latter instance the change in the place of residence and the people's departure to new localities and cities are voluntary and have the purpose of achieving better living conditions and better payment for their labor. Unlike this situation, in the case of refugees there is direct or hidden action to force them out of the places where they live. These people, especially in the event of danger to their lives, simply desert their homes and farms. That is what happened to the refugees from Azerbaijan, into Armenia, and into Azerbaijan. That is also what happened to the Meskhetian Turks who were chased out of the Fergana Valley. The crowd of almost 200,000 refugees from Baku consisted basically of city dwellers, and they left their apartments and property there.

In the event that the refugees attempted to sell their homes, farm structures, livestock, and orchards, according to Soviet sociologists Kseniya Myalo and Petr Goncharov the refugees were financially ruined. Because the amounts of money that they got when they sold their property were only one-tenth, or sometimes even one-twentieth, of the generally accepted prices. But in most

instances they were forced by simply terroristic methods to leave behind without any compensation everything that they owned, that transferred into the hands of the indigenous population.

Currently the potential refugees are no longer awaiting a worsening of the situation, when the indigenous population will begin to drive them out by setting fire to their homes and by committing murders. Instead, they are preparing ahead of time for their departure: they are selling their homes, exchanging apartments, etc. But even so, although to a lesser degree, they are still being financially ruined. Their property is being sold for a song, and the moving expenses are high. The fate of these people is turning out to be dramatically difficult. The new places to which they are moving are for them not habitable. They do not have housing or work there. However, it is extremely difficult for the refugees in the USSR to find all this.

The increasing unemployment in the USSR—and currently the experts estimate that there are already as many as 10 million unemployed there—is reducing their chances of finding a job in their specialty. Therefore it is not surprising that today's refugees from Central Asia, primarily Russian having a high level of education, are having difficulties finding a job in the new places, even a low-paid job employing manual labor. In the cities and settlements to which the refugees are moving, the local inhabitants themselves have been on a waiting list for housing for decades.

The refugees' situation is also complicated by the institution of residence registration. The militia agencies refuse to register the refugees in their new place of residence, and thus the refugees fall into the category of people without a definite place of residence and are equated to vagabonds. They are not provided with medical services. They are deprived of pension support. Their children cannot go to schools or kindergartens. Having fallen out of the so-called internal passport system, they lose the right to all forms of the meager Soviet social security.

And, finally, there is the crudest infringement upon their political rights. In their new places of residence they are deprived of their voting rights.

The refugees who probably are having the most difficult time are the representatives of the nations that were deported in the past by Stalin and his clique. As everyone knows, the persistent attempts of the Germans to restore a republic for themselves in the Volga region were not crowned with success as a result of the mass resistance against that, a resistance that was accompanied by racism, on the part of the Russian population and authorities in Saratov Oblast. Therefore the Germans—those who did not go to Germany, but who nevertheless are leaving Kazakhstan and Central Asia as a result of the xenophobia demonstrated by the local population and also as a result of their own uncertainty about tomorrow—are dispersing themselves over the oblasts in



the Russian Federation. The same thing is occurring with the Meskhetian Turks.

As for the Crimean Tatars, they currently are returning on the spur of the moment to their hometowns in the Crimea. They are moving there and living in tent cities and shacks. More than 100,000 persons have already returned to the Crimea in this way. The Russian and Ukrainian population opposes this. The militia refuses to register the Crimean Tatars, thus depriving them of the opportunity to find legal work. State enterprises do not sell them materials for building homes, and they are not put on the waiting list for apartments. In other words, at the present time they exist in their own country as newcomers without any rights.

The most important thing is that the situation of all the refugees in the Soviet Union is dramatically complicated by the indifference and even the hostility shown to them on the part of the public. Several months ago, public-opinion polls dealing with the problem of internal refugees were conducted in the Soviet Union. The results proved to be stupefying.

According to the data obtained in a survey conducted by the All-Union Center to Study Public Opinion, among the residents of Moscow more than half of them—56 percent—do not want the refugees to settle alongside of them. And, in response to the question as to whether it would be admissible to eject from Moscow by force the refugees of non-Russian nationality, practically every other person polled (42 percent) answered in the affirmative.

It is generally recognized that the government's contribution to the resolution of the problems of the internal refugees has been insignificant. True, after the Meskhetian Turks were evicted from Uzbekistan, the RSFSR government helped several tens of thousands of them to find new places of residence in central Russia. But one cannot consider that action to have been successful, because the Meskhetian Turks, who are not accustomed to severe winters, began moving from there to the south. After the stream of refugees from Baku in January 1990, the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a resolution concerning the granting of assistance to them. According to that resolution, the refugees received a miserly lump-sum grant in aid of 100 rubles per person, and they were also authorized to live temporarily in empty unheated summer rest homes and the buildings in Young Pioneer camps. However, they were told that they would have to leave those temporary accommodations by 15 May.

In that same resolution it was pointed out that a total of 60 ministries were supposed to be concerned about finding jobs for the refugees. But, at the same time, a secret instruction was issued not to register them in Moscow or in Moscow Oblast, and not to give them jobs there.

This resolution also decided in a no less mocking manner the question of compensating the refugees for the losses that they had incurred, with a determination being made

of the size of the monetary compensation that they could receive from the state agencies of Azerbaijan. But Azerbaijan has no intentions of paying any compensation to the refugees. Therefore the establishment of the size of such compensation was an absolute farce on the part of USSR Council of Ministers.

The root of the problem lies in the fact that the USSR government still has not defined its policy in the question of the internal refugees, or, most important, the question of helping them. Here what should be the first step is the enactment of a law governing the status of the refugees in the USSR, in which their rights to receive a new place of residence, to be registered there, and to get jobs would be legally stated. Certain people reasonably recommend the introduction for them of special internal passports similar to international Nansen passports. The law governing the status of the refugees should also establish legally the forms and extent of the compensation for property lost by them.

The necessity for this law is being currently discussed both by prominent social figures and by many officials. Moreover, recently the draft for that law has already been developed in two state departments: in the Administration for Affairs of Migration and Resettlement, of the USSR State Committee for Labor; and the Subcommittee for the Affairs of Refugees and Resettlers, of RSFSR Supreme Soviet. But those drafts are being ignored both by USSR Council of Ministers and USSR Supreme Soviet.

In this situation many of them rightfully feel that a way to save themselves would be to become a refugee from the Soviet Union. As everyone knows, during the past two or three years emigration from the USSR increased by a factor of many times in numerical terms. Among the main stream of emigres are the Jews, who officially emigrate for purposes of reuniting with their relatives, but actually are emigrating primarily in order to avoid the antisemitism that has raised its head in the USSR, so that at the present time there are a large number of refugees in the direct sense of that word. The same thing pertains to the Germans.

One can state confidently that, if there was no xenophobia on the part of the titular nations in those republics in which the Germans have been living after their deportation, if there was no direct or disguised policy of crowding them out of those republics, and if there was no national selfishness on the part of the Russian population that has dashed the Germans' hopes of getting a republic on the Volga, the number of people leaving the USSR and going to Germany would not be so massive.

In conformity with official forecasts, after the enactment of the law governing immigration and emigration, approximately three million persons will leave the Soviet Union within the near future in order to find new homes and jobs in the West. Without a doubt, a considerable share in that colossal stream is made up of the internal refugees, the majority of whom have literally nothing to

lose in the Soviet Union. Currently thousands of them are already taking that path. According to official data, approximately 1,300 refugees from Baku who are in Moscow have received U. S. entry visas. And several thousand more are planning to get such visas in the near future.

For the most part the Meskhetian Turk refugees are orienting themselves toward emigrating to Turkey. In May 1990 a delegation of them gave the Turkish embassy in Moscow a list of 10,000 persons who want to emigrate for permanent residence in Turkey. This is understandable. The USSR government has also shown that it is incapable either of preventing or regulating the stream of internal refugees, or of substantially helping them.

Currently, when Germany and other countries are rendering direct assistance to the Soviet Union with food products and medicines, the internal refugees in the USSR should have become, alongside of other groups and children who are in the greatest need, the first-priority recipient of that assistance.

But it is doubtful that the local authorities, seeing in the refugees "undesirable elements," will be seriously concerned about their getting anything from the West. So, "if the mountain doesn't come to Mohammed..."

#### **Agreement Signed for Opening Salvation Army Office in Leningrad**

91US0473B Moscow TRUD in Russian 4 Apr 91 p 1

[Article by Ye. Druzhinina: "Under the Banner of the Salvation Army"]

[Text] Some 68 years later the Salvation Army is coming back to Leningrad. The Leningrad Gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] has signed an agreement with the Norwegian branch of this international organization. The agreement outlines the establishment of a social aid center in Leningrad.

A special building in downtown Leningrad was selected for the Salvation Army and now it is being restored by a Swedish firm. In July it will open its doors to those who need help and protection. The first floor of the center will accommodate a free cafeteria for retirees; Sunday school classes will be conducted in the halls of the building. But even before the center opens the Norwegian Salvation Army is sending aid to the unprotected groups of the population: Parcels with food and goods for children are arriving in Leningrad from Oslo.

Many Leningrad residents have already displayed interest in becoming soldiers in the Salvation Army. The people's interest in such an organization, needed by everyone, was aroused with the help of the "Vozrozhdeniye" [Revival] TV marathon. A considerable amount of money was deposited in the Salvation Army project account.

#### **Greater Control Over Moral Standards in Video Content Urged**

91US0444A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA  
in Russian 13 Apr 91 p 2

[Article by Yu. Popov and V. Romanov: "On 'Hot Steamy Sex' and the Fruits of Enlightenment"]

[Text] "Their Name Was Kostoloma," "Eaten Alive," "Five Fallen Women," "Go and Undress," "Hot Sex in Denmark," "Memoirs of a Girl of Pleasure"—tantalizing titles, are they not? Can one really walk past a video parlor or video salon that shows such films? And, as we found out during a recent inspection of video points in the cities of Staryye Dorogi in Minsk Oblast, Alma-Ata, and Tashauz, and in the Belorussian Railroad Station in the capital, many people do not walk past—they drop in for several hours. And not only viewers over 16, but also those who are "under age"...

Almost three-fourths of the customers at video parlors are adolescents and youth. Only in rare cases are they prevented from entering the hall or are programs appropriate to their age selected for them. And, as we found out, in certain places they deliberately try to expand the "horizons" of the youngsters with these subjects. For instance, in the Palace of Pioneers in Nizhegorodskiy Rayon in Nizhnyy Novgorod young visitors are offered such tapes as "Love on the Hot Sand" and "Midnight Express," and students of Alma-Ata secondary school No. 121 are offered the erotic "Adventures of a Sanitary Engineer" and "The Story of O"...

There is hardly any need to prove that this kind of permissiveness contributes to the decline of moral standards and growth of crime and violence.

Tens of thousands of video points each day attract viewers with the garish titles of foreign pornographic films. Unfortunately, we do not know how many of these salons there are in the country—there are no statistics. But a study of the "activity" of more than 2,500 video salons and video parlors showed that the basis of the repertoire is comprised mainly of movie hits which cultivate cruelty and distorted ideas about intimate relations among people.

Of the video points we inspected, 15 percent belong to state movie and video associations, about 30 percent operate in clubs and other trade union institutions, and more than 40 percent are attached to Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] organizations. The rest are at enterprises for consumer services, public catering, transportation, and other organizations that have nothing to do with the spiritual education of the population. More than half of the nonstate salons are not registered anywhere nor do they have "mandates" for commercial video activity issued by the proprietors of the premises.

Video programs are shown most frequently without official tickets—at prices established on the spur of the

moment which significantly exceed the list prices. And there is no financial reporting at all. Taking advantage of the lack of control, the shady businessmen stop at nothing for the sake of their own personal gain. Most of the films and programs they circulate are of foreign production and no license has been acquired for showing them in the USSR. Yet the advertising of these tapes is out in the open—in the local press. Illegal reproduction of unlicensed products is carried out by youth centers, cooperatives, video businessmen at home, and recently—by certain state movie theaters. In essence they are legalizing commercial use of films that have actually been stolen from foreign owners or those who have the rental rights.

Of course, with the republics' current desire for sovereignty, correct organization of the video business depends on the local soviets of people's deputies. And one must say that under the pressure of protest from parents, educators, and law enforcement agencies, a number of soviets have adopted decisions to register video salons and monitor their activity. But in the majority of cases, the Komsomol and trade union organizations that own the video salons refuse to register them with the ispolkoms [executive committees] and ignore the recommendations of the interdepartmental repertoire commissions, blaming the contradictory instructions of the USSR Ministry of Culture, the Komsomol Central Committee, and the central trade union organs.

The situation is exacerbated by legal illiteracy and the interpretation of existing norms based on personal interests. For instance, the All-Union Agency for Authorial Rights officially explained that, according to the Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the USSR and the Union republics, videotapes of foreign films may be shown publicly without the permission of the owners of the authorial rights but with payment of the remuneration set for them. The RSFSR Ministry of Justice has corroborated this. But because we have not yet determined the rates of remuneration or the procedure for paying it to the foreign authors, the local areas have taken as guidelines only the first part of the VAAP [All-Union Agency for Authorial Rights] clarification. The result is clear: the flourishing of video piracy.

Strange as it may be, the USSR Procuracy has involuntarily contributed to this. In April 1989, it sent to the local law enforcement agencies an information letter warning about stricter application of the article on the liability for the manufacture and sale of pornographic objects and also works that promoted the cult of violence and cruelty (referring to video films of foreign production and the showing of them). Appended to the letter were recommendations for expert artistic evaluation. But there was not the slightest mention of the penalty for the use of unlicensed video products.

All this has led to a situation where in our country the video has become a source of unjustified income and one of the spheres of the shadow economy. According to the

approximate estimates of specialists, incomes of video businessmen over the past year amounted to more than 4 billion rubles [R]. About R2.2 billion did not find its way into the local budgets because at the time the video showers did not have to pay taxes.

State video parlors and video salons, unfortunately, are not able to resist the negative process that is taking place. Their "assets" already include pirated videotapes—no less than 10,000 of them. Moreover, the State Video Fund has few attractive video shows; they receive new tapes, as a rule, after they have been shown on the movie screens. But enterprises of the USSR State Committee for Cinematography are not filling all orders for new films either. This is mainly because of a shortage of cassettes, most of which make their way into the hands of the underground video dealers. Moreover, under the conditions of the market, domestic movie studios have raised the prices of their products. And if one takes into account that as of 1 July of last year enterprises of the state video network were to have paid taxes in the amount of 70 percent of their income, all that is left for them is either to "go down the tube" or to "spin" unlicensed films as well.

In our country these are the kinds of problems that surround videotapes, that progressive invention of the human mind. As practice shows, when it falls into unprofessional or dishonest hands, alas, it does more harm than good. It is no accident that the video business was declared a "national disaster" in the declaration of the Committee for Affairs of Women and Protection of the Family, Maternity, and Childhood of the USSR Supreme Soviet. This declaration, which was addressed to the government, expresses the demand to protect our children from spiritual and moral decay.

Anticipating the sad consequences of the distribution of various pornographic products, erotic videotapes, and other such tapes in our country, a special commission headed by USSR Minister of Culture N. Gubenko recommended immediate measures for protection of public morals.

It seems to us that there is no solution other than a direct ban on commercial use of unlicensed videotapes and programs. Under the conditions of our country's transition to the market economy and entry into the world trade community, there can be no question of legalizing video piracy in any form. The state must guarantee the right to ownership of video products. We must finally solve the problem of the USSR signing the Bern and other international conventions on the protection of literary and artistic works.

People may object that there will still be video piracy but it will go underground. Well, that may be so. But when the law appears the sphere of decay of morals will undoubtedly be narrower. And this will be a great benefit in itself.

The republics themselves can adopt legislation to ban commercial use of foreign and domestic video products

that have not been acquired from their owners or those who have the rental rights and for which there is no rental license—which, incidentally, has been done, for example, in the Turkmen SSR. The procedure for issuing the license has been determined by the USSR State Committee for Cinematography. But perhaps we also need an all-Union registry of the rights to video products, which should be nondepartmental.

There is no doubt that one of the most important issues has to do with the selection. One can discuss ad infinitum the imaginary rigidity in this matter or how eroticism differs from pornography, but would it not be simpler to decide what should be shown—taking into account the age groups of the viewers and the local moral and cultural values and traditions? And here the final word regarding the formation of the repertoire for public showing goes to the local soviets of people's deputies for their corresponding territories.

And, finally, we must establish in legislation of the USSR and republics measures of responsibility related to guaranteeing the right to ownership of video products and observance of the rules for registration of video salons.

It would seem that the minimum that would help bring some kind of order into the organization of renting and showing videotapes would help the powerfully and rapidly developing form of art to work for the good of the people.

### **Role of Language, Nationalities Policies in Admission to Higher Education Institutions**

*91US0480A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 8, Feb 91 p 19*

[Interview with V.F. Noskov, deputy chief of the Main Administration for Education Methods of the USSR State Committee on Education, by Georgiy Dolgov, place and date not given: "Is an Exam Based on Ethnicity Needed?"]

[Text] Nobody knows anything for sure. There are only conjectures, assumptions, guesses, and, because of this, a growing nervous tension.

High school graduates, and their parents and teachers, are anxious. Our unstable time has seriously affected our system of higher education. The procedures for entering institutions of higher education are changing every year.

What can high school graduates expect this year? This is the issue we are discussing with V.F. Noskov, deputy chief of the Main Administration for Education Methods of the USSR State Committee on Education.

[Dolgov] Valeriy Feofanovich, in the past such questions simply would not even come up. It was known in advance which exams had to be taken to enter technical schools and which were required for studying humanities; they also knew the requirements new entrants had to meet. During the last few years this entire system has

been stirred into action. It is impossible to guess all the changes in advance. What will the coming summer bring us?

[Noskov] Surprises are undoubtedly possible. The reason is that now institutions of higher education have considerably greater independence and the right to determine on their own the specific procedures for selecting future students. Therefore, both the number of exams, the subjects on which entrants will be tested, and even the evaluation systems are now established by the school on the basis of our general recommendations.

For instance, there may be anywhere between two and 10 entrance exams. The grading system may not necessarily be based on a five-point scale. Schools that provide education in creative professions now use a 50-point grading scale. Some others use 10-point scales.

[Dolgov] But when will it be known to all those who will need to make these 20 or 100 passing points?

[Noskov] In the immediate future all schools are supposed to establish admission commissions and work out admission rules and procedures. There is a special reference book, published annually, where all this information will be listed. This book will contain information not only on exams but also on the majors each school will be offering.

[Dolgov] Is it not too late, Valeriy Feofanovich? I can imagine the astonishment of a high school senior who, for instance, finds out at the end of March that the institute he wants to enter has canceled exams in, say, mathematics. Or, on the contrary, introduced a new exam—say, chemistry. Meanwhile, he had been studying mathematics with a private tutor since September; his parents have spent a small fortune on this prep training; chemistry was the last thing on their mind—since last year this exam was not required. Now all their effort and money have been wasted, and the kid is basically unprepared for the exam.

[Noskov] Such a possibility cannot be dismissed. Unfortunately, our system is not yet as mobile as we would wish. Life changes so fast that we, like many others, simply cannot keep up. It would be good, of course, to have complete information on next year's admission requirements as early as the fall. So far we have not been able to accomplish this. However, a comprehensive reform of the entire system of higher education is in the works; we hope that this problem will also be resolved in the process.

[Dolgov] As is known, this year there will be no exams in social science either for high school graduates or for college entrants. Does this mean that studying the history of the CPSU is over?

[Noskov] No, it is not over, although today practically no school has it as a separate course in its curriculum. The study of the history of the Communist Party will remain in the curriculum for those who graduate in philosophy

and for some other professions—for instance, historians and journalists. But it will be studied in the framework of completely new courses, for instance, the political history of the 20th century, and together with the history of other political parties and movements. We believe it to be absolutely necessary.

The political map of our society is so cluttered that only a well-trained person can figure it out. There are, for instance, anarcho-syndicalists now, but nobody knows much about this political movement other than the rollicking song about "steamed-and-fried chicken." Our time requires broad political education.

[Dolgov] In the past there were a number of institutes and departments in universities where letters of recommendation from party organizations were documents of decisive importance. It did not make any sense even to approach admission boards without such recommendations. Membership in the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] or the CPSU used to be just as mandatory...

[Noskov] All ideological cordons and special passes to get through them, issued by party committees, are a thing of the past. Today even the Moscow State Institute of International Relations is actively undergoing democratization. Current procedures for admission to this institute almost fully meet our recommendations. The latter are really limited to elementary requirements: To be eligible to take entrance exams in any higher education institution in the country one needs proof of high school education, a medical certificate, photographs, and a passport. That is all. The candidate's party affiliation and his political views have no relevance. It is as if the line on the candidate's resume reserved for this information does not exist.

[Dolgov] So, party affiliation may be ignored now. What about ethnicity, and language?

[Noskov] In this respect it is more complicated. In the past, candidates entering schools located at the ethnic territorial entities were divided into two groups. One consisted of candidates who took exams in their native language, and the other of those who spoke only Russian. Actually, this procedure is still applicable.

[Dolgov] Applicable or applied?

[Noskov] Well, it is applied in the Central Asian republics. In the Baltics—practically not. For instance, Vilnius University has almost completely switched to Lithuanian. They teach in that language and, naturally, conduct entrance exams the same way. It looks like this practice will be increasingly applied in schools of higher education located in cities of the West Ukraine. We can expect similar processes to develop in the Transcaucasian republics as well.

[Dolgov] What if a person is of nonindigenous, as they say now, nationality, but speaks the language—

Lithuanian or Ukrainian, for instance? Will he run into difficulties in the admission process?

[Noskov] Theoretically, he should not, but it is hard to tell for certain. It all depends on the specific situation.

[Dolgov] In other words, in order to enter an institution of higher education, Russian-speaking entrants must pass the grade of ethnic identification first. And if they do not pass it—are they supposed to move out of the republic where they were born and raised?

[Noskov] They are indeed moving out. People from the Baltics, for example, are going to Leningrad, Pskov, Novgorod, and Minsk. And, of course, Moscow.

[Dolgov] The institutes in the capital will probably remain multinational, as they have always been?

[Noskov] Of course. By the way, quite a few republic leaders who now actively implement a strict language policy were educated in Moscow. The situation is quite peculiar now: Everybody without exception can study in the institutes of Russia, while Russians themselves are far from always able to get an education in the republic where they live.

[Dolgov] This will probably result in some redistribution of potential students on the territory of the country?

[Noskov] So far it is hard to say exactly how this process will develop, but the beginning is already clear. Also, do not forget about refugees. People who are forced to leave their native parts will not go back there for education. This means that they will try to enter institutions of higher education wherever they reside now. There is also a problem of the level of preparation of high school graduates. Many refugees have had considerable interruptions in their studies, and when they did study it was under far from optimum conditions...

[Dolgov] And they do not have the means to pay tutors...

[Noskov] Yes, this can create serious problems, since the requirements potential entrants have to meet are not getting easier; on the contrary, they are increasing.

[Dolgov] In addition, we cannot preclude incidents of prejudice on the part of those who conduct the exams, as well as bribe-taking and nepotism.

[Noskov] Higher education is not free of the diseases that have infected the entire society. We are trying, of course, to fight them. For instance, we recommend using more written exams. They make it easier for the appeal or expert commissions to establish the true level of the entrant's knowledge. We are changing the forms of the exams. As is known, in the past the most widely used exam was a written essay. Or, rather, not written, but copied. The country has an entire industry that produces exam cribs, and many of them are done on quite a high professional and technical level. To avoid this all-out copying we recommend wider use of dictation or exposition for Russian language exams. Of course, the essay

will stay at schools of philology and some others where this skill is necessary for mastering the future profession.

In addition, we are beginning to implement the system of tests more widely. Experience shows that use of tests permits a quite objective evaluation of the entrant's level of knowledge.

[Dolgov] There is increasing talk today about paying for education. What is your opinion on this subject?

[Noskov] According to our Constitution education is free. It is true, however, that lately a variety of commercial and cooperative schools, centers, and associations that provide training in a variety of professions on a commercial basis have emerged. In principle I do not see anything wrong with this. Perhaps, in the future the state education system will use this experience in some form. The important point is to observe the main condition: to guarantee human rights. For instance, state stipends and subsidies may be introduced for those who cannot afford to pay for education. The state may provide educational loans that will later will be repaid either by the student or by the enterprise that hires the student. In short, there can be many options.

We are also trying to accommodate those who have already decided to get an education in a commercial entity. If the diploma they receive in that school is acceptable to their future employer, that is fine. But they can also receive a standard diploma from a state higher educational institution. All they need to do is pass the graduating exams in the state school. We now permit such exams to be taken without attending classes. In the past this practice was categorically prohibited.

### Position of Ukrainian Schools in Kharkov Detailed

91UN1427A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA  
in Russian 3 Apr 91 p 3

[Antonina Palagnyuk report: "Sign Up for the Ukrainian Class"]

[Text] Kharkov—Only two Ukrainian schools remain in the former capital of the Ukraine with its population of two million. One of them, School No. 96, is right out in the suburbs. The other, although in the center, is in a dilapidated condition (our newspaper has already written about the situation in School No. 6). The kindergartens do not bear talking about: a great deal of time will probably be needed before we hear our native language there.

So where can native speech still be heard? A handful of people go to performances at the Ukrainian Drama Theater imeni Shevchenko. Of the local newspapers, only SLOBIDSKYY KRAY is published in Ukrainian. VECHERKA has become bilingual, and the youth newspaper SOBYTYIYE is now published in Russian instead of Ukrainian.

Many courses have been started recently in the city at which foreign languages are studied. Everything is in the spirit of the times: intensive teaching, a minimum level of conversation, business vocabulary; the choice is yours. But where can we study our own language? They passed the well-known resolution recently to start speaking in Ukrainian in a year or two. Is this realistic, particularly in a specific city such as Kharkov?

"I think that it is realistic, but not immediately," says V.A. Tsygulskiy, an inspector with the oblast board of general education. "In my 18 years of work in the oblast no one has come to me with a request to start a Ukrainian class. On the contrary, parents have asked me to have their children released from study of the Ukrainian language. This program requires a very tactful approach. We need a transitional period to somewhere about the year 2000."

"But will that not go the same way as the Housing-2000 program?"

"It is difficult to talk about this now. We are right at the very beginning. Many difficulties lie ahead, and one of them is cadres."

Yes, paradoxical though it may seem, in an enormous city that has its own university, pedagogical institute, and pedagogical school, today there is a shortage of specialists to teach Ukrainian.

Nonetheless, the first steps have been taken. In the village of Eskhar in Chuguyevskiy Rayon the republic's first pedagogical lycee for men has been opened. Some 62 of the Russian-speaking schools in the oblast have enrolled first-graders in Ukrainian classes. For previously there were no Ukrainian schools in many of the rayon centers. During the next academic year another 13 schools in the oblast will switch completely to the native language for teaching.

It is probable that we are beginning to understand that without a native language, culture, and customs, it is difficult to be a nation, a people.

### Yakunin on Political Unrest, Religious Conflicts

91UN1426A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA  
in Russian 3 Apr 91 p 2

[Interview with Father Gleb Yakunin, RSFSR people's deputy and member, Coordinating Council, Democratic Russia Movement, by S. Tikhiy: "The Lord Is Helping Russia...."]

[Text] [S. Tikhiy] Esteemed Father Gleb, what are you thinking about above all on this day?

[G. Yakunin] Tomorrow, on Sunday, Passion Week begins. Today is a special day. In accordance with our Orthodox calendar, today marks the resurrection of the stinking Lazarus. When Christ entered Jerusalem, he indicated that he was voluntarily going to his own death, and he resurrected the corpse of his friend Lazarus,

which was beginning to decay. And in Russia we honor and revere this day particularly, for it is considered, so to speak, a symbol of the resurrection of Russia, which is already stinking and decaying. And obviously the Lord is helping Russia, and the processes which are now going on are going on, as it were, with the aid of a favoring wind. In describing the events of 1917, our great Solzhenitsyn was struck by how purposefully the wind of history impelled Lenin and the Bolsheviks. But now it has swung around 180 degrees. No matter what "Russia's Communists" undertake, no matter what steps Gorbachev takes, it is all either a caricature or will lead to just the opposite results—to an intensification of the democratic processes and to an awakening of the people.

[S. Tikhii] In your opinion, what will be the final outcome of this congress?

[G. Yakunin] First of all, it should be emphasized that this congress was intended by "Russia's Communists" as their convulsive attempt to avert changes. And they will suffer an utter defeat on this principal strategic level, even though the Agrarians, for example, as well as the representatives of the autonomous units—many of which have started on the path of the Russian Federation's collapse—supported "Russia's Communists" in their lack of a desire to institutionalize the post of President of Russia.

[S. Tikhii] And what can you tell us about the situation in Russia as a whole?

[G. Yakunin] After 2 April, when people become convinced that the 60-ruble sop is a paltry attempt to soften the blow to be inflicted on the people, anything can be expected.

[S. Tikhii] But will Russia have enough of its renowned patience?

[G. Yakunin] Obviously this patience is running out, especially among the workers. To our shame, this congress has failed to take a position directly on the side of the striking miners. But, even under these conditions, we see that the miners have not despaired. On the contrary, their movement will evidently continue to spread.

[S. Tikhii] But, you know, the miners went out on strike in 1989. And at that time nobody else besides them went out on strike.

[G. Yakunin] Nowadays the situation is fundamentally different. The price hike affects everyone. We do not have the moral right to call for this; you see how carefully Boris Nikolayevich [Yeltsin] speaks about this. I sympathize with the miners with all my heart, but the spontaneous process of other working people joining them is obviously inevitable. And may God grant that we experience the Czech variant of events rather than the Romanian one.

[S. Tikhii] Do you think that such events—which are terrifying to the central authorities—are possible in the absence of some kind of organizing force like the Polish "Solidarity"?

[G. Yakunin] This next plundering of the working people, this mad financial policy of the central authorities, this lack of a desire to carry out genuine economic reforms will continue to be organized. All this will inevitably politicize people who, up to now, have kept aloof from such problems.

[S. Tikhii] But, as a "man of the cloth," you cannot, of course, welcome all this. Or can you?

[G. Yakunin] That depends upon what you mean by "welcome." Of course, this is a tragic situation, but, you know, the miners and all the others are really not to blame. They have been driven to extremes. And, therefore, we call upon Pavlov and Gorbachev to conduct talks or negotiations. To be sure, political demands have already been put forth. But, even so, talks must be held concerning the handing over of power in order to prevent it from falling into the hands of a mob.

[S. Tikhii] What is your attitude toward the fact that nowadays, after 70 years of suppressing freedom of conscience, the authorities are moving toward establishing a "fraternal relationship" with the Church?

[G. Yakunin] I would not say that this is a clearly delineated tendency quite yet. Of course, Gorbachev is an extraordinary politician. He has sensed that there is an advantage to be gained here.... But, in contrast to many other churches, the Orthodox Church has never been socially active. And we have seen that in 1917 the Orthodox Church, despite the fact that Russia was an Orthodox Empire, could do nothing to oppose Lenin's demagoguery. That was a tragedy for the Orthodox Church.

[S. Tikhii] What do you think about the conflict between the UAPTs [Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church] and the Moscow Patriarchate?

[G. Yakunin] Unfortunately, the Moscow Patriarchate was a branch of the KGB's Fifth Administration for a long time. It's a well-known fact that in 1943 the Church in Russia was restored by Stalin but placed under the strictest supervisory control of Beria's state security organs. NKVD Lieutenant General Karpov was appointed chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs, and he ran the Church's entire foreign, domestic, and personnel policy. And then the central government utilized the Church to carry out its own imperial functions. And because of this the Church became extremely intractable, and amidst the Ukraine's growing national awareness such a policy also caused dissatisfaction. And this likewise speeded up the emergence of opposition in the form of the reborn UAPTs and the UGKTs [Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church]. Such a process is natural for many countries in the West. There are many jurisdictions of the various different dioceses which exist there.



That, properly speaking, was likewise the case in our country after 1917. But during the 1930's, when Stalin instituted totalitarianism by force, he annihilated all kinds of religion. And so nowadays a return to the situation of the 1920's is completely natural.

[S. Tikhii] Do you know what happened in Kiev on the day when the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia conducted a service in the St. Sophia Cathedral?

[G. Yakunin] I know. And I consider that the Patriarch made a political mistake there. He did not have to go there. It provoked merely emotions and religious hostility. All of this reminds me of what occurred during the Middle Ages [sic] between Luther and the Holy See in Rome. It was a religious war, which presaged the totalitarian policy conducted for many years by the Stalinist regime.

[S. Tikhii] If we look at the hierarchy, we can see that the distance between you as a rank-and-file priest and the Patriarch is gigantic. Nevertheless, are they any contacts between you two?

[G. Yakunin] There are no personal contacts. But I must say that the Patriarch, despite the fact that, in my opinion, he committed several political errors following the events which occurred in Lithuania, did level some accusations at the central authorities. And this was the first time for such things in many years. Fortunately, at one time our country had Patriarch Tikhon, who condemned Lenin and the Bolsheviks for vandalism and blasphemy directed against holy places. Since that time no such voice has sounded forth. But now Patriarch Aleksii II has called what the president did in Lithuania an error from the viewpoint of politics and a sin from the viewpoint of morality. So let's hope that such independent speeches, such a sincere and honest Church voice will be reinforced and become more powerful.

[S. Tikhii] Do you place your hopes for a favorable solution to the present-day situation on any other person besides the Lord God?

[G. Yakunin] The Lord God helps history to be carried out through the means of specific persons. I place my hopes on the simple believers, on that democracy which we call "sobornost" [congregationality or togetherness].

[S. Tikhii] And what do you consider B.N. Yeltsin to be—an atheist?

[G. Yakunin] He has never said that he was a believer. I don't think that he could be called a believer. But who knows...? The Lord moves in every person, and even at an advanced age a person can turn to religion. And perhaps such a major political figure, standing at the helm of our history, will have his heart touched with a blessing of abundance.

[S. Tikhii] Let's wish the same thing for M.S. Gorbachev. And thank you for granting this interview!

### Controversy Over Roman Catholic Archdiocese in Lvov Described

91UN1426B Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA  
in Russian 3 Apr 91 p 3

[Article by Yuriy Kril: "With Regard to the Archdiocese"]

[Text] When L.M. Kravchuk was asked during his visit to the Lvov region whether he was enrolled in the course which has been inaugurated in Lvov by the Roman Catholic Archdiocese, he merely spread his hands in a gesture of helplessness. He said that that was the first time he had heard about it. And when the local authorities found out about this event, they were not only surprised but even stunned. And well they might be: Without obtaining the consent of these authorities, a Roman Catholic Center has been opened, and a citizen of Poland has been appointed as its chief. He is subordinate to the Primate of Poland rather than to the Vatican. Why is he not a citizen of our country. Why was Lvov chosen as the place of residence instead of Kiev or some other city? And, finally, why did the oblast soviet or even the republic-level government not know anything about this?

Bishop Markiyon Trofimyak attempted to answer some of these questions at a press conference held at the Polish Consulate in Lvov. According to him, the Lvov Roman Catholic Archdiocese, which had existed here for several centuries, was abolished in 1946 and is now being revived or reinstituted. And Pope John Paul II has appointed Marian Jaworski to be the new metropolitan here. Jaworski is a native of Lvov and studied here until 1946 at the Roman Catholic Seminary. But after the latter was closed down, he was compelled to move to Poland. In recent times he has served as head of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese in Exile. He is subordinate to the Primate of Poland, Cardinal Glemp, only until such time as he comes to live on the territory of this state. Moreover, Trofimyak noted, His Eminence Marian Jaworski has already expressed the wish to become a Soviet citizen. And after he has moved to Lvov, he will be directly subordinate to the Vatican.

Such is the version put forth by the representative of the Roman Catholic side. The Lvov Oblast authorities have a different opinion. V. Chornovil, for example, does not think that the very term "revival of the former archdiocese" corresponds to the actual state of affairs. Because, of course, prior to 1946 the [Polish] Lwow-Przemysl Archdiocese functioned in this region, and it is clear that—under present-day conditions—there can be no talk of reviving it in its previous form.

Let me add on my own that, if we were to follow the logic of the Roman Catholic side, we could be equally successful in opening up our own Orthodox or Greco-Catholic centers in Przemysl. It is just that I fear that we lack the boldness to do this. And, moreover, we simply have no desire to provoke the sovereign state of Poland.



### Reorganization of Catholic Church

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[Excerpts] Pope John Paul II has basically reorganized the Catholic Church of Latin rites in the Soviet Union, Belorussia, Russia, and Kazakhstan where there are more than 1.5 million Catholics. New dioceses have been set up, new borders of the new and present dioceses have been established, new bishops have been appointed.

For the first time in history a Moscow Apostolic Administration has been formed. It will be headed by Bishop Tadas Kondrusevicius. [passage omitted] There are at present some 60,000 Catholics in Moscow and in the Russian Federation.

A new Grodno diocese has been set up in Belorussia. The dean of the Holy Spirit Church in Vilnius, Rev. Aleksandras Kaskevicius, has been appointed its bishop ordinary. The whole territory of the new diocese formed part of the Vilnius archdiocese before World War II which belonged to Poland. The Grodno diocese occupies 25,000 square kilometers and has 1.2 million residents; 900,000 of them are Catholics. The diocese has 122 parishes.

Pinsk Diocese is administered at present by Minsk and Mogilev Archbishop Swiatek. At present there are some 100,000 Catholics in Pinsk Diocese. It has 32 parishes serviced by 20 priests.

### Filaret Denounces Perestroika, Supports Strong Authority

91UN1350A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT  
in Russian No 7, Feb 91 p 3

[Interview with Filaret, metropolitan of Kiev and All the Ukraine, conducted by SOVETSKIY PATRIOT editor-in-chief Mikhail Zemskov and SOVETSKIY PATRIOT special correspondent Georgiy Chernomorskiy: "Timely Interview": "They Do Not Love Their People, They Love Themselves"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Your Reverence, our first question hardly pertains to the spiritual realm, and it would not even seem to pertain church affairs. But such is life... Six years have passed since we first proclaimed perestroika. What is your assessment of the road we have traveled?

[Filaret] Of course, perestroika, or the process which out of inertia we continue to call perestroika, is a secular matter. But you are wrong when you assume that it does not concern the church. Believers, and in this case I am referring to the Orthodox, comprise a substantial portion of the population, and it is of concern to us how our brothers in Christ live. Yes, the church is separate from the state, but not from society. The church simply cannot exist outside of society, just as, incidentally, in my opinion people cannot get along without a spiritual foundation.

[Correspondent] We agree. Nevertheless, what would you like to say about perestroika?

[Filaret] What was envisioned has not always become reality. It does become me to speak categorically. But I am convinced that perestroika as it was originally conceived has not come to pass. We were counting on a bright future, on a society in which love for one's neighbor would flourish, and in which diligence and industriousness would bring prosperity to every home. Yet what is the reality? Blood is being shed; interethnic and interchurch strife has worsened. If we do not stop and rethink our course our once-mighty state will disintegrate into tens of petty princedoms, and brother will make war on brother.

And how meager our lives have become! We stand on the threshold of poverty. It is shameful to say, but some of our people who are not known for their affluence celebrated New Year's and Christmas with the alms of foreign powers. Those alms were given to us on specific terms. This is not a matter of excessive vanity. Every people simply wants to be able to feed itself. It seems that we have completely forgotten the Biblical injunction that "the lazy hand will be made poor, but the diligent hand will become rich."

We have an abundance of laws and constant shortages on store shelves. Over the past six years production has declined. There is much talk of a market economy and various forms of property. But thus far no one has been able to tell people when they will start living better. The slide toward the abyss continues.

In order to rectify this situation we need harmony. Harmony in the family, harmony between neighbors and harmony among peoples. It is time we finally realized that all destruction and all destructive forces are harmful to society; they are the forces of evil. In this connection I would like to mention one very important thought expressed at the turn of the century by Petr Arkadyevich Stolypin, who said that we do not need great upheavals, we need a great Motherland.

Unfortunately the situation which presently exists in our country cannot fail to alarm all decent people, believers and non-believers alike.

[Correspondent] That is true. Still, why did perestroika not come about? Why are we sliding downward toward the point beyond which lies the abyss, instead of moving forward?

[Filaret] To the church there "are neither Jews nor Greeks." To the church all are equal. Unfortunately, in worldly life these prejudices have by no means been overcome. That is both due to the insufficiency of our spirituality, and to the inability of our country's leaders to define our primary, top-priority tasks. When did we start talking about a new Union Treaty? After blood was shed in Sumgait and Karabakh, Osh and Baku... I think that this matter should have been resolved, if not in 1985, then at least by 1986. Now new complications

have been added to those which existed before. Look at the Baltic republics. Of course, the people of Lithuania or Latvia, for instance, do have a right to independence. But they should achieve independence solely through peaceful, lawful means.

No one may achieve happiness at the expense of another. I think that it would be quite appropriate today to remember this Biblical commandment: "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." I repeat that I have deep respect for the Baltic republics' efforts to achieve independence, but to what purpose is it for almost half the people living in the region to be declared migrants and second-class citizens? At issue is not even the size of the Russian-speaking population. Of all sovereignties the most important is the sovereignty of human beings, of the individual. Provision should have been made for that in our laws.

[Correspondent] You said "in our laws." We have more than enough laws. But the problem is that a majority of legislative acts, whether decrees by local soviets or presidential ukases, often amount to nothing. They are simply ignored. Just recall the ukases ordering people to disband armed units and surrender weapons.

[Filaret] The laws of the state are created in order to be carried out. Of course, there are perfect laws, and there are those which no longer meet society's needs. However, those laws as well must be carried out, or else we will be plunged into an abyss of anarchy. At the same time the members of our parliament should be striving to perfect those laws and make them work.

[Correspondent] What is your position on the work of supreme soviets and participation by clergymen in that work?

[Filaret] In an interview published in your newspaper two years ago I expressed the hope that participation by clergymen in legislative organs would enliven the work of those organs and permit the interests of our citizens, believers and non-believers alike, to be better taken into account. Now I see that I was wrong. I applaud the work of Agafangel, Ukrainian people's deputy and Metropolitan of Vinnitsa and Bratslav. But, I ask you, is there much that he can accomplish in parliament? I do not think I am revealing a great secret when I tell you that today many of our people have a sarcastic attitude toward the work of parliaments, because some of our people's elected officials have forgotten that they must walk in the ways of truth. Disdaining the Biblical saying that "with many words you will not avoid sin, but it is reasonable to restrain the words of your mouth," they often engage unrestrainedly in political machinations and attempt to identify their personal ambitions with the people's interests.

[Correspondent] Yet all authority comes from God. That is an age-old dogma of the church. What is your attitude toward authority?

[Filaret] I cannot dispute the dogma. If, of course, it is real authority. Nowadays it is fashionable to point to the West as a model of democracy. Yes, it is beyond dispute that presidents Bush and Mitterand possess real power. And does Kohl in Germany or the English prime minister have any less power? Once again, allow me to quote from the Bible. It says: "When a country departs from the law, then it has many heads; yet with a reasonable and wise husband it is lasting..."

[Correspondent] We can see that you are a support of strong authority, but that is precisely what the radicals are now using to alarm our citizens. They feel that strong authority is a springboard to dictatorship.

[Filaret] I favor strong authority, but I am opposed to dictatorship, just as I am opposed to a "democracy" in which there is constant bloodshed. It seems to me that if the situation does not change, then democracy could take on a clearly brownish hue. There have been many examples of that in history.

[Correspondent] But today it is precisely those who call themselves democrats who are using the specter of strong authority to frighten the people.

[Filaret] Well, what can I say... One can hardly suspect the Apostle Paul of championing dictatorship. Yet in his letter to the Romans he wrote: "Let every spirit be subject to higher authorities, for there is no authority which is not of God; if authorities exist they were established by God. For that reason if one resists authority one is resisting something established by God. And those who resist will bring down judgment upon themselves. For those in authority do not threaten good works, but rather evil works. Do you want not to fear authority? Then do good and you will be praised for it, because the person in authority is God's servant, there for your good. If you do evil, then be afraid, for it is not in vain that he carries a sword: he is God's servant, the avenger who punishes evildoers. Therefore it is fitting to obey not just out of fear of punishment, but also out of conscience..."

There you have it: do good!

[Correspondent] What is your opinion of the fact that some very well-known political figures in our country have called for the use of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union? Incidentally, it appears that their appeal has received some attention abroad.

[Filaret] The events in the Baltic republics are, of course, very regrettable, and that has been stated quite clearly by Aleksey II, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. But calling for foreign interference in our internal affairs is simply immoral; it is, one might say, a veiled call for intervention. Economic in nature, yet intervention nonetheless. I would remind you that all types of intervention,

including economic, diplomatic and ideological intervention, are banned by international law and are incompatible with the U.N. Charter. One would have to not love one's Motherland and one's people to do such a thing!

[Correspondent] Can it be regarded as normal that the Orthodox in the Ukraine are divided into two camps? We are referring to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, of which you are head, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which is headed by Metropolitan Mstislav (Skripnik).

[Filaret] There was always one Orthodox Church in the Ukraine, and today there is not a single one of the 15 existing patriarchates which recognizes the autocephalites. Actually, with the exception of a few tens of Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox parishes, all their parishes are located in three oblasts: Ivano-Frankovsk, Lvov and Ternopol. So this church can scarcely be called an all-Ukrainian church.

I think that we should strive for unity, because any interchurch strife leads to a rift in society.

[Correspondent] In conclusion: what is your attitude toward military service?

[Filaret] Positive. The church has always blessed patriotic feelings. Recall the words of the Apostle Paul: "I am willing to be severed from Christ for the sake of my dear brothers in the flesh." I feel that defense of the Fatherland is one of the highest manifestations of love for one's neighbor. That is why we always pray for our military. For there is no greater love than that of one who would lay down his life for his friends. We react negatively to slogan-filled speeches by certain "democrats" aimed at halting induction of young people into the Armed Forces and to decisions in this spirit by certain local organs of authority.

We are prepared to render all possible assistance to sick and wounded soldiers. For instance, we could take the Kiev District Military Hospital under our partial patronage. There are some young people undergoing treatment there whose parents do not even know their whereabouts. The church is willing starting today to begin seeing to improvement in their food and providing medicines to them. We are also willing to help improve the financial status of civilian doctors, nurses and medics. That would be the Christian thing to do, and I am certain that the commanders of Kiev Military District will respond with understanding to our initiative.

[Correspondent] Thank you, Your Reverence, for talking with us. We wish you success in your noble work.

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